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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the MAS Subsystem
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1.0 EXECUTIVE 8UMM/_Y
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL. cbanue 2. PRCBD 40107D. 28
_LV_C___l_1. The IOA approach features a top-down analysis of
the hardware to determine failure modes, criticality, and
potential critical items. To preserve independence, this
analysis was accomplished without reliance upon the results
contained within the NASA FMEA/CIL documentation. This report
documents (Appendix C) the independent analysis results
corresponding to the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System (MAS)
hardware.
The MAS hardware is required for performing critical functions of
crew ingress/egress, air data parameter data acquisition, thermal
protection of the elevon spar, fittings and External Tank (ET)
umbilica_ cavities, communications support via the Tracking and
Data Relay Satellite, target tracking during rendezvous and
proximity operations, access for cargo to the payload bay,
support for the ATCS and enables pressurized control of
unpressurized compartments during transient pressure periods and
environmental control during static pressure periods.
Specifically, the MAS hardware consists of the following
components:
o
o
o
o
o
o
-0
o
o
Air Data Probe (ADP)
Elevon Seal Panel (ESP)
External Tank Umbilical (ETU)
Ku-Band Deploy (KBD)
Payload Bay Doors (PBD)
Payload Bay Radiators (PBR)
Personnel Hatches (PH)
Vent Door Mechanism (VDM)
Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM)
The IOA analysis process utilized avaiiable MAS hardware
drawings and schematics for defining hardware assemblies,
components, and hardware items. Each level of hardware was
evaluated and analyzed for possible failure modes and effects.
Criticality was assigned based upon the severity of the effect
for each failure mode.
Fi_are 1 presents a summary of the failure criticalities for each
of the nine major subdivisions of the MAS. A summary of
the number of failure modes, by criticality, is also presented
below with Hardware (HW) criticality first and Functional (F)
criticality second.
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m
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Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality : 1/1
ADP : 0
ESP : 6
ETU : 23
KBD : 3
PBD : 25
PBR : 0
PH : 1
VDM : 0
SDM : 0
2/IR
0
0
30
6
45
0
0
26
0
2/2
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
0.
3/IR
143
0
0
111
4
14
12
0
6
3/2R
0
0
0
42
2
0
3
0
0
3/3
69
1
2O
37
2O
22
5
1
5
TOTAL
212
7
73
2OO
98
36
21
27
ii
i
i
l
D
I TOTAL = 158 11O713129O147 1180 1 685 1
imp
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify critical items. A summary of
Potential Critical Items (PCIs) is presented as follows:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical items (HW/F)
Criticality :
ADP
ESP
ETU
KBD
PBD
PBR
PH
VDM
SDM
I/i
0
6
23
3
25
0
1
0
0
2/IR
0
0
30
6
45
0
0
26
0
2/2
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
3/IR
143
0
0
ii0
0
0
i0
0
0
3/2R
0
0
0
42
0
0
3
0
0
TOTAL
143
6
53
162
72
0
14
26
0
I TOTAL
4
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Figure 1 - MAS OVERVIEW ANALYSIS SUMMARY
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2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to re-address
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS
Office has undertaken the task of re-evaluating the FMEA/CIL for
the Space Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent
assessment of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL re-evaluation results for
completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The scope of the independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity
encompasses those Shuttle Orbi_ersubs_ys--_ems and GFE hardware _
identified in the Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CILAssessment
Contractor Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses
hardware, functions, internal and external in£er_aceS, and
operational requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The independent analysis approach is a top-down analysis _ _
utilizing as-built drawings to breakdown the respective subsystem
into components and low-level hardware items. Each hardware item
is evaluated for failure mode, effects, and criticality. These
data are documented in the respective subsystem analysis report,
and are used to assess the NASA and Prime_Contractor FMEA/CIL
re-e:valuation results. The IOA analysis approach is summarized in
the following Steps 1.0 through 3.0. Step 4.Osummarizes the _
asse_ssment of the NASA and Prime contractor FMEAs/CiLS to be
performed and documented at a later date.
Step 1.0 Subsystem Familiarization
I.i Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document IOA analysis results
I
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wStep 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
Z.4 MAS Ground Rulos and Assumptions
The MAS ground rules and assumptions used in the IOA are defined
in Appendix B. The subsystem specific ground rules were defined
to limit the analysis to single-failed-parts for each failure
mode. A subset of the "failure mode" and "causes" keywords were
identified for the MAS team. This allowed for commonality in the
analysis results.
w
w
w
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q3 • 0 SUBSYSTEM DESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Funation
The MAS consists of the electrical power, display, control and
mechanism hardware associated with the ADP, ESP, ETU, KBD, PLD,
PBR, PH, VDM and SDM. Figure 2 shows this breakdown. More U
specifically, the MAS consists of the following components:
: : 7_zz Z_ZZ]_ _ _ _ :i = ii
1. The Air Data Probe (ADP) consists of hardware required to U
sense atmospheric conditions and provide digital data
to the GNC subsystem for display and control of the Orbiter
during the Terminal Area Energy Management (below !4K alt-
itude and Mach S) andlanding phase. Pressure data is i
provided below Mach 2.5 to compute angle of attack, accel-
eration, Mach/clean air mass velocity, equivalent and true
airspeed, barometric altitude, and descent rate. Prior to m
this point the flight parameters are computed using inertial
sensed acceleration data and a ground/airborne computed state z
vector. A temperature sensor on the head of the probe was i
designed to provide outside air temperature to be used to
compute the true and equivalent airspeeds. This data is no
longer used by the Orbiter GNC subsystem. =
U
The Mechanical Actuation Assembly consists of a probe
housing mounted to the Orbiter Inner Mold Line and contains
the dual operational redundant three phase AC motors,
reduction gear drive and mechanical linkage required to
rotate the probe mast from its stowed position to its de-
ployed position in the Orbiter air stream. A three position
lever-lock switch for each probe allows the pilot or I
commander to deploy the probe and turn the heaters on if
required. Deployment will occur within 15 seconds with two
motors operating or 30 seconds with only one motor operating, u
The two motors for each probe are powered by seperate Main
AC buses so that any one main AC bus can be used to deploy
at least one ADP. When the probe is fully deployed, a limit
switch is closed which provides feedback to the Motor Control i
Assembly which then removes power from the motors. This same
Motor Control Assembly signal which removes power from the
motors also closes a set of relays that enable the heater
function of the three position switch. All three heaters in
any one probe are powered by the same Forward Power Controller
in the Orbiter. In order to stow either ADP, a separate two
position lever-lock switch must be activated to enable the
stow position of the deploy/heat switch. When fully
stowed, redundant stow limit switches will provide a
signal to the Motor Control Assembly to remove power from
the motors. Reference Figure 3 and Figure 4.
2. Elevons may be deflected from 0 to 40 degrees up
(negative) and 0 to 25 degrees down (positive). As the
elevons traverse the 65 degrees, the Elevon Seal Panels
(ESP) track the elevons and limits heat flow to the
elevon spar and fittings. There are 34 outboard and
6
g
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inboard Elevon Seal Panel linkage mechanisms used to
move the 30 Elevon Seal Panels. The linkage mechanism is
attached to the elevon with a clevis and is attached to
the Elevon Seal Panel with another clevis. Thus the
mechanism is driven by elevon displacement and maintains
appropriate clearances between the edge of the elevon and
the Elevon Seal Panel over the 65 degrees of elevon
movement. Reference Figure 5 and Figure 6.
3. The Orbiter External Tank Umbilical (ETU) Doors
protect the aft Orbiter ET Umbilical Cavities from
aerodynamic heating. The ET Umbilical Cavities contain
the aft Orbiter/ET attachment points, the LOX and LH2
feedlines, and electrical connectors. The two ET
Umbilical Doors are held open during ascent by two
centerline latches.
These latches have to be released before the doors can be
closed. Each door is closed by an actuator and
mechanical linkages. On the inside of each cavity are
three uplock latches which engage three uplock rollers on
each door. The latches prevent the door from vibrating
or re-opening. The Umbilical Doors are closed and.
latched by the crew manually except in the event of an
RTLS or contingency abort when the closure sequence is
done by the GNC software. Reference Figure 7 and Figure
8.
4. The Ku-Band Antenna is utilized to support commun-
ications via the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite
or to support target tracking during rendezvous and
proximity operations. The Ku-Band Deploy (KBD) Mechanism
facilitates the Ku-Band Antenna as it performs these dual
functions. The Deployment Mechanism consists of the
Deployed Assembly, the Deployment Mechanism Subsystem and
the Electronics Assembly 1. The Electronics Assembly is
located in the Forward Avionics Bay 3A. All other
components are located on the Starboard Payload Bay Sill
Longeron at approximately Z=410, X=589, and Y=I00. The
Deployed Assembly consists of the Antenna Dish, Deployed
Electronics Assembly, Gimbal Mechanism, Gimbal Lock
Mechanism, 2 Lock Pins, 2 Motors and 2 Microswitches.
The Deployment Mechanism Subsystem consists of an
Actuator Assembly with 2 motors, differential and gear
box and a Deployment Mechanism with 2 deploy/stow limit
switches, housing, input/output shaft, balls, Hardstop
and Jettison Assembly with guillotine wire cutter and
Structural Separation Systems, and frangible nut/bolt.
Reference Figure 9 and Figure i0.
5. The Payload Bay Doors (PBD) are comprised of left-hand and
right-hand doors hinged at the Orbiter midfuselage and
latched at the forward and aft fuselage bulkheads. The left
and right doors also are latched along the top centerline.
7
The doors are 60 feet long. They are constructed of graphite/
epoxy composite material. The left door weighs 2,375 pounds
and the right door weighs 2,535 pounds. The right door is
heavier because it carries the active centerline latch
mechanisms. The closed PBD provide the aerodynamic fairing
required for the midfuselage and complete the environmental
envelope for the payload bay. The PBD react fuselage l
torsional loads, support their own flight and purge pressure
loadings, and support the radiators.
mm
There are 16 centerline latches, 8 aft bulkhead latches, and
8 forward bulkhead latches which hold the doors in the closed
position. The latches are grouped in gangs Of four. Each gang
has its own pair of actuating motors, gearbox and drive mechan-
ism.
The PaYload Bay Doors Mechanicai sUbsystem consists of three u
parts. These are the Centerline Latch Mechanism, the Bulkhead
Latch Mechanism, and the Door Drive. Reference Figure ii and =_
Figure 12. _ _ _ ....... =
6. The Payload Bay Radiator (PBR) Deploy Mechanism provides
the capability to release, deploy, stow and latch the two
forward port and starboard radiator panels on the Payload
Bay Doors. The Deploy Mechanism consists of (1) a latch
system and (2) a deployment syst_em. The Latch and
Deployment Mechanisms are located on the Payload Bay
Doors while the Passive Latch Rollers and the Radiator
Hinge Plates are on the radiator panels.
Each deployable radiator is secured to the PBD in the
stowed position by six ganged latches. One latch PDU on
each panel contains two 3-phase motors used to latch or
release the six latches/panel simultaneously. PDU motor
output drives, via torque shafts, three rotary actuators
on each panel. As the torque shaft rotates, the rotary
actuator arm is displaced 53 degrees. This rotational
displacement drives two iatch hookS, connected to the
actuator arm by push rods, bellcranks and links, to the
latch or release state.
Z
The Radiator Deployment System consists of PDUs (one per
side), torque shafts, rotary actuators (two per panel),
deployment cranks and connecting links. Deployment
PDUs, torque shafts and rotary actuators are basically
the same as in the Latch System except for rotational
displacement of the rotary actuator which is 92 degrees
during deployment operations. This rotational
displacement is applied to a deployment crank attached to
the output arm of the Rotary Actuator, which drives the
Radiator Panel to a deployed or stowed state. A
deployment mechanism disconnect feature allows for manual
disconnect of the Deployment Crank by EVA crewman in the
event of a failed radiator. Reference Figure 13 through
Figure 20.
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w7. The Personnel Hatches (PH) allow crew and service personnel
ingress and egress capability to the Orbiter. There are
three hatches, the Ingress/Egress Hatch, which allows access
to the Orbiter, and two Airlock H_tches, which allow access
to the airlock and payload bay. All three hatches are on the
middeck and are of a similar design.
Each of the three hatches cqnsist of the following hardware:
Actuator, Hatch Crank, Latches, O-Rings, and Purge Ports. In
addition to the above hardware the Entry Hatch has a 10 inch
viewport. The crank will rotate 450 degrees clockwise and
counterclockwise. When the crank is rotated the actuator
opens and closes the latches. The Entry Hatch has 18 latches
and the Airlock Hatches have 6. These latches pull the hatch
flush with the bulkhead and the O-rings form an airtight seal
(see figure 24). The Purge Ports equalize the pressure be-
tween the two sides of the hatch. This allows the hatch to
be easily opened. Reference Figure 21 through Figure 24.
8. The Vent Door Mechanism (VDM) enables pressure control of
unpressurized compartments during transient pressure
periods and environmental control during static pressure
periods. There are eighteen doors which the Door
Mechanism actuates electromechanically. The doors
provide pressure and environmental control for the
Forward RCS, Forward Fuselage Plenum, Mid Fuselage,
Payload Bay, Aft Fuselage, Vertical Fin, OMS Pods and
Wheel Wells. The Door Mechanism consists of 24 inde-
pendently powered three-phase AC motors, connected via
a differential gearbox and torque shaft/slip clutch
to bellcranks, linkages, rod assembly with bolts, nuts,
washers, cotterpins, microswitch position indicators,
etc. Reference Figure 25 through Figure 27.
9. The Startracker Door Mechanism (SDM) enables an aperature
in the orbiter skin on orbit in the Y & Z axis and
provides protection for the Startracker and compartment
during ascent and entry. The two doors are actuated
electro-mechanically. Each Door Mechanism consists of
two independently powered three-phase AC motors connected
via a differential gearbox/traln, actuator output and
limit switches to either the Y or Z door. Reference
Figure 28 and Figure 29.
--o
1
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The MAS interfaces with many onboard Orbiter systems including
the Active Thermal Control System (ATCS), Air Surface Controls
used for guidance and control, Crew, Guidance and Navigation,
Communication and Tracking, Data Processing System, Electrical
Power Display & Control, Elevons, External Tank Umbilical Door,
Guidance & Navigation, and Purge, Vent & Drain Doors.
9
The MAS hardware is located throughout the Orbiter and interfaces
prinarily with the structure, electrical power, display and
controls. The Air Data Probe and Startracker Door are
located forward of the crew cabin. Personnel Hatches provide
ingress/egress to the crew cabin. Ku-Band Deployment Mechanism,
Payload Bay Doors, and the Payload Bay Radiator Deployment
Mechanism are located in the Payload Bay. Purge, Vent and Drain
Doors are located on each side of the Orbiter. The Elevon Seal
Panels are located on top of each wing. ET Umbilical Doors are
on the bottom side of the Orbiter.
3.3 Hiezszohy
FigAlre 2 illustrates the hierarchy of the MAS hardware and
the corresponding subcomponents. Figures 3 through 23 comprise
the detailed system representation.
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Figure 18 - RADIATOR LATCH HOOK MECHANISM
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Figure 19 - PLB RADIATOR EPD&C
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Figure 22 - INGRESS/EGRESS HATCH
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Figure 25 - VENT DOOR MECHANISM
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Figure 26 - VENT DOOR MECHANISM LOCATION
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Figure 28 - STARTRACKER DOOR MECHANISM
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4• 0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table I presents a summary of
the failure criticalities for each of the nine major subdivisions
of the MAS. Further discussion of each of these subdivisions
and the applicable failure modes is provided in subsequent
paragraphs.
4 +
u
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HW/F)
Criticality :
ADP
ESP
ETU
KBD
PBD
PLR
PH
VDM
SDM
z/1
0
6
23
3
25
0
1
0
0
2/IR
0
0
30
6
45
0
0
26
0
2/2
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
3/IR
143
0
0
iii
4
14
12
0
6
3/2R
0
0
0
42
2
0
3
0
0
313
69
1
2O
37
2O
22
5
1
5
TOTAL
212
7
73
2OO
98
36
21
27
ii
mmm_B_E1
I TOTAL : 158 I lov I 3 I 2901 4v I 18ol 685
4 ..---- .......
Of the 685 failure modes analyzed, 58 failures were determined to
result in loss of crew or vehicle, and ii0 were determined to
result in loss of mission. A summary of the Potential Critical
Items is presented in Table II. Appendix D presents a cross-
reference between each Potential Critical Item (PCI) and a
specific worksheet in Appendix C.
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality :
ADP
ESP
ETU
KBD
PBD
PLR
PH
VDM
SDM
1/1
0
6
23
: 3
: 25
: 0
: l
: 0
: 0
2/IR
0
0
30
6
45
0
0
26
0
2/2
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
0
0
3/IR
143
0
0
ii0
0
0
I0
0
0
3/2R
0
0
0
42
0
0
3
0
0
TOTAL
143
6
53
162
72
0
14
26
0
I TOTAL : I 58 I 1071 3 I 263 I 45 I 476 I
-t '1-
The scheme for assigning IOA analysis (Appendix C) worksheet
numbers is shown in Table III.
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TABLE III IOA Worksheet Numbers
IOA ID Number
Component MECH EPD&C
ADP
ESP
ETU
KBD
PBD
PBR
PH
VDM
SDM
MAS-II01 to MAS-III2
MAS-2100 to MAS-2106
MAS-3101 to MAS-3144
MAS-4101 to MAS-4113
MAS-5101 to MAS-5179
MAS-6101 to MAS-6302
MAS-7100 to MAS-7120
MAS-8100 to MAS-8109
MAS-9100 to MAS-9108
MAS-1500 to MAS-1699
NA
MAS-3501 to MAS-3529
MAS-4500 to MAS-4687
MAS-5501 to MAS-5519
MAS-6501 to MAS-6510
NA
MAS-8501 to MAS-8517
MAS-9500 to MAS-9501
4.1 Analysis Results - Air Data Probe
....The ADP analysisexaminedthe components required £0
deploy the Orbiter Air Data Probes. The analysis
identified Ii failure modes and 212 worksheets were
generated. The analysis results identified 143 PCIs
and these are listed in Appendix D.
4.2 Analysis Results-- E_leyon Seal Panel
4.3
The ESP analysis examined the components of the 34 outboard
and inboard ESP linkage mechanisms. The analysis identified
7 failure modes and 7 worksheets were generated. The
analysis results identified 6 PcIS and these are iisted in
Appendix D.
Analysis Results - External Tank Umbilical
4.4
The ETU analysis examined the components required to
protect the Orbiter ET Umbilical Cavities from entry
heating. The analysis identified 23 failure modes and
73 worksheets were generated. The analysis results
identified 53 PCIs and these are listed in Appendix D.
Analysis Results - Ku Band Deploy
The KBD analysis examined the components required to deploy/
stow the Ku-Band Antenna. The analysis identified potential
failure modes and 200 worksheets were generated. The
analysis results identified 162 PCIs and these are listed in
Appendix D.
4.5 Analysis Results - Payload Bay Doors
The PBD analysis examined the components used to open and
close the Payload Bay Doors. The analysis identified 27
failure modes and 98 worksheets were generated. The analysis
results identified 72 PCIs and these are listed in Appendix D.
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4.7
4.8
4.9
Analysis Results - Payload Bay Radiators
The PBR analysis examined the components involved in
latching and releasing, and deploying and stowing the
Payload Bay Radiators. The analysis identified 18 failure
modes and 36 worksheets were generated. The analysis
results identified no PCIs.
Analysis Results - Personnel Hatches
The PH analysis examined the possible failures in the
components used to open and close the personnel hatches.
The analysis identified 8 failure modes and 21 work-
sheets were generated. There were 14 PCIs identified
and these are listed in Appendix D.
Analysis Results - Vent Doo{ Mechanism
The VDM analysis examined the components involved in opening
/closing the Active Vent Doors and providing purge control
via these vent ports. The analysis identified 10 potential
failure modes and 27 worksheets were generated. The
analysis results identified 26 PCIs and these are listed in
Appendix D.
Analysis Results - Startracker Door
The SDM analysis examined the components required to open/
close the Startracker Doors. The analysis identified
potential failure modes and 11 worksheets were generated.
The analysis results identified no PCIs.
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5.0 I_FII_NCEB
Reference documentation available from NASA and Rockwell was used
in the analysis. The documentation used includes the following:
I. JSC-18341
2. JSC-18863
3. JSC-08934
Mechanical Systems Console Handbook,
Volume I, 3-1-85 & Volume II, 2-28-85.
Shuttle Operations, Guidance Navigation
& Control, 9-30-85.
Shuttle Operational Data Book Rev. D,
10-1-84.
4. VS70-971102 Integrated System Schematic Rev. D,
9-28-85.
5. JSC-12770 Shuttle Flight Operations Manual,
Volume 2, Electrical Power Systems,
11-28-84.
6. Jsc-i2820 sTS Operational Fiight Rules, Final
PCN-I, 4-16-87.
7. JSC-II174 Space Shuttle System Handbook, Rev. C,
DCN-5, 9-13-85.
8. V72 Vol III Operations and Maintenance Requirements
and Specification Document - Orbiter
OMRS D.
9. VS70-973099 Integrated System Schematic, Rev. AI0,
10-17-85.
I0. SD72-SH-0102-12 Requirements/Definition Document
Rendezvous Radar Deployment Mechanisms
Volume 2-12, 11-1-75.
ii. VS72-956099 Integrated System Schematic, Mechanical
& Payload Systems, 2-11-85.
12. NSTS 22206 Instructions for Preparation of Failure
Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and
Critical Items List (CIL), change 2,
PRCBD 40107D, 3-28-87.
13. STRK/COAS 2102 Star Tracker/Crew Optical Alignment
Sight Workbook, 9-30-83.
14. VS70-590509 Schematic Diagram- Active Vent Door
Subsystem, Rev-C, 1-17-85.
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ACRONYMS
1
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w
AC - Alternating Current
ADP - Air Data Probe
AOA - Abort Once Around
ATCS - Active Thermal Control System
ATO - Abort To Orbit
BLKHD - Bulkhead
- Critical Item
- Critical Items List
- Center Line
- Criticality
- Data Processing System
- Elevon Seal Panel
- External Tank
- External Tank Umbilical
- ETU Door
- Extravehicular Activity
- Functional
- Failure Mode
CI
CIL
CL
CRIT
DPS
ESP
ET
ETU
ETUD
EVA
F
FM
FMEA
GFE
GN&C
HW
IOA
KBD
LRU
MAS
MDAC
MTR
NA
NASA
NSTS
- Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
- Government Furnished Equipment
- Guidance, Navigation and Control
- Hardware
- Independent Orbiter Assessment
- Ku-Band Deploy
- Line Replaceable Unit
- Mechanical Actuation System
- McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
- Motor
- Not Applicable
- National Aeronautics and Space Administration
- National Space Transportation System
OMRSD - Operational Maintenance Requirements and
Specifications Document
OMS
PCI
PDU
PH
PLB
PBD
PBR
RI
RM
RPC
RS
RTLS
- Orbital Maneuvering System
- Potential Critical Item
- Power Drive Unit
- Personnel Hatches
- Payload Bay
- Payload Bay Doors
- Payload Bay Radiator
- Rockwell International
- Redundancy Management
- Remote Power Controller
- Redundant Set
- Return To Landing Site
1
A-I
SDM
SM
STS
SW
TAL
TD
THC
TLC
VDC
VDM
- Startracker Door Mechanism
- Systems Management
- Space Transportation System
- switch
- Transatlantic Abort Landing
- Touch Down
- Translational Hand Controller
- Torque Limit Clutch
- Volts Direct Current
- Vent Door Mechanism
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B.I
B.2
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Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.1 Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206. Instructions Fo_PreDaration
of FMF___A/CIL, I0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight ........
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
CREDIBLE _CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARI,Y M_SSION TERMINATION - termination of on-orbit phase prior
to planned end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
hig_iest criticality
HIG_[EST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(0pE:)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISS/_0_ - assigned performanceof a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or event of all units which performa necessary (critical)
function
OF_-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard malfunction procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
pRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up and ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
Q_0RBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at transition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
B-3
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DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, _Dstructions for
Preparation cf FMEA/CIL. 10 October 1986, was employed with the
following amplifications and additions.
1 The operational flight software is anaccurate
implementation of the Flight System SoftWare Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this _task.
2. After !iftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
Warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
3. Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown. _....._........
RATIONALE: Mission dataverification is out-of-scope of
this task.
e
o
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications/drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail.
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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B.3 _-Speciflc Ground Rules and AssumptLons
The IOA analysis was performed to the component or assembly level
of the Orbiter Mechanical Actuation System. The analysis
considered the worst case effects of the hardware or functional
failure on the subsystem, mission, and Crew and vehicle safety.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the IOA analysis worksheets employed during
the analysis of the Mechanical Actuation System. The information
on these worksheets is intentionally similar to the FMEA's
written by Rockwell and the NASA. Each of these sheets
identifies the item being analyzed, and parent assembly, as well
as the function. For each failure mode, the possible causes are
outlined, and the assessed hardware and functional criticality
for each mission phase is listed, as described in the Rockwell
Desk Instructions 100-2G. Finally, effects are entered at the
bottom of each sheet, and the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
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LEGEND FOR IOA ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities :
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission
3 = Non loss of life or vehicle or mission
Functional Criticalities :
1R = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant identical hardware components or redundant
functional paths all of which, if failed, could cause
loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A :
1 I Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 - Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
4 - Do Not Know
Redundancy Screens B and C :
P = Passed Screen
F _ Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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AIR DATA PROBE _ALYSIS WORKSHEETS
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MDAC-ID
ii01 *
1102 *
1103 *
1104 *
1105 *
1106 *
1107 *
1108 *
1109
Iii0
iiii
1112
1500 *
1501 *
1502 *
1503 *
1504 *
1505 *
1506 *
1507 *
1508
i509 *
1510
1511 *
1512
1513 *
1514
1515 *
1516 *
1517
1518 *
1519
1520 *
1521
1522 *
1523
1524 *
1525
1526 *
1527
1528
1529
1530
1531
1532 *
AIR DATA PROBE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/1R 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/1R 3/1R P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/1R 3/1R P F P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/IR P F P
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/1R 3/1R P F P
MOTOR
GEARBOX
GEARBOX
PRESSURE LINE
PROBE
PROBE
SHAFT
SHAFT
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH
STOW MICROSWITCH
STOW MICROSWITCH
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
CONTACT #1
CONTACT #I
CONTACT #2
CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #I
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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AIR DATA PROBE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC- I D H/F H/F A B C
1533; * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1534 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1535 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1536 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1537 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1538 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1539 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1540 3/3 3/3 ........
1541. * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1542, 3/3 3/3
154._; * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1544 313 313
1545 * 311R 311R P F P
1546 3/3 3/3
1547 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1548 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1549 3/3 3/3
1550 * 311R 3/IR P Y P
1551. 3/3 3/3
155;: * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
155_ 3/3 3/3
1554, * 3/IR" 311R P F P
1555 3/3 3/3
1556 * 3/1R 3/IR P F P
1557 3/3 3/3 ...............
1558 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1559 3/3 3/3
1560 3/3 3/3
156_. 313 3/3
156:_ 3/3 3/3
1563 3/3 3/3
156_L * 311R 311R__ :_P:_:FP
1565 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1566 * 3/IR 3/iR P F P
1567 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1568 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1569 3/3 3/3
1570 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1572. 3/3 3/3
1572 * 3/1R 3/IR P F P
1573 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1574 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1575 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1576 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
157_, 3/3 3/3
(*) Potential Critical Items.
ITEM NAME
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+2sv cONTACT #3....
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+2sv c6_T_CT #1
+28V CONTACT #1
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2 _ J
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+2sv CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #1
+2 8-V CONTACT #
+28V CONTACT #2
CONTACT #i
CONTACT #i
CONTACT .....#2
CONTACT #2
INVERTEDAND GATE
INVERTED AND GATE
INVERTED AND GATE
INVERTED AND GATE
INVERTED AND GATE
INVERTED AND GATE
INVERTED AND GATE
INVERTED AND GATE
RELAY DRIVER
RELAY DRIVER
RELAY DRIVER
RELAY DRIVER
RELAY DRIVER
RELAY DRIVER
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AIR DATA PROBE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT ABORT
MDAC-ID H/F H/F
mwmm_
1578 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1579 3/3 3/3
1580 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1581 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1582 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1583 * 3/IR 3/iR P F P
1584 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1585 3/3 3/3
1586 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1587 3/3 3/3
1588 3/3 3/3
1589 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1590 3/3 3/3
1591 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1592 3/3 3/3
1593 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1594 3/3 3/3
1595 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1596 3/3 3/3
1597 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1598 313 313
1599 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1600 3/3 3/3
1601 * 3/IR 3/iR P F P
1602 3/3 3/3
1603 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1604 3/3 3/3
1605 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1606 3/3 3/3
1607 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1608 3/3 3/3
1609 * 3/IR 3/1R P F P
1610 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1611 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1612 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1613 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1614 3/3 3/3
1615 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1616 3/3 3/3
1617 * 3/IR 3/1R P F P
1618 3/3 3/3
1619 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1620 3/3 3/3
1621 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1622 3/3 3/3
REDUNDANCY
SCREENS
ABC
(*) Potential Critical Items.
ITEM NAME
RELAY DRIVER
RELAY DRIVER
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
AND GATE
AND GATE
TIME DELAY
TIME DELAY
SOLID STATE DRIVER
SOLID STATE DRIVER
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
REMOTEPOWER CONTROLLER
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
SWITCH RELAY
SWITCH RELAY
LATCH RELAY
LATCH RELAY
EMI FILTER
EMI FILTER
OP AMP
OPAMP
REGULATOR
REGULATOR
GENERATOR
GENERATOR
CLOCK
CLOCK
+Q TRANSISTOR
+Q TRANSISTOR
-Q TRANSISTOR
-Q TRANSISTOR
TRANSFORMER
TRANSFORMER
+IOV AMP
+I0V AMP
-10V AMP
m
C-5
AIR DATA PROBE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC-ID H/F H/F A B C
1623 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1624 3/3 3/3
1625 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1626 3/3 3/3
1627 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1628 3/3 3/3
1629 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1630 3/3 3/3
1631 3/3 3/3
1632 3/3 3/3
1633 3/3 3/3
1634 3/3 3/3
1635 3/3 3/3
1636 3/3 3/3
1637 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1638 3/3 = 3/3 I i _ i
1639 * 3/IR 3/!R P F P
1640 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1641 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1642 ..... 3/3 .... 3/3
1643 3/3 3/3
1644 3/3 3/3
1645 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1646 3/3 3/3
1647 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1648 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1649 * 3/IR 3/1R P F P
1650 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1651 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1652 * 3/IR 3/IR_ P F P
1653 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1654 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1655 * 3/IR 3/1 _ P F P
1656 * 3/iR 3/IR PF P
1657 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1658 * 3/!R 3/1R P F P
1659 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1660 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1661 * 3/1R 3/IR P F P
1662 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1663 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1664 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1665 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1666 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1667 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
(*) Potential Critical Items.
ITEM NAME
-10V AMP
+10V TRANSISTOR
+I0V TRANSISTOR
-10V TRANSISTOR
-10V TRANSISTOR
PO_R SUPPLY TEST AMP
POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP
AMP
AMP
AMP
AMP
THERMISTER THERMOMETER
THERMISTER THERMOMETER
FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTOR
FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTOR
CON OL crac T
CONTROL CIRCUIT
READ ONLY MEMORY
READ ONLY MEMORY
TRANSDUCER TEMP AMP
TRANSDUCER TEMP AMP
AMP
AMp _
TRANSISTOR
TRANS I S TOR
AND GATE
AND GATE
SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER
SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER
BINARY COUNTER
BINARY COUNTER
ADDRESSABLE SWITCH
ADDRESSABLE SWITCH
AMp
SWITCHING LADDER
SWITCHING LADDER
POLARITY DETECTOR
POLARITY DETECTOR
CONTROL LOGIC
CONTROL LOGIC
REGISTER
REGISTER
DISCREET INPUT BUFFER
DISCREET INPUT BUFFER
C-6
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AIR DATA PROBE ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
1668 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1669 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1670 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1671 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1672 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1673 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1674 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1675 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1676 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1677 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1678 * 3/IR 3/1R P F P
1679 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1680 * 3/IR 3/1R P F P
1681 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1682 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1683 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1684 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1685 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1686 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1687 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1688 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1689 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1690 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1691 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1692 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1693 * 3/IR 3/IR P F P
1694 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1695 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1696 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1697 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1698 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
1699 * 3/1R 3/1R P F P
ITEM NAME
SERIAL/PARALLEL CONVERTER
SERIAL/PARALLEL CONVERTER
OS C I LLATOR
OS C I LLATOR
2 MH2 CLOCK
2 MH2 CLOCK
1 MH2 CLOCK
1 MH2 CLOCK
500 MH2 CLOCK
500 MH2 CLOCK
COUNTER
COUNTER
OR GATE
OR GATE
SENSOR WINDOW GENERATOR
SENSOR WINDOW GENERATOR
BUFFER
BUFFER
OUTPUT CONTROL
OUTPUT CONTROL
ENCODER
ENCODER
AMP
AMP
CPU
CPU
SELECTOR LOGIC
SELECTOR LOGIC
READ ONLY MEMORY
ROM
READ/WRITE MEMORY
READ/WRITE MEMORY
u
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS W()RKSHEET
DATE-.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/11/87
MECH/ADP
ii01
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM."
FAILURE MODE :
MOTOR
FAILS TO OPERATE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3 ) MECHANICAL
4)
5) ....
6)
v)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: /
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
MA. ADS. MTR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF MOTOR WILL CAUSE PROBE TO DEPLOY ON ONE MOTOR.
[]
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R
REFERENCES: l
l
l
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-8
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: GEARBOX
FAILURE MODE: JAMMED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
MECHANICAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
/
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
MA.ADS.GB
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBE WILL NOT DEPLOY.
REFERENCES".
n
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/11/87
MECH/ADP
1103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAII_RE MODE:
GEARBOX
BROKEN GEAR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BRE_DOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
MECHANICAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/!R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 .....
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION. •
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
MA. ADS. GB
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRU_L FAILURE ..........
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBE WILL NOT DEPLOY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/11/87
MECH/ADP
1104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE LINE
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
MECHANICAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
MA.ADS.PL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LEAKAGE OF THE PRESSURE LINE WILL RESULT IN INCORRECT PRESSURES
BEING RECEIVED BY THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
u
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-II
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 6/1 i/8 7
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: PROBE
FAI_/RE MODE: JAMMED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAI.<DOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
MECHANICAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/iR
TAL: 3/1R
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: /
-REDi_DANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MA. ADS. PRB
CAUSES : PIECE-PART STRU_L_ILURE .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROBE WILL NOT DEPLOY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/11/8v
MECH/ADP
1106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
PROBE
CLOGGED PORT
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PRESSURE ASSEMBLY
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
MECHANICAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
MA.ADS.PRB
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BLOCKAGE OF THE PROBE PRESSURE PORTS WILL RESULT IN INCORRECT
PRESSURES BEING RECEIVED BY THE ADTAS.
u
z
m
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: SHAFT
FAILURE MODE: BROKEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
MECHANICAL
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/1R
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
i
LOCATION: FORWARD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: MA. ADS. SHF
CAU$:ES : PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
c[P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PRO_E WILL NOT DEPLOY.
u
z
i
I
i
i
I
m
m
N
i
mm
m
l
I
!
R
,,m
i
REFERENCES :
: =
i
i
mR
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-14
J
m
HI
w1
u
unto
w
w
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/11/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP
MDAC ID: 1108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: SHAFT
FAILURE MODE: BENT
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) MECHANICAL
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: /
3/3
A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
MA.ADS.SHF
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAI_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL CAUSE PROBE TO DEPLOY AT AN INCORRECT ATTITUDE. THIS WILL
IN TURN CAUSE INCORRECT PRESSURES TO BE SENT TO THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-15
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/24/87
MECH/ADP
1109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BP_XDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
MECHANICAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ADS .MCH.MS. DEP
] c [ ]
CAUSES : PIECE-PART STRU_LFAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
DISPLAYS WILL SHOW THAT AIR DATA PROBE IS ALWAYS DEPLOYED.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/24/87
MECH/ADP
iii0
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT-.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
4)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
MECHANICAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD FUSELAGE
ADS.MCH.MS.DEP
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DISPLAYS WILL NEVER SHOW THAT AIR DATA PROBE IS DEPLOYED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-17
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
L
7124187
MECHIADP
Iiii
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT-.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STOW MICROSWITCH
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
MECHANICAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDWI FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF : / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT : / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING : 3/3
RED[_DANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO_%TION: FORWARD FUSELAGE
PAR[_ NUMBER: ADS.MCH.MS.STW
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DISPLAYS WILL SHOW THAT AIR DATA PROBE IS ALWAYS STOWED.
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7124187
MECHIADP
1112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STOW MICROSWITCH
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) MECHANICAL
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: ADS. MCH. MS. STW
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DISPLAYS WILL NEVER SHOW THAT AIR DATA PROBE IS STOWED.
w
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-19
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/24/'87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1500
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITF2[:
FAILURE MODE :
+28V CONTACT #I
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BRE_DOWNHIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
7) DEPLOY POSITION
8)
9)
CRiTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _
RED[mDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PAR_ NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRU_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ]'MMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE _COMMANDED
DEPLOYME_OF_I_ DATA-P;[OBE. .......... _ _ _ _ _ _.....
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
FROM DEPLOYING.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE PROBE
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-21
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BRE_KDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN2
CAU_ES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
DEPSOYMENT OF AIR DATA PROBE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECHIADP/EPD&C
1503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
FROM DEPLOYING.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE PROBE
i
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-23
i
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/iR
ITEM:
FAII_rREMODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BRE_/q)OWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
7) DEPLOY POSITION
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIF--TOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND_ONTROL P_L C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN3
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAI_S COULD CAUSE UNCO_DED
DEPI_YMENT OF AIR DATA PROBE. _
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-24
mm
=INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7124/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1505
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/iR
3/IR
/
C[P]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
FROM DEPLOYING.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE PROBE
m
REFERENCES:
=
w
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESS_NT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WO_SHEET
DATE :
SUBSYST_:
_AC ID:
7/24/87
_CH/ADP/EPD&C
1506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
3/IR
3/IR
ITS:
FAIL_ MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAI_ SHORTED
_D _ALYST: A.D. MO_GO_RY SUBSYS _AD: H.J. _RY
BREakDOWN HIE_CHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_C_ICAL AC_ATION SYST_
AIR DATA SUBSYST_
ET._.CTRICAL
DISP_Y _D CONTRO_
SWITCHES
RIG_ AIR DATA PROBE
DEP_Y POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT
P_UNCH: / ..... RT_:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/_C
3/iR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
_CATION: DISP_Y _D CONTROL P_EL C3
P_T _BER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN4
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T S_U_L FAIL_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
DEPIDYMENTOFAIR DATA PROBE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5 ) SWITCHES
6) RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
7) DEPLOY POSITION
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
FROM DEPLOYING.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE PROBE
REFERENCES:
w
z
m
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w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-27
DATZ_:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1508
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
IT_E:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #1
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BRE;_d<DOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELE_ICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
7) DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
/
LIPTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CNI
c C ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFeCTS/RATIONALE:
NO [_FFECT._ _ _ _
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1509
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC"
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #i
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
7) DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
8)
9)
q
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING; 3/3
HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/1R
TAL: 3/1R
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
u
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-29
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
1510 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: AoD. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: ..... 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECHIADP/EPD&C
1511
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-31
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1512
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #3
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAYING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
_: =
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1513
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
i
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-33
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1514
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
7) DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: /
REDTmDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND cONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN4
c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ]EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1515
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
S/IR
3/IR
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.DEP.CN4
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1516
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
ELE_ICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/1R ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOC_TION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS. DC. SW. RP. STW. CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOWAGE OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECHIADP/EPD&C
1517
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RP.STW.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-37
DATE :
SUBS YSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/24/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT:
1518 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
7) STOW POSITION
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR k
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS. DC. SW.RP. STW. CN2
C [ P ]
CAUE:ES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ]IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
sTo_rAGE OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCO_DED
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-38
m
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1519
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RP.STW.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
W
w
w
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-39
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7124187
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1520
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
/
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
RED[_DANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RP.STW.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE ......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOWA_ Oq_PROBE. =
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
I
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REFERENCES:
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U
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-40
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7124187
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1521
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RP.STW.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1522
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
7) STOW POSITION
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/1R
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS .DC .SW. RP .STW .CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ]IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STO_GE OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE _COMMANDED
u
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REFERENCES :
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w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-42
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1523
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RP.STW.CN4
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
i
REFERENCES:
w
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-43 < " _-_
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 7/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC I D: 1524
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #i
FAII_RE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEA[) ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4) DIsP_Y AND CONTROLS
5 ) SWITCHES
6) RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
7) ENABLE POSITION
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PAR_ NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RPS.EN.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ]iMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOWAGE OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
I
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REFERENCES:
l
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-44
i
m
i
L_
m
i
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1525
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
ENABLE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RPS.EN.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOW PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE FAILURE TO
REFERENCES".
w
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-45
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/8v
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1526
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREakDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
ENABLE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
/
RED[_DANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCI_ION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RPS.EN.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
c[p]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ]IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOWAGE OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-46
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7124187
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1527
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
ENABLE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] S[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION. "
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RPS.EN.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOW PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE FAILURE TO
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-47
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1528
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTACT #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
7) INHIBIT POSITION
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
RE_JNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LO_%TION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RPS.IN.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-48
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/8v
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1529
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTACT #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
INHIBIT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RPS.IN.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-49
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1530
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
INHIBIT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOC_ TION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.RPS.IN.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/-25/87 C-50
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1531
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
7) INHIBIT POSITION
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/3
/ TAL: 3/3
/ AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: /
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.RPS.IN.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-51
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1532
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #I
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
DEPLOYMENT OF AIR DATA PROBE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-52
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1533
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
FROM DEPLOYING.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE PROBE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-53
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1534
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BRF2d(DOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
RE_rNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCI_ION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO J[MMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
DEPLOYMENT OF AIR DATA PROBE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-54
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1535
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
FROM DEPLOYING.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE PROBE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-55
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECHIADP/EPD&C
1536
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
CRITI_ALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PA_T NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
DEPLOYMENT OF AIR DATA PROBE.
REFERENCES:
REI<)RT DATE 11/25/87 C-56
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1537
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA!
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
/
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
FROM DEPLOYING.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE PROBE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-57
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/24/sv
MECHIADP/EPD&C
1538
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: /
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PAR? NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ZMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
DEPLOYMENT OF AIR DATA PROBE.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-58
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1539
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY POSITION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF :
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.DEP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
FROM DEPLOYING.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT THE PROBE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-59
=mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7124187
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1540
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREakDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER : ADS. DC •SW. LP •DH. CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-60
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1541
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #I
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
_DING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: /
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.DH.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-61
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/sv
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1542
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DH.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-62
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
v/24/s7
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1543
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.DH.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 1 i/25/87 C-63
ms
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1544
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c C ]
LOCATION. "
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW. LP.DH.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-64
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1545
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.DH.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-65
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1546
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREakDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
RED[_DANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DH.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-66
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7124187
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1547
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
DEPLOY/HEAT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.DH.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES".
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-67
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1548
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAIIb-RE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREakDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS. DC. SW. LP. STW. CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STO_rAGE OF THE PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-68
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1549
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.STW.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-69
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1550
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2
FAII_JRE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BRE_DOWNHIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
/
C[P]
LOC;_ION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.STW.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO ]iMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STO_GE OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
REFERENCES :
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-70
_m
z
_m
=
u
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1551
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.STW.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
r_
B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-71
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/24/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1552
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
Z
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
7) STOW POSITION
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
3/IR
3/IR
/
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.STW.CN3
C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOWAGE OF THE PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
m
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REFERENCES:
m
u
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-72
U
u
m
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w
m
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1553
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
SUBSYS LEAD: H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.STW.CN3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRU_RAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-73
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/24/sv
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1554
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: AoD. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
\
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/1R
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW. LP.STW.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOWAGE OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
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I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1555
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.STW.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
u
w
REFERENCES:
u
2
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-75
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/8v
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1556
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #I
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
RIGHT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
ENABLE POSITION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.EN.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOWAGE OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
REFERENCES:
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I
M
wir
i
J
1
u
n
L
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1557
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) LEFT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
7) ENABLE POSITION
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.EN.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOW PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE FAILURE TO
REFERENCES:
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u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-77
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7124187
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1558
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
ENABLE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/1R
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.EN.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOWAGE OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1559
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
ENABLE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.EN.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOW PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE FAILURE TO
w REFERENCES:
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-79
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1560
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
_FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTACT #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
INHIBIT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.IN.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1561
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTACT #1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
INHIBIT POSITION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/3
/ TAL: 3/3
/ AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: /
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.IN.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
w
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-81
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1562
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: HoJ. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
INHIBIT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
ADS.DC.SW.LP.IN.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-82
wn
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/24/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1563
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
LEFT AIR DATA PROBE STOW
INHIBIT POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL C3
PART NUMBER: ADS.DC.SW.LP.IN.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
W
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-83
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEMz
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1564
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTED AND GATE
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MEC_ICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY #1
CRITICALiTIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.DEI.IAG
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILU_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
PROBE DEPLOYMENT.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1565
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTED AND GATE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY #1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.DEI.IAG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE PROBE.
REFERENCES:
W
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-85
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/31/8v
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1566
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTED AND GATE
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
311R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.DE2.IAG
c[p]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRU__FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
PROBE DEPLOYMENT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/31/sv
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1567
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTED AND GATE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
B)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.DE2.IAG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE PROBE.
REFERENCES:
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i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-87
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1568
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTED AND GATE
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
STOW #i
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/iR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.STI.IAG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE .....
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
STOWAGE OF PROBE.
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT:
1569 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTED AND GATE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
STOW #1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.MCA.STI.IAG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWING THE
PROBE.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-89
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECHIADP/EPD&C
1570
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTED AND GATE
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
STOW #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/!R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _-_ _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.ST2.IAG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURKL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
STOWAGE OF PROBE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1571
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTED AND GATE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
STOW #2
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/3
/ TAL: 3/3
/ AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: /
3/3
A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.MCA.ST2.IAG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE OF
PROBE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-91
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131187
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1572
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWI_NC
311R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY DRIVER
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY #I
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/!R _
311R
/
B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS. MCA. DE 1. RD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
PROBE_DEPLO_NT.
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REFERENCES: I
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-92
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u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1573
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY: _
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY #1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.MCA.DEI.RD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE PROBE.
D
REFERENCES:
=
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-93
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1574
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY DRIVER
FAILS SHORTED
±
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
4)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS :
LI FTOFF : / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.DE2.RD
c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
PROBE DEPLOYMENT.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
m
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REFERENCES:
m
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-94
m
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i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131/87
MECHIADPIEPD&C
1575
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.MCA.DE2.RD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREENT DEPLOYMENT
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-95
i
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87
MECHIADP/EPD&C
1576
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY DRIVER
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
STOW #i
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT_ 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.MCA.STI.RD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOWAGE OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-96
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1577
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
STOW #i
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B E ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.STI.RD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
r
i
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-97
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1578
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY DRIVER
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
STOW #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: FoRW_D AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.ST2.RD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOWAGE OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCO_DED
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-98
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1579
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
STOW #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.MCA.ST2.RD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
mmm
w
B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-99
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1580
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY #1
\
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.MCA.DEi.RLY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
PROBE DEPLOYMENT.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
l
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REFERENCES:
D
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-100
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ww
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1581
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
3/IR
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY #i
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : 3/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.MCA.DEI.RLY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE PROBE.
REFERENCES:
--!
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-101
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1582
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: ,_/
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFiNG: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/1R
TAL: 3/iR
AOA: 3/1R
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.DE2.RLY
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
PROBE DEPLO_NT.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I02
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1583
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.MCA.DE2.RLY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE PROBE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I03
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1584
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
STOW #i
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.STI.RLY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOWAGE OF P-ROBE. T_
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I04 _-
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1585
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
STOW #1
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.MCA.STI.RLY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I05
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1586
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
STOW #2
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.MCA.ST2.RLY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_RAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
STOWAGE OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1587
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS I_AD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
STOW #2
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.MCA.ST2.RLY
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF PROBE.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
m
w
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I07
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7131187
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1588
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: AND GATE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
x)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / .AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
" 3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.AG
c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT .......
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1589
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4) HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.HCA.AG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
w
n
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I09
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1590
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TIME DELAY
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
i
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
HDWfFUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.HCA.TD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1591
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TIME DELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.HCA.TD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-lll
_L
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
iTEM: SOLID STATE DRIVER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT:
1592 ABORT:
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: H oJ. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.SSD
] c C ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1593
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SOLID STATE DRIVER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.HCA.SSD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
m
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w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1594
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
FAILS SHORTED : :
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
r
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELEC_ICAL
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
320W HEATER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.RPC
CAUSES: PIECE'PART STRU_L FAILURE_
c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131187
MECHIADP/EPD&C
1595
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
320W HEATER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
311R
3/IR
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.HCA.RPC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
w
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-115
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1596
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
a)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_CHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
270W HEATER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELA_CH: / .... RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.270.RPC
] c [ ] ......
CAUSES:' PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1597
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7>
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
270W HEATER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.270.RPC
c[p]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONOUES OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1598
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
FAILS SHORTED
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
330W HEATER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] cc ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA. 330.RPC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
I
D
mm
m
U
I
U
m
m
J
l
!
g
mm
m
m
m
mu
REFERENCES:
m
i
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I18
m
m
m
mn
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1599
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
330W HEATER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.HCA.330.RPC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-I19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/31/sv
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1600
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH RELAY
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
P_LAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.SRL
c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131187
MECHIADP/EPD&C
1601
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: /
3/IR
A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.SRL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
L
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-121
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7131187
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1602
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LATCH RELAY
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTO?F: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.HCA.LRL
c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WoRKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1603
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LATCH RELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
HEATER CONTROL ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.HCA.LRL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECTS. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT HEATER
OPERATION. THIS COULD RESULT IN ERRONEOUS OR NO AIR DATA
REACHING THE ADTAS.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-123
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1604
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMI FILTER
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT. PS. FIL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1605
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT'.
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EMI FILTER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.PS.FIL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 c-125
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1606
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPAMP
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
5) POWER SUPPLY
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.PS.OA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/31/sv
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1607
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OP AMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.PS.OA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
c[P]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
REFERENCES:
w:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-127
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1608 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGULATOR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
r
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFT-OFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
\
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS. ADT. PS. REG
cAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
c [ ]
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-128
I
w
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v131/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1609
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGULATOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: /
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.PS.REG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
REFERENCES:
w
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-129
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
suBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/31/sv
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1610
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GENERATOR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: HoJ. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: /
3/3
A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.PS.GEN
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-130
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/s7
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1611
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GENERATOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
e)
7)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
\
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.PS.GEN
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
REFERENCES:
w
m
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-131
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT:
1612 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CLOCK
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
"1)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
SUBSYS LEAD: H. J. LOWERY
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
37i_
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION : FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS. ADT. PS. CLK
C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-132
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
_/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1613
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CLOCK
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.PS.CLK
C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-133
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1614
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+Q TRANSISTOR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4) AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
5) POWER SUPPLY
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: I RTLS : 3131
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.PS.+QT
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE .......
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1615
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+Q TRANSISTOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.PS.+QT
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
REFERENCES:
m
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-135
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1616
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
-Q TRANSISTOR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.PS.-QT
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1617
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
-Q TRANSISTOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.PS.-QT
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
u
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m
i
F
m
REPORT DATE i1/25/87 C-137
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT:
1618 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: TRANSFORMER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.PS.TMR
c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_RAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1619
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: TRANSFORMER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
CRITICALITIES
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.PS.TMR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
REFERENCES:
= :
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-139
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1620
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+10V AMP
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
................
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
P_LAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS. ADT. PS. +AM
] c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1621
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+I0V AMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.PS.+AM
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
w REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-141
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
_131187
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1622
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
-10V AMP
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.PS.-AM
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1623
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
-10V AMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.PS.-AM
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
REFERENCES'.
u
u
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-143
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1624
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT-.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3_
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+10V TRANSISTOR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.PS.+TR
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1625
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: +10V TRANSISTOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IS
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.PS.+TR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
REFERENCES:
=
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-145
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1626
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
-10V TRANSISTOR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.PS.-TR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1627
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
-10V TRANSISTOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
POWER SUPPLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.PS.-TR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-147
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1628
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/3 ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7131187
MECHIADP/EPD&C
1629
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER SUPPLY TEST AMP
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDWIFUNC
3/1R
311R
311R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.TA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE ADTA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-149
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1630 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
5) TEMP BRIDGE
6) HIGH INPUT
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD A_/IONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TB.HA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
i
I
I
I
m
[]
II
i
I
i=i
i
I
i
II
I
I
I
I
REFERENCES:
I
z
i
I
im
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-150
I
I
i
I
uw
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1631
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TEMP BRIDGE
HIGH INPUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TB.HA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TEMPERATURE DATA.
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM'.
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1632
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
5) TEMP BRIDGE
6) LOW INPUT
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/3 ATO:
313.
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TB.LA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1633
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TEMP BRIDGE
LOW INPUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.TB.LA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TEMPERATURE DATA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131187
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1634
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
THERMISTER THERMOMETER
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.TT
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE _
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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IINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1635
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: THERMISTER THERMOMETER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/3
/ TAL: 3/3
/ AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: /
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.TC.TT
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER TEMPERATURE DATA.
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INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1636
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTOR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.FET
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE
c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1637
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FIELD EFFECT TRANSISTOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.FET
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-157
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM."
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1638
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROL CIRCUIT
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.CC
c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECHIADP/EPD&C
1639
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROL CIRCUIT
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
IA_DING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: /
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.CC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1640
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
READ ONLY MEMORY
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.TC.ROM
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1641
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
READ ONLY MEMORY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
.7)
8)
9)
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION ."
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.TC.ROM
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-161
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
_CH/ADP/EPD&C
1642
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_C
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
T_SDUCER TEMP _P
FAI_ SHORTED
_D _ALYST: A.D. MO_GO_RY SUBSYS T._AD: H.J. _RY
B__ HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
_C_ICAL AC_ATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ET,_CTRICAL
AIR DATA T_SDUCER ASSEMBLY
T_SDUCER CIR_IT
C_iTICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC
P__CH: /
LI_OFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/3
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RT_: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: /
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
_CATION: FORW_D AVIONICS BAYS
P_T _BER: ADS.ADT.TC.TTA
] c C ]
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONAL_.:
_SS OF T_SDUCER TEMPE_RE DATA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1643
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: TRANSDUCER TEMP AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.TC.TTA
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER TEMPERATURE DATA.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 1644 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
c C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.TC.AMP
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-164
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1645
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.AMP
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES".
w
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-165
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/8v
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1646
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TRANSISTOR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
5) TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 .........
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS. ADT. TC.
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1647
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TRANSISTOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IR
3/1R ATO: /
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.TC.
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
i
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-167
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131187
MECH/ADPIEPD&C
1648
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS :
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
I RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: /
3/3 -; ..... :i_ :
A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.TC.AG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURALFAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
i
me
me
i
m
m
_m
im
M
m
me
m
l
l
me
mlm
REFERENCES:
m
z
B
m
g
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1649
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: AND GATE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS :
TAL:
AOA:
ATO :
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
/
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.TC.AG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
i
E
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-169
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1650
ITEM: SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT : 3/IR
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/iR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.SSR
B [ F ] c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-170
U
B
B
wr -
u
=
m
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1651
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SERIAL SHIFT REGISTER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: /
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.TC.SSR
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-171
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1652
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BINARY COUNTER
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7).
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/iR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.TC.BC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-172
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECHIADP/EPD&C
1653
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BINARY COUNTER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
TRANSDUCER CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.TC.BC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
m
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-173
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1654
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ADDRESSABLE SWITCH
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CR!TICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS. ADT. AD. AS
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1655
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: ADDRESSABLE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: /
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.AD.AS
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-175
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 1656 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/iR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LAND_NG/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION. •
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS. ADT. AD. AMP
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1657
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.AD.AMP
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
n
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-177
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
713118_
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1658
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCHING LADDER
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
2)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _ •
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR _
3/ia
•/
A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.AD.SL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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REPORT DATE Ii125/87 C-178
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1659
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
311R
311R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCHING LADDER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
311R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION. "
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.AD.SL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE ii/25/87 C-179
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
v/31/sv
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1660
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POLARITY DETECTOR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
• DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.AD.PD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1661
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POLARITY DETECTOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.AD.PD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
m
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-181
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1662
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROL LOGIC
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.AD.CL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1663
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROL LOGIC
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
/
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.AD.CL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
m REFERENCES:
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i •
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w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-183
J
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1664
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REGISTER
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
• q F _ =
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.AD.REG
C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1665
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: REGISTER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
A/D CONVERTER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.AD.REG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
w
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-185
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1666
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM: DISCREET INPUT BUFFER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3 _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.DIB
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-186
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1667
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DISCREET INPUT BUFFER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/ZR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.DIB
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-187
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHE_T .....
v/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1668
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SERIAL/PARALLEL CONVERTER
FAILS SHORTED _ ..........
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
=
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.SPC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1669
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SERIAL/PARALLEL CONVERTER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: /
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS. ADT. SPC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
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u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-189
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31187
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1670
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OSCILLATOR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H. J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.CG.OSC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1671
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OSCILLATOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
5) CLOCK GENERATOR
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.CG.OSC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
L REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-191
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1672
ITEM: 2 MH2 CLOCK
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT'.
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS :
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
/
A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.CG.2CL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-192
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SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1673
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
2 MH2 CLOCK
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
B)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
\
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.CG.2CL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
u REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-193
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT:....
1674 ABORT"
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
1 MH2 CLOCK
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
\
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR -_
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS .ADT .CG. ICL .....
c[P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
"#13118"#
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1675
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
1 MH2 CLOCK
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
_)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IR
3/IR ATO: /
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.CG.ICL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-195
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1676
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT-.
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
500 MH2 CLOCK
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
5) CLOCK GENERATOR
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.CG.5CL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1677
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
500 MH2 CLOCK
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.CG.5CL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
u
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-197
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1678
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUNTER
FAILS SHORTED
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOW_ HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUI_CH: / RTLS :
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: _ AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
HDW/FUNC
3/_R_
3/IR
3/1R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.CG.CNT
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1679
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
COUNTER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.CG.CNT
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-199
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT:
1680 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM"
FAILURE MODE :
OR GATE
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
5) CLOCK GENERATOR
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LI FT0_FF / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.CG.OG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA•
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1681
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OR GATE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.CG.OG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
w
i
REFERENCES:
r
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-201
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT:
1682 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SENSOR WINDOW GENERATOR
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.CG.SWG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-202
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7131187
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1683
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SENSOR WINDOW GENERATOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
CLOCK GENERATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.CG.SWG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
m
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-203
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT:
1684 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BUFFER
FAILS SHORTED ....
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
DIGITAL OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/IR
TAL: 3/IR
AOA: 3/IR
ATO: /
A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.DO.BUF
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-204
m
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1685
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BUFFER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/.
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.DO.BUF
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
w
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-205
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/s7
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1686
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OUTPUT CONTROL
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.DO.OC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-206
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1687
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OUTPUT CONTROL
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS .ADT. DO .OC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
m REFERENCES"
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-207
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/31/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ADP/EPD&C FLIGHT:
1688 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENCODER
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL OUTPUT
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/IR
/ TAL: 3/IR
/ AOA: 3/IS
3/IR ATO: /
3/3
B [ F ] C [ P ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.DO.ENC
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-208
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1689
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT"
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ENCODER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.DO.ENC
CAUSES: PIECE'PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
u
i
REFERENCES:
w
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W
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-209
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1690
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
5) DIGITAL OUTPUT
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO:
12%NDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.DO.AMP
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-210
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1691
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL OUTPUT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
/
A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.DO.AMP
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
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i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-211
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1692
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CPU
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL OUTPUT
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAU_CH: / RTLS: 3/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/1R
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.DO.CPU
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-212
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1693
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: CPU
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
5) DIGITAL OUTPUT
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
PART NUMBER: ADS.ADT.DO.CPU
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'.
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-213
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
MECHIADP/EPD&C
1694
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SELECTOR LOGIC
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL PROCESSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
311R
/
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.DP.SL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-214
l
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
7/31/87
MECHIADP/EPD&C
1695
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SELECTOR LOGIC
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL PROCESSOR
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.DP.SL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES".
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-215
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/31/sv
MECH/ADP/EPD&C
1696
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT"
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
READ ONLY MEMORY
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
"I)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL PROCESSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
311R
3/IR
3/IR
/
c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.DP.ROM
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-216
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1697
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
ITEM: ROM
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL PROCESSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.DP.ROM
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-217
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1698
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
READ/WRITE MEMORY
FAILS SHORTED
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
LEAD ANALYST : A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL PROCESSOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.DP.RWM
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-218
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/31/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ADP/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 1699
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
f
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: READ/WRITE MEMORY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
AIR DATA SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
AIR DATA TRANSDUCER ASSEMBLY
DIGITAL PROCESSOR
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
/ AOA:
3/IR ATO:
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
/
c[P]
LO CAT ION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD AVIONICS BAYS
ADS.ADT.DP.RWM
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF TRANSDUCER DATA.
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ELEVON SEALS PANEL ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
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ELEVON SEALS PANEL ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT ABORT
MDAC-ID H/F H/F
mg1_
21oo * 1/1 i/1
2101 * I/I i/I
2102 * i/I I/i
2103 * i/I I/I
2104 * I/I i/i
2105 * i/i i/i
2106 3/3 3/3
REDUNDANCY
SCREENS
A B C ITEM NAME
ROD ASSEMBLY
ROD ASSEMBLY
BELLCRANK
BELLCRANK
BOLT
BOLT
ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID
l
w
w
w
w
(*) Potential Critical Items.
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C-221
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ESP
MDAC ID: 2100
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/I
i/i
ITEM: ROD ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BiNDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE IN OPERABLE,
BENT, BROKEN, DEBRIS OR-FROZEN BEARING SURFACE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) ELEVON SEAL PANEL LINKAGE
3) ROD ASSEMBLY
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RT_: I/i
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
(42 TOTAL)
OUTBOARD ELEVON SEAL PANELS
V070-596009-007/008, 10-001/013, 70-001/005, 77-001
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ELEVON SPAR AND FITTINGS LOOSE STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF
OVER HEATING. FRACTURED COMPONENTS RUPTURE THE HYDRAULIC LINES
OR SHORT-OUT/SEVER THE ELECTRICAL CABLES OR COMPONENTS, THUS
ORBITER EXPERIENCES LOSS OF: ELEVONS, HYDRAULIC FLUID, CONTROL,
VEHICLES/CREW.
REFERENCES: V070-596008
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ESP
MDAC ID: 2101
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
I/i
ITEM: ROD ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE IN OPERABLE,
BENT, BROKEN, DEBRIS OR FROZEN BEARING SURFACE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ELEVON SEAL PANEL LINKAGE
ROD ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 1/l
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: INBOARD ELEVON SEAL PANELS
PART NUMBER: V070-596003-001/016, 80-001/007, 82-001/004, 87-
001/007 (50 TOTAL)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ELEVON SPAR AND FITTINGS LOOSE STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF
OVER HEATING. FRACTURED COMPONENTS RUPTURE THE HYDRAULIC LINES
OR SHORT-OUT/SEVER THE ELECTRICAL CABLES OR COMPONENTS, THUS
ORBITER EXPERIENCES LOSS OF: ELEVONS, HYDRAULIC FLUID, CONTROL,
VEHICLES/CREW.
REFERENCES: V070-596001
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-223
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ESP
MDAC ID: 2102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: BELLCRANK
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE IN OPERABLE,
BENT, _ BROKEN, DEBRIS OR FROZEN BEARING SURFACE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
ELEVON SEAL PANEL LINKAGE
BELLCRANKS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: 1/1
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: OUTBOARD ELEVON SEAL PANELS
PART NUMBER: V070-596011-001/4, 12-005/006, 14-001/002, 22-
001/002, 23-001/006 (16 TOTAL)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ELEVON SPAR AND FITTINGS _QSE STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF
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OVER HEATING. FRACTURED COMPONENTS RUPTURE THE HYDRAULIC LINES
OR SHORT-OUT/SEVER THE ELECTRICAL CABLES OR COMPONENTS, THUS
ORBITER EXPERIENCES LOSS OF: ELEVONS, HYDRAULIC FLUID, CONTROL,
VEHICLES/CREW.
REFERENCES: V070-596008
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ESP
MDAC ID: 2103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM: BELLCRANK
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE IN OPERABLE,
BENT, BROKEN, DEBRIS OR FROZEN BEARING SURFACE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) ELEVON SEAL PANEL LINKAGE
3) BELLCRANKS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 2/2 RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF : 2/2 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : 2/2 AOA : i/1
DEORBIT : I/i ATO : i/1
I2%NDING/SAFING : 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: INBOARD ELEVON SEAL PANELS
PART NUMBER: V070-596004-001/002, 005-001/006, 006-001/002, 007-
001/002, 024-001/002, 025-001/002, 026-001/002, 027-001/002, 028-
001/002 (18 TOTAL)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ELEVON SPAR AND FITTINGS LOOSE STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF
OVER HEATING. FRACTURED COMPONENTS RUPTURE THE HYDRAULIC LINES
OR SHORT-OUT/SEVER THE ELECTRICAL CABLES OR COMPONENTS, THUS
ORBITER EXPERIENCES LOSS OF: ELEVONS, HYDRAULIC FLUID, CONTROL,
VEHICLES/CREW.
REFERENCES: V070-596001
w
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-225
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ESP
MDAC ID: 2104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/I
1/1
ITEM: BOLT
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE IN OPERABLE,
BENT, BROWN, DEBRIS OR FROZEN: BEARING SURFACE _
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) ELEVON SEAL PANEL LINKAGE
3 ) BOLTS
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C _ ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: I/I
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: OUTBOARD ELEVON SEAL PANELS
PART NUMBER: V070-596083-001-4; MDIII-1001-0416, 18, 19; 0515-
19, 0616-18, 22; MDIII-I002-0413 (i00 TOTAL)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
E_VON SPAR AND FITTINGS LOOSE STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF
OVER HEATING. FRACTURED COMPONENTS RUPTURE THE HYDRAULIC LINES
OR SHORT-OUT/SEVER THE ELECTRICAL CABLES OR COMPONENTS, THUS
ORBITER EXPERIENCES LOSS OF: ELEVONS, HYDRAULIC FLUID, CONTROL,
VEHICLES/CREW.
REFERENCES: V070-596008
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 6/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ESP
MDAC ID: 2105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
I/i
ITEM: BOLT
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE IN OPERABLE,
BENT, BROKEN, DEBRIS OR FROZEN BEARING SURFACE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) ELEVON SEAL PANEL LINKAGE
3) BOLTS
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: I/I
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: INBOARD ELEVON SEAL PANELS
PART NUMBER: V070-596083-001-4; MDIII-1001-0418, 19, -0516-18,
23, 27, -0616, 18, 22, 27; MDIII-I002-0517 (118 TOTAL)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ELEVON SPAR AND FITTINGS LOOSE STRUCTURAL CAPABILITY BECAUSE OF
OVER HEATING. FRACTURED COMPONENTS RUPTURE THE HYDRAULIC LINES
OR SHORT-OUT/SEVER THE ELECTRICAL CABLES OR COMPONENTS, THUS
ORBITER EXPERIENCES LOSS OF: ELEVONS, HYDRAULIC FLUID, CONTROL,
VEHICLES/CREW.
REFERENCES: V070-596001
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-227
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ESP FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 2106 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 100-105 (WASHER,
BUSHING, NUT, COTTER PIN, SAFETY WIRE, ETC)
FAILURE MODE: ALL FAILURE MODES
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ELEVON SEAL PANEL LINKAGE
ALL REMAINING PARTS
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
INBOARD/OUTBOARD ELEVON SEAL PANELS
ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 100-105
CAUSES: ALL CAUSES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 100-105 WILL HAVE NO
EFFECT ON MISSION, VEHICLE OR CREW.
REFERENCES: V070-596001/8
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ET UMBILICAL ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
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C-229
ET UMBILICAL ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC-ID H/F H/F A B C
m_m_m
3101 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3102 * 2/IR 2/1R P F P
3103 3/3 3/3
3104 3/3 3/3
3105 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3106 * 1/1 1/1
3107 * 1/1 1/1
3108 * 1/1 1/1
3109 * 2/1R 2/1R P P P
3110 3/3 3/3
3111 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3112 * 2/1R 2/1R P P P
3113 3/3 3/3
3114 3/3 3/3
3115 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3116 * i/i i/i
3117 * i/i i/I
3118 * i/I i/1
3119 * i/I i/I
312o , 1/1 1/1
3121 * i/I i/I
3122 * i/i I/I
3123 * 1/1 1/1
3124 * 2/!R 2/IR P P P
3125 3/3 3/3
3126 * I/! i/i
3127 * 1/1 1/1
3128 * 1/1 1/1
3129 * 1/1 1/1
3130 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3131 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3132 3/3 3/3
3133 3/3 3/3
3134 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3135 * 1/1 1/1
3136 * 1/1 1/1
3137 * 1/1 1/1
3138 * 1/1 1/1
3139 * 1/1 1/1
3140 * 1/1 1/1
3141 * i/I i/i
3142 * I/I 1/l
3143 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
3144 3/3 3/3
3501 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
ITEM NAME
CENTERLINE LATCH MOTOR
CENTERLINE MOTOR CLUTCH
CENTERLINE MOTOR CLUTCH
CENTERLINE MOTOR BRAKE
CENTERLINE MOTOR BRAKE
CL LATCH DIFFERENTIAL/GEARBOX
CL LATCH DIFFERENTIAL/GEARBOX
CENTERLINE LATCH
CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CLUTCH
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CLUTCH
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BRAKE
DOOR CLOSURE_ MOTOR BRAKE
TLC/DIFFERENTIAL/GEARBOX
TLC/DIFFEI_ERTIAL/GEARBOX
DOOR LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
DOOR LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
HINGE LINAGE A_MBLY
HINGE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
CLOSURE TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
CLOSURE TORQUE _BE ASSEMBLY
DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SWITCH
DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SWITCH
DOOR HINGE
DOOR HINGE
DOOR UPLATCH ROLLER
UMBILICAL DOOR
UPLOCK LATCH MOTOR
UPLATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
UPLATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
UPLATCH MOTOR BRAKE
UPLATCH MOTOR BRAKE
TLC/DIFFERENTIAL/GEARBOX
TLC/DIFFERENTIAL/GEARBOX
UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH LINKAGE
INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH LINKAGE
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MEC_ISM
READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
RELAY
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(*) Potential Critical Items.
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ET UMBILICAL ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC-ID H/F H/F A B C
_w_wm
3502 3/3 3/3
3503 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
3504 3/3 3/3
3505 3/3 3/3
3506 3/3 3/3
3507 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3508 3/3 3/3
3509 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3510 3/3 3/3
3511 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3512 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3513 3/3 3/3
3514 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
3515 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
3516 * 2/1R 2/1R P P P
3517 * 2/1R 2/IR P P P
3518 3/3 3/3
3519 * 2/1R 2/1R P F P
3520 3/3 3/3
3521 3/3 3/3
3522 * 2/IR 2/IR F F P
3523 3/3 3/3
3524 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
3525 * 2/IR 2/IR F F P
3526 * 2/IR 2/IR F F P
3527 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
3528 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
3529 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
ITEM NAME
RELAY
RELAY
RELAY
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
CENTERLINE LATCH-STOW SWITCH
CENTERLINE LATCH-STOW SWITCH
ETUD OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
ETUD OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
ETUD OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
ETUD LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
ETUD LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
ETUD LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
CONTROL BUS FUSE
MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER
HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER
DIODE
DIODE
RESISTOR, 5.1K 1/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FUSE, IA, ACTUATOR STATUS
RESISTOR, 1.2K, MCA LOGIC SW
RESISTOR, 1.2K, MCA LOGIC SW
u
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-231
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
= =
DATE: 6/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD
MDAC ID: 3101
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: CENTERLINE LATCH MOTOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO START
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN _IE_CHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICALDOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH_C_ISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 2/IR
TAL: 2/IR
AOA: 2/IR
ATO: /
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCA_0N: A_ FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
LOSS OF OUTPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF A CENTERLINE LATCH MOTOR WOULD RESULT IN SECOND MOTOR
STOWING THE LATCH AT A REDUCED RATE. LOSS OF SECOND MOTOR WOULD
PREVENT STOWING CENTERLINE LATCH AND CLOSING OF UMBILICAL DOOR.
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REFERENCES: JSC-III74
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
MECH/ETUD
3102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE MOTOR CLUTCH
FAILS TO ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE MOTOR CLUTCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF CLUTCH TO ENGAGE WOULD REDUCE POWER TRANSFER FOR LATCH
STOWING. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD STOW LATCH BUT AT A REDUCED RATE.
u
REFERENCES: JSC-II174
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD
MDAC ID: 3103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: CENTERLINE MOTOR CLUTCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO DISENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE MOTOR CLUTCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: ..... 5/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, __CAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CLUTCH FAILING TO DISENGAGE WOULD REDUCE REDUNDANCY.
RELEASE AND STOWING WOULD BE COMPLETED. NO EFFECT ON
ORBITER/CREW OR MISSION.
LATCH
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
MECH/ETUD
3104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE MOTOR BRAKE
FAILS TO ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE MOTOR BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BRAKE TO ENGAGE AND HOLD CENTERLINE LATCH IN STOWED
POSITION COULD RESULT IN DAMAGE TO LATCH ON ENTRY. NO EFFECT ON
ORBITER/CREW OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC-II174
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z
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
MECH/ETUD
3105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT-.
.DW/nmC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE MOTOR BRAKE
FAILS TO DISENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET _BILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM _: '
CENTERLINE MOTOR BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: _/IR
LIFTOFF : / TAL: 2/--1R=
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BRAKE TO DISENGAGE WOULD REDUCE POWER TRANSFER FOR
LATCH STOWING. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD STOW LATCH BUT AT A REDUCED
RATE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/8_
MECH/ETUD
3106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF : / TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : / AOA: i/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING : /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING WOULD PREVENT CENTERLINE LATCH FROM STOWING AND
UMBILICAL DOOR FROM CLOSING. HEAT COULD ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY
ON ENTRY. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-IlI74
u
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-237
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
MECH/ETUD
3107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
PARTIAL OUTPUT _ _ _ _
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENT_RLINE LATCH _CH_SM _'_
CENTERLINE LATCH DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF: / TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: / AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT : 1/1 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PARTIAL TRANSMISSION OF MOTOR POWER WOULD SLOW LATCH OPERATION.
MOTOR_ REACHSTALLTI_ BEFORE L_TC_RE_HES STO_POSiTTO_ _
PREVENTING DOOR CLOSURE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE ,
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
MECH/ETUD
3108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : I/1
TAL: i/1
AOA: i/1
ATO : /
B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565062-001/V070-565062-002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ACCELERATION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF LATCH ON ASCENT OR BEFORE LATCH CLEARS UMBILICAL DOOR
PREVENTS CLOSURE WHICH WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ORBITER/CREW. FAILURE
AFTER LATCH CLEARS DOOR AT WORST WOULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO LATCH DUE
TO AERODYNAMIC HEATING ON ENTRY.
REFERENCES: V070-565000
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-239
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
T
6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ETUD FLIGHT:
3109 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICALDOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM ......
CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/I R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: _ /
LANDING/SAFING: / _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-
PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT OPERATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE CLOSING OF CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH WOULD CAUSE
MOTOR TO STOP. SECOND MOTOR WOULD STOW LATCH BUT AT A REDUCED
RATE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6116187
MECH/ETUD
3110
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE TO OPERATE UNTIL LATCH REACHES LIMIT, MOTOR
WOULD STALL. LATCH WOULD MOVE TO STOWED POSITION.
REFERENCES: JSC-11174
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-241
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 3111 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE: _ _ _ I
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR
FAi_ TO START
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHYz
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE MECHANISM
DOOR CLOSE MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
 /IR
2/1R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF UMBILICAL DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR WOULD RESULT IN SECOND MOTOR
CLOSING THE UMBILICAL DOOR AT A REDUCED RATE. LOSS OF SECOND
MOTOR WOULD PREVENT CLOSING OF UMBILICAL DOOR.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
MECH/ETUD
3112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CLUTCH
FAILS TO ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MACHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CLUTCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: y AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF CLUTCH TO ENGAGE WOULD REDUCE POWER TRANSFER FOR DOOR
CLOSURE. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD CLOSE DOOR AT REDUCED RATE.
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m
REFERENCES: JSC-II174
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-243
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/xs/s7
MECH/ETUD
3113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CLUTCH
FAILS TO DISENGAGE ........
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
3) CENTERLINE LATCH MACHANISM
4) DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR CLUTCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
3/3
313 "
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] c[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CLUTCH FAILING TO DISENGAGE WOULD REDUCE REDUNDANCY. UMBILICAL
DOOR CLOSURE WOULD BE COMPLETED. NO EFFECT ON ORBITER/CREW OR
MISSION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
MECH/ETUD
3114
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BRAKE
FAILS TO ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MACHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BRAKE FAILURE TO ENGAGE UPON DOOR CLOSURE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON
ORBITER/CREW OR MISSION.
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n
REFERENCES: JSC-II174
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-245
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
MECH/ETUD
3115
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BRAKE
FAILS TO DISENGAGE ........ _ i
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MACHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,_C_ICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BRAKE TO DISENGAGE WOULD REDUCE POWER TRANSFER FOR
UMBILICAL DOOR CLOSURE. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD CLOSE DOOR BUT AT
A REDUCED RATE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/ETUD FLIGHT: i/i
3116 ABORT: I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH DIFFERENTIAL GEAR ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/I
LI FTOFF: / TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : / AOA: i/1
DEORBIT : I/1 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING WOULD PREVENT DOOR CLOSURE. ALLOWS HEAT TO ENTER
UMBILICAL CAVITY ON ENTRY. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-II174
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-247
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/ETUD FLIGHT: I/i
3117 ABORT: I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH DIFFERENTIAL GEAR ASSEMBLY
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH DIFFERENTIAL GEAR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS : I/1
LIFTOFF : / TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/1
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING : /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
PARTIAL INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PARTIAL TRANSMISSION OF MOTOR POWER WOULD SLOW UMBILICAL DOOR
CLOSURE. DOOR CLOSURE MOTORS REACH STALL TIME BEFORE DOOR
CLOSED. IF UNABLE TO CLOSE DOOR THEN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS
POSSIBLE.
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=INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
MECH/ETUD
3118
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT : i/1
ABORT : i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
DOOR LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: / AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565017-003/V070-565001-001/V070565001-
002/V070-565002-001/V070-565002-002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING WOULD PREVENT DOOT FROM BEING CLOSED. HEAT
ENTERS UMBILICAL CAVITY DURING ENTRY. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES" V070-56500
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-249
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
6/16/8T
MECH/ETUD
3119
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR LINKAGE ASSEMBLY ........... '
LINKAGE BROKEN/UNATTACHED _ _.....
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCHMECHANISM
DOOR LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: / AOA: I/I
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565017-003/V070-565001-001/V070565001-
002/V070-565002-001/V070-565002-002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN/UNATTACHED DOOR LINKAGE PREVENTS DOOR CLOSURE OR ALLOWS
CLOSURE BUT DOOR CANNOT SEAL OPENING ALLOWING HEAT TO ENTER
UMBILICAL CAVITY DURING ENTRY. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-250
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD
MDAC ID: 3120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/I
ITEM: HINGE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
HINGE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
ABORT
B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565017-00I/V070-565017-004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING WOULD PREVENT DOOR FROM BEING CLOSED. OPEN
UMBILICAL DOOR ALLOWS HEAT TO ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY ON ENTRY.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: V070-56500
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-251
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
MECH/ETUD
3121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HINGE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY .......
LINKAGE BROKEN/UNATTACHED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
B)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM _
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM ..... _ ........
HINGE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/l
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: / AOA: I/I
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
B [ ] C [ ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
V070-565017-00I/V070-565017-004
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
BROKEN/UNATTACHED HINGE LINKAGE PREVENTS DOOR CLOSURE OR ALLOWS
CLOSURE BUT DOOR CANNOT SEAL OPENING ALLOWING HEAT TO ENTER
UMBILICAL CAVITY. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
MECH/ETUD
3122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR CLOSURE TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565010
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION,MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING OF TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY PREVENTS DOOR CLOSURE
BECAUSE ALL DOOR CLOSURE LINKAGES ARE DRIVEN BY TORQUE TUBE.
ENTRY HEAT COULD ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
ON
u
REFERENCES: V070-56500
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-253
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ETUD FLIGHT:
3123 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR CLOSURE TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
TORQUE TUBE BROKEN .....
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
DOOR CLOSURETORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/I
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
V070-565010
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ACCELERATION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BRg_N TORQUE TUBEP_REVENT S DO0 R C I_SURE_BECAUSE ................ALL LINKAGES ARE
DRIVEN BY TORQUE TUBE. ON ENTRY HEAT COULD ENTER UMBILICAL
CAVITY. LOSS-0FCREW/VEH_C_.
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REFERENCES: V070-56500
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-254
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
MECH/ETUD
3124
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SWITCH
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE MECHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: • / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-
PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT OPERATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE CLOSING OF DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SWITCH WOULD CAUSE MOTOR
TO STOP. SECOND MOTOR WOULD CLOSE DOOR BUT AT A REDUCED RATE.
REFERENCES: JSC-II174
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-255
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/16/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD
MDAC ID: 3125
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR CLOSURE _LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
=
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
............... DOOR MECHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE MECHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DOOR CLOSURE MOTOR WOULD NOT RECEIVE CUTOFF COMMAND WHEN
UMBILICAL DOOR CLOSES. ALSO LOSE SIGNAL OF DOOR CLOSURE WITH
APPLICABLE MISD SHOWING DOOR OPEN. PROCEDURE IS MANUAL ON
NOMINAL MISSION AND AUTOMATIC DURING AN ABORT SO THERE IS NO
EFFECT ON
ORBITER/CREW OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC-II174
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-256
J
mm
um
W
u
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
MECH/ETUD
3126
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/1
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR HINGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE MECHANISM
DOOR HINGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/I
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: / AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
V070-565030-003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING DOOR HINGE PREVENTS DOOR CLOSURE. DOOR ALLOWS
HEAT TO ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY ON ENTRY. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-565000
w
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-257
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 3127 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/!
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR HINGE
STRUC_t.IRAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE MECHANISM
DOOR HINGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 1/1
ONORBIT: / AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565030-003
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A HINGE WOULD PREVENT DOOR CLOSURE OR NOT SEAL THE
DOOR IN THE OPENING. HEAT COULD ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY DURING
ENTRY. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
6/16/87
MECH/ETUD
3128
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
1/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DOOR UPLATCH ROLLER
BROKEN OFF DOOR COMPLETELY/PARTIALLY
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
DOOR CLOSURE MECHANISM
DOOR UPLATCH ROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF : / TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/1 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING : /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565160-001 & 002/V070-565166-001 & 002/1070-
565167-001 & 002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ACCELERATION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
COMPLETE OR PARTIAL LOSS OF AN UPLATCH ON ASCENT PREVENT LATCHING
DOOR INTO PLACE. HEAT COULD ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY ON ENTRY.
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-565000
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-259
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
6/16/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ETUD FLIGHT:
3129 ABORT:
ITEM: UMBILICAL DOOR
FAILURE MODE: DAMAGED ON ASCENT
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/I
LEAD ANALYST : J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM _ _!
UMBILICAL DOOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: I/I
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: /
LANDING/SAFI_: / _
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DAMAGE TO UMBILICAL DOOR CAUSES LOSS OF TILES OR WARPS DOOR.
ALLOWS HEAT TO ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY DUE TO MISSING TILES OR
INABILITY OR DOOR TO CLOSE SECURELY. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: V070-565000
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
6117187
MECH/ETUD
3130
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UPLOCK LATCH MOTOR
FAILS TO START
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF UPLATCH MOTOR WOULD MEAN SECOND MOTOR WOULD LATCH
DOORS SECURE AT A REDUCED RATE. ONLY EFFECT IS LOSS OF
REDUNDANCY.
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REFERENCES: JSC-II174
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-261
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD
MDAC ID: 3131
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: UPLATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
3) UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
4) UPLATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.Jo LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF CLUTCH TO ENGAGE WOULD REDUCE POWER TRANSFER FOR
DRIVING UPLATCH MECHANISM. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD LATCH DOORS BUT
AT A REDUCED RATE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6117/87
MECH/ETUD
3132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UPLATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
FAILS TO DISENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
UPLATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CLUTCH FAILING TO DISENGAGE WOULD REDUCE REUNDANCY. UPLOCK
LATCHING WOULD BE COMPLETED. NO EFFECT ON ORBITER/CREW OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC-III74
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-263
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WQRKSHEET_
6/17/87
MECH/ETUD
3133
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UPLATCH MOTOR BRAKE
FAILS TO ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
UPLATCH MOTOR BRAKE
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/3
/ TAL: 3/3
/ AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: /
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, _CHANi_AL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF UPLATCH MOTOR BRAKE TO ENGAGE WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT.
SECOND MOTOR AND LATCH MECHANISMS WOULD SECURE DOOR.
REFERENCES: JSC-II174
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD
MDAC ID: 3134
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: UPLATCH MOTOR BRAKE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO DISENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
UPLATCH MOTOR BRAKE
\
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BRAKE FAILING TO DISENGAGE AT START OF UPLATCH MOTOR OPERATION
WOULD RESULT IN SECOND MOTOR LATCHING THE DOOR AT A REDUCED RATE.
FAILURE REDUCES REDUNDANCY.
i
REFERENCES: JSC-II174
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-265
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 3135 ABORT: i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH/DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/_
ONORBIT: / AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
] B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING WOULD PREVENT DOOR LATCHING. DOOR WOULD NOT BE
SECURELY CLOSED ALLOWING IT TO OPEN OR NOT SEAL PROPERLY. ALLOWS
HEAT TO ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY DURING ENTRY. LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/ETUD FLIGHT: i/1
3136 ABORT : I/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH DIFFERENTIAL GEAR ASSEMBLY
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
TORQUE LIMIT CLUTCH DIFFERENTIAL GEAR ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: I/i
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/I
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
PARTIAL INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PARTIAL TRANSMISSION OF MOTOR POWER WOULD SLOWDOOR LATCHING.
MOTORS REACH STALL TIMELIMIT BEFORE DOOR LATCHED. IF UMBILICAL
DOORS NOT CLOSED HEAT COULD ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY ON ENTRY.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: JSC-II174
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-267
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
DATE: 6/17/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD
MDAC ID: 3137
ITEM: UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H. J. LOWERY
HDW/FUNC
I/i
I/i
HIERARCHY:BREAKDOWN
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : I/1
LI FTOFF: / TAL: I/1
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/1
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565130-001/V070-565130-O02
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING OF TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY PREVENTS DOOR BEING
LATCHED DUE TO OUTBOARD UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISMS BEING DRIVEN BY
TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY. UMBILICAL DOOR NOT SECURELY LATCHED COULD
OPEN OR NOT SEAL CLOSED ALLOWING HEAT TO ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD
MDAC ID: 3138
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
1/i
ITEM: UPLATCH TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: TORQUE TUBE BROKEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
UPLATCHTORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: I/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: / AOA: I/i
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
V070-565130-001/V070-565130-002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ACCELERATION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN TORQUE TUBE PREVENTS DOOR LATCHING BECAUSE INBOARD UPLATCH
LOCK MECHANISM IS DRIVEN BY TORQUE TUBE ASSEMBLY. ON ENTRY HEAT
COULD ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-565000
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-269
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
6117/87
MECH/ETUD
3139
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/I
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH LINKAGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING /_ .....
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
3) UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
4) INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : i/1
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: / AOA: I/1
DEORBIT: i/1 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING : /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] c[ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565144-001/V070-565144-002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/_IONA_:
BINDING/JAMMING OF LINKAGE PREVENTS OPERATION OF INBOARD LATCH
CAPTURE AND SECURING UMBILICAL DOORS IN THE CLOSED POSITION.
UMBILICAL DOOR COULD OPEN ALLOWING HEAT TO ENTER DURING ENTRY.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/17/87
MECH/ETUD
3140
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH LINKAGE
BROKEN/UNATTACHED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
INBOARD UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: i/i
LIFTOFF: / TAL: i/i
ONORBIT: / AOA: i/i
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565144-001/V070-565144-002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ACCELERATION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN/UNATTACHED LINKAGE PREVENTS CAPTURE OF INBOARD ROLLER AND
SECURE DOOR LATCH. UMBILICAL DOOR COULD OPEN AND ALLOW HEAT TO
ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY DURING ENTRY. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
m
REFERENCES: V070-565000
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-271
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE. •
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/17/87
MECH/ETUD
3141
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION sYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
CRITI CALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF: / TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : / AOA: I/1
DEORBIT : I/1 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565102-001 & 002/V070-565103-001 & 002/V070-
565104-001 & 002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING PREVENTS CAPTURE OF ROLLER ON DOOR. WITHOUT
SECURE LATCH DOOR MAY OPEN ON ENTRY ALLOWING HEAT TO ENTER
UMBILICAL CAVITY. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/17/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD
MDAC ID: 3142
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/1
ITEM: UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
FAILURE MODE: BROKEN/UNATTACHED
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
3) UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS : i/1
LI FTOFF : / TAL: i/1
ONORBIT : / AOA : i/1
DEORBIT : I/1 ATO : /
LANDING/SAFING : /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER: V070-565102-001 & 002/V070-565103-001 & 002/V070-
565104-001 & 002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ACCELERATION,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN/UNATTACHED LATCH MECHANISM PREVENTS DOOR BEING LATCHED.
DOOR MAY OPEN ON ENTRY ALLOWING HEAT TO ENTER UMBILICAL CAVITY.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-56500
REPORT DATE i1/25/87 C-273
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
6/17/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ETUD FLIGHT:
3143 ABORT:
ITEM: READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-
PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT OPERATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE INDICATION OF READY TO LATCH WOULD CAUSE MOTOR TO STOP.
REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE TO CAPTURE ROLLER BUT AT A REDUCED
RATE. EFFECT IS A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE
OR MISSION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/17/87
MECH/ETUD
3144
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MECHANISM
UPLOCK LATCH MECHANISM
READY TO LATCH LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO INDICATE READY TO LATCH CAUSES CONTINUED MOTOR
OPERATION. LATCH MECHANISM WILL CONTACT A STOP AND STALL MOTOR.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-56500
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-275
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8118187
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE, AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
K7-KI0, KI2-KI8, K57, K59
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELAY IS USED TO STOW THE CENTERLINE LATCHES, CLOSING THE
UMBILICAL DOORS, OR ENGAGING THE UPLOCK LATCHES. FAILURE OF
RELAY CAUSES AN OPEN CIRCUIT AND THE LOSS OF AC POWER TO A MOTOR.
THE REDUNDANT MOTOR CONTINUES THE PARTICUALR FUNCTION BUT AT A
REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE, AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
K7-K10, KI2-KIS, K57, K59
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF RELAY TO OPEN HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION. POWER CAN BE REMOVED FROM A MOTOR WHEN SECOND RELAY
OPENS FOR CENTERLINE LATCH STOWING AND UPLOCK LATCH ENGAGEMENT.
DOOR CLOSURE RELAY DOES NOT HAVE REDUNDANCY BUT POWER CAN BE
REMOVED BY FLIGHT DECK SWITCHES.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-277
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/1R
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FUSELAGE, AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
K5, K6, KI0-KI2, KI4, K15, KI7-K20, K56, K58
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELAY IS USED TO LOCK THE CENTERLINE LATCHES, OPENING THE
UMBILICAL DOORS, OR RELEASE THE UPLOCK LATCHES. THE ET UMBILICAL
DOORS MUST BE OPENED ASAP POSTLANDING WHEN A TAL OR RTLS OCCURS
AND FOR ALL OTHER CASES IF THERE IS AN INDICATION OF H2
BUILDUP. RELAY FAILURE REDUCES REDUNDANCY. SECOND MOTOR WOULD
CONTINUE THE FUNCTION BUT AT A SLOWER RATE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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uINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RELAY
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FUSELAGE, AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
PART NUMBER: K5, K6, KI0-KI2, KI4, KI5, KI7-K20, K56, K58
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELAY IS USED TO LOCK THE CENTERLINE LATCHES, OPENING THE ET
UMBILICAL DOORS, OR RELEASE THE UPLOCK LATCHES. FAILURE OF RELAY
TO OPEN HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE. POWER CAN BE REMOVED BY
OTHER MEANS POSTLANDING.
i
u
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-279
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/8v
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3505
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH FROM GPC TO MANUAL MODE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.Jo LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C C ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH TO MOVE FROM GPC TO
MANUAL MODE HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. SWITCH
FAILING IN THE GPC MODE WILL NOT PREVENT ET UMBILICAL DOOR
CLOSURE. THE NECESSARY COMMANDS CAN BE SENT TO THE ORBITER FROM
MCC. SWITCH IS IN GPC MODE ON ASCENT TO ALLOW GNC SOFTWARE TO
CLOSE THE DOORS DURING AN RTLS. THIS MODE IS ALSO USED FOR REAL-
TIME UP-LINK COMMANDS TO CLOSE ET UMBILICAL DOORS, IS REDUNDANT
CLOSURE PROCEDURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM MANUAL TO GPC MODE
LEAD ANALYST : J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$47
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH TO MOVE FROM MANUAL TO
GPC MODE HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. SWITCH
FAILING IN THE _AL MODE KEEPS SUPPLYING RELAY LOGIC POWER FROM
THE FOUR CONTROL BUSES. THIS POWER CAN BE TAKEN OFF LINE BY
SWITCHING OFF THREE MCA LOGIC SWITCHES (SWITCHES $4, SI0, SI4 ON
PANEL MA73CB). IF POWER IS LEFT ON-LINE, MANUAL OPERATION OF
UMBILICAL DOORS AND UPLOCK LATCHES IS POSSIBLE.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-281
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C FLIGHT:
3507 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM GND TO STOW
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
CENTERLINE LATCH-STOW SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
FAILURE OF SWITCH TO GO FROM GND TO STOW PREVENTS THE FOUR
CONTROL BUSES FROM SUPPLYING RELAY LOGIC POWER TO THE AFT MOTOR
CONTROLLERS. THIS PREVENTS MANUAL CENTELRINE LATCH STOWING. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISION BECAUSE OF ALTERNATIVE GPC MODE
OF DOOR CLOSURE.
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REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-282
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/18/8v
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3508
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTELRINE LATCH-STOW SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM STOW TO GND
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
CENTERLINE LATCH-STOW SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$48
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SWITCH TO GO FROM STOW TO GND HAS NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. SWITCH ENABLES OPERATION OF THE TWO
CENTERLINE LATCHES ACTUATORS. WHEN ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE SWITCH
($47) IS IN GPC MODE THIS WILL DISABLE THE CENTERLINE LATCH-STOW
SWITCH.
REFERENCES". VS70-560109, VS72-956099
m
REPORT DATE i1/25/87 C-283
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3509
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
3) DISPLAY AND CONTROL
4) ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$49 (LEFT), $51 (RIGHT)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SWITCH TO GO FROM OFF TO CLOSE PREVENTS THE FOUR
CONTROL BUSES FROM SUPPLYING RELAY LOGIC POWER. THIS PREVENTS
MANUAL CLOSING OF THE LEFT AND RIGHT ET UMBILICAL DOORS. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION BECAUSE OF ALTERNATIVE GPC
MODE OF DOOR CLOSURE.
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REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/8v
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3510
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM CLOSE TO OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$49 (LEFT), $51 (RIGHT)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SWITCH TO GO FROM CLOSE TO OFF HAS NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. OFF SWITCH POSITION REMOVES RELAY LOGIC
POWER FOR MANUAL DOOR OPERATION. WHEN ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE
SWITCH ($47) IS IN GPC MODE THIS WILL DISABLE LEFT/RIGHT ET
UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87
J
C-285
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C FLIGHT :
35 ll ABORT :
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$49 (LEFT), $51 (RIGHT)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ET UMBILICAL DOORS MUST BE OPENED ASAP POSTLANDING WHEN A TAL
OR RTLS OCCURS AND FOR ANY OTHER CASE IF THER IS AN INDICATION OF
H2 BUILDUP. POSSIBLE LOSS OR DAMAGE TO ORBITER MAY OCCUR IF
UNABLE TO OPEN UMBILICAL DOOR TO RELEASE THE H2 ................
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3512
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF TO LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$50 (LEFT), $52 (RIGHT)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SWITCH TO GO FROM OFF TO LATCH PREVENTS THE FOUR
CONTROL BUSES FROM SUPPLYING RELAY LOGIC POWER. THIS PREVENTS
MANUAL LATCHING OF THE LEFT AND RIGHT ET UMBILICAL DOORS. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION BECAUSE OF ALTERNATIVE GPC
MODE OF DOOR CLOSURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87
i
C-287
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C FLIGHT:
3513 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH_RELEASE SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH FROM LATCH TO OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
$50 (LEFT), $52 (RIGHT)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ....
FAILURE OF SWITCH TO GO FROM LATCH TO OFF HAS NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. OFF SWITCH POSITION REMOVES RELAY LOGIC
POWER FOR MANUAL DOOR OPERATION. WHEN ET UMBILICAL DOOR MODE
SWITCH ($47) IS IN GPC MODE THIS WILL DISABLE ET UMBILICAL DOOR
LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3514
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH FROM OFF TO RELEASE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
ET UMBILICAL DOOR LATCH-RELEASE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: ORBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
PART NUMBER: $50 (LEFT), $52 (RIGHT)
C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE ET UMBILICAL DOORS MUST BE OPENED ASAP POSTLANDING WHEN A TAL
OR RTLS OCCURS AND FOR ANY OTHER CASE IF THERE IS AN INDICATION
OF H2 BUILDUP. POSSIBLE LOSS OR DAMAGE TO ORBITER MAY OCCUR IF
UNABLE TO UNLATCH AND OPEN UMBILICAL DOOR TO RELEASE THE H2.
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REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-289
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3515
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROL BUS FUSE
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
CONTROL BUS FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LI FTOFF : / o TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: oRBITER COCKPIT PANEL R2
P_T _BER: F36, F37, F38, F39
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, O_RLOAD, PIECE-P_T FA7LURE, VIBRATION,
MEC_ICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: '_
BLOWN FUSE REDUCES REDUNDANCY. REDUNDANT CONTROL BUSES WOULD
STILL BE ABLE TO SUPPLY NEEDED POWER FOR CENTERLINE LATCH, DOOR
M0_MENT_D UP_CK _TCH _NCTIONS. NO EFFECT ON CREW_HIC;._
OR MISSION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3516
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
AC BUS
MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL MA73CD
CB4, CBI0, CBI4
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, INADVERTENT OPERATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF CIRCUIT BREAKER CAUSES LOSS OF THE THREE PHASE AC
POWER FROM THE MAIN AC BUS. THIS CAUSES THE LOSS OF 4 MOTORS.
REDUNDANT MOTORS WILL COMPLETE FUNCTION BUT AT A REDUCED RATE.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
i
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-291
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
 /18/87
MECH/E_D/EPD&C
3517
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
2/IR
2/1R
ITS:
FAILU_ MODE:
MCA _Y _GIC POWER SWITCH
FAI_ OFF
_AD _ALYST: J. _CHER SUBSYS _AD: H.J. _RY
BRE_DO_ HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MEC_ICAL AC_ATION SYSTEM
ET _BILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISP_Y _D CONTROL
CONTROL BUS
MCA _Y _GIC POUR SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC
P_UNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR
_DING/SAFING: 2/IR
ABORT HDW/_NC
RT_: 2/IR
TAL: 2/IR
AOA: 2/IR
ATO: /
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
_CATION: P_EL _73CB
P_T _BER: $4, SI0, S14
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, MEC_ICAL SHOCK, PIECE-P_T FAILURE,
VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
SWITCH FAILING IN THE OFF POSITION CAUSES THE _SS OF CONTROL
SIGNAL TO THE ASSOCIATED RPC. SECOND RPC AL_WS CONTI_ED
OPE_TION FOR A FUNCTION BUT AT A REDUCED _TE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/_HICT._ OR MISSION.
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_FERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/18/87
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3518
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
CONTROL BUS
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL MA73CB
$4, SIO, S14
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILING IN THE ON POSITION HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE
OR MISSION. THE USE OF OTHER COCKPIT SWITCHES AND CIRCUIT
BREAKERS WILL PREVENT INADVERTENT ET UMBILICAL DOOR OPERATION.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-293
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/18/8_
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3519
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
CONTROL BUS
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF A REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
SECOND RPC CONTINUES OPERATING REDUNDANT MOTORS. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
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REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72Tg5609 _
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/18/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C FLIGHT:
3520 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER
FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATo: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT AVIONICS BAY 4, AFT AVIONICS BAY 5
PART NUMBER: AR3, AR6, AR3-AR5, AR4, AR5, AR21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER FAILING OFF HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE
OR MISSION. DEVICE IS USED TO DRIVE FLIGHT DECK TALKBACK
INDICATORS. LOSS OF ONE DEVICE REDUCES REDUNDANCY, SECOND DEVICE
WILL DRIVE TALKBACK. STATUS OF CENTERLINE LATCHES AND
READY-TO-LATCH SWITCHES IS ALSO AVAILABLE FROM TELEMETRY AND GPC
TM.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-295
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/18/87
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3521
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER
FAILS ON _!
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: /
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT AVIONICS BAY 4, AFT AVIONICS BAY 5
AR3, AR6, AR3-AR5, AR4, AR5, AR21
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HYBRID CIRCUIT DRIVER FAILING ON HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION. IF FAILURE OCCURS BEFORE DUAL MOTOR OPERATION TIME HAS
ELAPSED A PR__ TALKBACK INDICATION WOULD OCCUR. SINCE
TELEMETRY AND GPC TM WOULD NOT CONFIRM FUNCTION HAD BEEN
COMPLETED CREW CAN CONTINUE UMBILICAL DOOR CLOSURE.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3522
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
AFT MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE CAUSES A LOSS OF INPUT TO LOGIC GATES.
LOSS OF A LOGIC GATE CAUSES A LOSS OF AN ACTUATING MOTOR.
REDUNDANT DIODE WILL ALLOW CONTINUED ACTUATOR MOTOR OPERATION,
FUNCTION WILL BE COMPLETED BUT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES'. VS70-560109, VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-297
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/18/8v
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3523
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
SHORTED OUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
AFT MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: / AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SHORTED OUT DIODE HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. IN
MANUAL MODE FOR CLOSING AND LATCHING THE ET UMBILICAL DOORS A
SHORTED DIODE WOULD ALLOW POWER TO REACH THE LOGIC CIRCUIT FOR
THE OPPOSITE _NCTION, SINCETHER WOULD BE NO INPUTS TO THE
LOGIC GATES THE FAILURE DOES NOT HAVE ANY EFFECT. THE SAME
SITUATION OCCURS IF THE GPC MODE IS ACTIVE.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/18/87
MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
3524
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
SHORTS, RESISTANCE LOWER THAN RATED VALUE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
AFT MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTOR THAT SHORTS OR WITH RESISTANCE LOWER THAN RATED VALUE
WOULD ALLOW EXCESSIVE CURRENT TO REACH OTHER COMPONENTS. CURRENT
WOULD BE MORE THAN COMPONENTS WERE DESIGNED FOR. HIGHER CURRENT
CAUSES LOSS OF COMPONENTS AND LOSS OF FUNCTION. REDUNDANT
ELEMENTS WILL CONTINUE OPERATION BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-299
iINDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDACID: 3525
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 5.1K i/4W
OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
AFT MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 2/IR
/ TAL: 2/IR
/ AOA: 2/IR
2/IR ATO: /
211R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION' MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTOR FAILURE AS AN OPEN CIRCUIT WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF CURRENT
TO OTHER COMPONENTS. THIS RESULTS IN A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WHEN
AFFECTED COMPONENT CANNOT OPERATE. REDUNDANT ELEMENTS WILL
CONTINUE OPERATION BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3526
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
211R
2/1R
ITEM: RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
FAILURE MODE: RESISTANCE HIGHER THAN RATED VALUE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
AFT MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
PART NUMBER: SEE REFERENCES
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTANCE HIGHER THAN RATED VALUE CAUSES A LOSS OF CURRENT.
INPUT TO LOGIC GATE WOULD BE LESS THAN NOMINAL CAUSING A FALSE
OUTPUT. RELAY WOULD NOT BE CLOSED CAUSING A LOSS OF A ACTUATOR
MOTOR. REDUNDANT ELEMENT WOULD CONTINUE OPERATION WITH FUNCTION
CONTINUING AT A SLOWER RATE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-301
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3527
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: FUSE, IA, TO ACTUATOR STATUS SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: BLOWN ..... i _ _ _
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ETUMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
AFT MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FUSE, IA, TO ACTUATOR STATUS SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/1R
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT AVIONICS BAYS 4, 5, 6
FI, F4, F2, FI, F3, F2, F6, FS, F6, FI, F5, F7
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FUSE FAILURE CAUSES AN OPEN CIRCUIT, EFFECT IS A LOSS OF INPUT
TO LOGIC CIRCUIT CONTROLLING AC POWER RELAYS TOACTUATOI_MOTOR.
OPEN CIRCUIT WILL SIGNAL PREMATURE COMPLETION OF ACTUATOR
FUNCTION. REDUNDANT MOTOR WILL COMPLETE FUNCTION BUT AT A
REDUCED RATE. WILL GET PREMATURE TELEMETRY INDICATION OF
ACTUATOR STATUS FROM ONE PART OF PAIR. NO EFFECT ON CREW VEHICLE
OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-302
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3528
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: RESISTOR, 1.2K, TO MCA LOGIC SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: SHORTS, RESISTANCE LOWER THAN RATED VALUE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
CONTROL BUS
RESISTOR, 1.2K, TO MCA LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES : VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTOR THAT SHORTS OR WITH RESISTANCE LOWER THAN RATED VALUE
WOULD ALLOW EXCESSIVE CURRENT TO REACH RPC. THIS CAUSES RPC
CURRENT LIMITING TO TRIP OUT. RPC LOSS CAUSES LOSS OF AMC AND
ASSOCIATED MOTOR RELAYS. REDUNDANT ELEMENTS WOULD CONTINUE
OPERATION WITH FUNCTION COMPLETED AT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT
ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-303
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/18/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/ETUD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 3529
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR, 1.2K, TO MCA LOGIC SWITCH
OPEN CIRCUIT ....
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
ET UMBILICAL DOOR EPD&C
CONTROL BUS
RESISTOR, 1.2K, TO MCA LOGIC SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: / TAL: 2/IR
ONORBIT: / AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
RESISTOR FAILURE AS AN OPEN CIRCUIT WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF INPUT
TO ASSOCIATED RPC. LOSS OF RPC IN TURN CAUSES LOSS OF AMC AND
ASSOCIATED MOTOR RELAYS. REDUNDANT ELEMENTS WOULD CONTINUE
OPERATION WITH FUNCTION COMPLETED AT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT
ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
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REFERENCES: VS70-560109, VS72-956099
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KU-BAND DEPLOY ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
C-305
KU-BAND DEPLOY ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
MDAC-ID
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
4101 * I/i
4102 * 2/2
4103 * I/i
4104 * I/I
4105 * 2/IR
4106 * 2/IR
41o7 3/1R
4108 3/3
4109 * 2/IR
4110 * 2/IR
4111 * 2/IR
4112 * 2/IR
4113 3/3
4500 3/3
45oi 3/3
4502 3/3
4503 3/3
4504 3/3
4505 3/3
4506 3/3
4507 3/3
4508 * 3/2R
4509 * 3/IR
4510 * 3/2R
4511 * 3/IR
4512 * 3/2R
4513 * 3/IR
4514 * 3/2R
4515 * 3/IR
4516 * 3/IR
4517 * 3/2R
4518 * 3/IR
4519 * 3/2R
4520 * 3/IR
4521 * 3/2R
4522 * 3/IR
4523 * 3/2R
4524 3/3
4525 * 3/2R
4526 3/3
4527 * 3/2R
4528 3/3
4529 * 3/2 R
4530 3/3
4531 * 3/2R
313
3/3
3/3
I/i
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
INA
INA
tNA
_NA
tNA
tNA
tNA
INA
tNA
_NA
_NA
INA
INA
INA
INA
tNA
INA
INA
tNA
INA
INA
tNA
tNA
tNA
INA
tNA
tNA
tNA
tNA
tNA
tNA
INA
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
PPP
P PP
P FP
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
PFP
P FP
P F P
P F P
P FP
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
P F P
(*) Potential Critical Items.
GUILLOTINE/PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
GUILLOTINE/PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
NUT/BREECH
NUT/BREECH
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
INPUT/OUTPUT S_FT - HOUSING
STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 2)
STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 2)
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($5 & 6)
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($5 & 6)
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #1
+28V CONTACT #1
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
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MDAC-ID
4532 *
4533 *
4534 *
4535 *
4536 *
4537 *
4538 *
4539 *
4540
4541
4542
4543 *
4544 *
4545 *
4546 *
4547 *
4548 *
4549 *
4550 *
4551 *
4552 *
4553 *
4554 *
4555 *
4556 *
4557 *
4558 *
4559 *
4560 *
4561 *
4562 *
4563 *
4564 *
4565 *
4566 *
4567 *
4568
4569 *
4570
4571 *
4572 *
4573 *
4574 *
4575 *
4576 *
K-J-BAND DEPLOY ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/1R /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/1R /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P Y P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/3 /NA
3/2R /NA P F P
3/3 /NA
3/2R /NA P F P
3/1R /NA P Y P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
TALKBACK
TALKBACK
TALKBACK
AND GATE #1
AND GATE #i
AND GATE #2
AND GATE #2
AND GATE #1
AND GATE #1
AND GATE #2
AND GATE #2
AMP #1
AMP #i
AMP #2
AMP #2
AMP #1
AMP #i
AMP #2
AMP #2
KI4
KI4
K68
K68
K72
K72
K70
K70
STOW MICROSWITCH #i
STOW MICROSWITCH #i
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #I
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #I
AND GATE #1
AND GATE #i
AND GATE #2
AND GATE #2
AND GATE #i
AND GATE #1
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-307
IMDAC-ID
4577 *
4578 *
4579 *
4580 *
4581 *
4582 *
4583 *
4584 *
4585 *
4586 *
4587 *
4588 *
4589 *
4591 *
4592 *
4593 *
4594 *
4595 *
4596 *
4597
4598 *
4599
4600 *
4601 *
4602 *
4603 *
4604 *
4605 *
4606 *
4607 *
4608
4609
4610
4611
4612
4613
4614
4615
4616 *
4617 *
4618 *
4619 *
4620
4621
4622
KU-BAND DEPLOY ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS _ _ _...._
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
3/IR /NA P F P
312R /NA P F P
3/2R /NAP F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P FP
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA p F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/2R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/3 /NA
3/2R /NA P F P
3/3 /NA
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/1R /NA P F P
3/1R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
=
AND GATE #2
AND GATE#2
AMP #1
AMP #1
AMP #2
AMP #2
AMP #1
AMP #1
AMP #2 ....
AMP #2
K25
K25 =
K2
K2
K27
K27_
K37
K37
STOW MICROSWITCH #2
STOW MICROSWITCH #2
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #2
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #2
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #1
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #1
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
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(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-308
I
I
l
Ni
i
w
i
m
w
i
u
KU-BAND DEPLOY ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC- ID H/F H/F A B C
4623 3/3 /NA
4624 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4625 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4626 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4627 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4628 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4629 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4630 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4631 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4632 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4633 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4634 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4635 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4636 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4637 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4638 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4639 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4640 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4641 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4642 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4643 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4644 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4645 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4646 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4647 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4648 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4649 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4650 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4651 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4652 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4653 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4654 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4655 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4656 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4657 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4658 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4659 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4660 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4661 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4662 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4663 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4664 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4665 * 3/IR /NA P F P
4666 * 3/1R /NA P F P
4667 * 3/IR /NA P F P
ITEM NAME
IIIIIIIIIIIIIIIII I II
+28V CONTACT #2
AND GATE #i
AND GATE #i
AND GATE #2
AND GATE #2
40 MS TIME DELAY
40 MS TIME DELAY
AMP #1
AMP #1
AND GATE #3
AND GATE #3
4 SECOND TIME DELAY
4 SECOND TIME DELAY
AMP #3
AMP #3
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
AND GATE #I
AND GATE #1
AND GATE #2
AND GATE #2
40 MS TIME DELAY
40 MS TIME DELAY
AMP #1
AMP #i
AND GATE #3
AND GATE #3
4 SECOND TIME DELAY
4 SECOND TIME DELAY
AMP #3
AMP #3
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
AMP #2
AMP #2
AMP #2
AMP #2
CONVERTER
CONVERTER
INVERTED AND GATE
INVERTED AND GATE
w
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-309
MDAC - I D
4668 *
4669 *
4670 *
4671 *
4672
4673
4674 *
4675 *
4676 *
4677 *
4678 *
4679 *
4680 *
4681 *
4682 *
4683 *
4684
4685
4686 *
4687 *
KU-BAND DEPLOY ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/iR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/3 /NA
3/3 /NA
3/IS /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/1R /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA P F P
3/IR /NA .... P F P
313 ....
3/3 INA
311R INA P F P
3/IR /NA P F
ITEM NAME
_u in _mm_m
CAPACITOR BANK
CAPACITOR BANK
AND GATE
AND GATE
AMP
AMP
TEST LOGIC
TEST LOGIC
CONVERTER
CONVERTER
INVERTED AND GATE
INVERTED AND GATE
CAPACITOR BANK
CAPACITOR BANK
AND GATE
AND GATE
AMP
AMP
TEST LOGIC
TEST LOGIC
m
m
i
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g
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ms
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mm
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(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-310
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT: i/I
MDAC ID: 4101 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: GUILLOTINE/PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS MID-TRAVEL, FAILS TO CLOSE, INTERNAL
LEAKAGE, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE),
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
JETTISON ASSEMBLY
GUILLOTINE/PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
KU-BAND ANTENNA
SKD26100105-201/301
CAUSES:
JAMMED
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO PROPERLY SECURE/EJECT THE ANTENNA. ANTENNA WOULD BE
SECURED BY ONLY THE CABLE OR PARTIAL CABLE. EVA WOULD BE
REQUIRED TO SEVER THE CABLE AND EJECT THE DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM OR
PROPERLY SECURE THE DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-311
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 4102 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM: GUILLOTINE/PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
FAILURE MODE: PREMA_ OPERATION _ .......
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
JETTISON ASSEMBLY
GUILLOTINE/PRESSURE CARTRIDGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/2 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION-.
PART NUMBER:
KU-BANDANTENNA
SKD26100105-201/301
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE,
ACCELERATION, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF KU-BAND COMMUNICATION SYSTEM. DEPENDING ON MISSION
REQUIREMENTS, COULD _AN LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-312
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 4103 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: NUT/BREECH
FAILURE MODE: INTERNAL/EXTERNAL LEAKAGE, PHYSICAL
BINDING/JAMMING, RESTRICTED FLOW, STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE),
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
JETTISON ASSEMBLY
NUT/BREECH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
KU-BAND ANTENNA
SKD26100105-501/601
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, JAMMED
w
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO PROPERLY SECURE/EJECT THE ANTENNA. EVA WORK AROUND
WOULD BE REQUIRED TO PROPERLY SECURE/EJECT THE DEPLOYMENT
MECHANISM.
w
v
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
_ REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-313
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD
MDAC ID: 4104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
i/I
ITEM: NUT/BREECH
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE OPERATION ................
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
JETTISON ASSEMBLY
NUT/BREECH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH : 2/2 RTLS : 1/1
LI FTOFF" 1/1 TAL: i/1
ONORBIT: i/1 AOA: 1/1
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO : 1/1
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
KU-BAND ANTENNA
SKD26100105-601/501
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE,
ACCELERATION, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
UNABLE TO PROPERLY SECURE/EJECT THE ANTENNA. ANTENNA WOULD BE
SECURED-BY-ONL_ THE CABLE OR PARTIAL CABLE. EVA WOULD BE
REQUIRED TO SEVER THE CABLE AND EJECT THE DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM OR
PROPERLY SECURE THE DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM.
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-314
l
wDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
6126187
MECH/KBD
4105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE :
(RUPTURE)
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT-HOUSING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
KU-BAND ANTENNA
TBD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, ACCCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO DEPLOY/STOW THE ANTENNA.
SYSTEM POSSIBLY PLBD CLOSURE.
INHIBIT KU-BAND COMMUNICATION
w
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
r _
=
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-315
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDACID: 4106 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
FAIL U_MODE: FAILS TO START/STOPAS CORDED & ROTATES FREELY
IN DEPLOYMENT PLANE.
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT-HOUSING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
KU-BAND ANTENNA
TBD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, ACCCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO DEPLOY/STOW THE ANTENNA.
SYSTEM POSSIBLY PLBD CLOSURE.
INHIBIT KU-BAND COMMUNICATION
l
mR#
mm
l
i
i
g
U
B
z
mS
i
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
u
g
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-316
J
B
w2
w
w
=
I
i
L
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 4107 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 2) ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, PREMATURE
OPERATION, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY
STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY
S 1 & 2, V070-544903
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES ANTENNA STOWED WHEN IT MAY BE DEPLOYED.
ANTENNA IS DEPLOYED, STOW CAPABILITY WOULD BE INHIBITED.
IF THE
REFERENCES: V070-54490i,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-317
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 4108 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 2) ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, PREMATURE
OPERATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY
STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (Sl & S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY
S 1 & 2, V070-544903
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION,INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES ANTENNA NOT STOWED WHEN IT MAY BE PROPERLY
SECURED. _ MOTORS WOULD CONTINUE TO TURN UNTIL OFF COMMAND IS
TRANSMITTED. CREW WOULD BE REQUIRED TO DETERMINE CONFIGURATION.
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-318
I
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4109 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($5 & 6)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, PREMATURE
OPERATION, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($5 & 6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY
S5 & $6, V070-54903
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES ANTENNA DEPLOYED WHEN IT MAY BE STOWED. IF THE
ANTENNA IS STOWED, DEPLOYMENT CAPABILITY WOULD BE INHIBITED. IF
THE ANTENNA IS PARTIALLY DEPLOYED AND KU POWER ON POSSIBLE
ORBITER IMPACT WITH ANTENNA INITIALIZATION INITIATION.
n
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002' VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
u
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-319
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE: 6/26/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 4110 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($5 & 6)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, PREMATURE
OPERATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST; H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES (S5 & 6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: DEPLOYMENT ASSEMBLY ....
PART NUMBER: $5 & $6, V070-54903
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES ANTENNA NOT DEPLOYED WHEN IT MAY BE DEPLOYED.
MOTORS WOULD CONTINUE TO TURN UNTIL OFF COMMAND IS TRANSMITTED.
TRANSMIT SCAN ENABLE WOULD BE INHIBITED AND KU-BAND COMMUNICATION
LOST.
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REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-000_, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64 u
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-320
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87
MECH/KBD
4111
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FRACTURE
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
KU-BAND ANTENNA
MC287-0026-0002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
JAMMED, FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO STOW/DEPLOY ANTENNA.
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-321
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
6/26/87
MECH/KBD
4112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT-.
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
3/3
GEARTRAIN ASSEMBLY
FAILS TO REMAIN IN POSITION, FREELY ROTATES
SUBSYSLEAD: H.J. LOWERYLEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT MECHANISM
ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
o)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
B [ P ] C [ P ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
KU-BAND ANTENNA
MC287-0026-0002
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL
FAILU_2 VIBRATION, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO STOW OR DEPLOY ANTENNA.
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-322
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
6/26/87
MECH/KBD
4113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 4101 - 4112
ALL FAILURE MODES
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND ANTENNA DEPLOYMENT SUBSYSTEM
ALL REMAINING PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
KU-BAND ANTENNA
ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 4101 - 4112
CAUSES: ALL CAUSES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 4101 - 4112 WILL HAVE
NO EFFECT ON MISSION, VEHICLE OR CREW.
REFERENCES: V070-544901,2,3, SSSH DWG NO 15.7/16.5 SHEET 1 & 2,
SKD26100105, MC287-0026-0002, VS72-956099 SHEET 63 & 64
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-323
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/14/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4500
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3_
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DIRECT STOW
ON POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART _BER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS .DC .SW. DS .OP. CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-324
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
!)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DIRECT STOW
ON POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW. DS.OP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-325
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DIRECT STOW
ON POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4503
HIGHEST CRITICALITy HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DIRECT STOW
ON POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-327
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDE_ ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WO_SHEET
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
l) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
M-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DIRE_ STOW
ON POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4505
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DIRECT STOW
ON POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c [
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
w REFERENCES:
o
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-329
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DIRECT STOW
ON POSITION
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DIRECT STOW
ON POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OP.CN4
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
m
z
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-331
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4508
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #I
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DIRECT STOW
OFF POSITION
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OFP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
STOWAGE OF THE ANTENNA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4509
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
/
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #I
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DIRECT STOW
OFF POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.DS.OFP.CNI
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-333
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4510
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT'.
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHYz
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) DIRECT STOW
7) OFF POSITION
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OFP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT _FAILURES__ COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
STOWAGE OF THE ANTENNA. _
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4511
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DIRECT STOW
OFF POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL R13A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OFP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-335
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4512
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DIRECT STOW
OFF POSITION
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OFP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
STOWAGE OF THE ANTENNA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/14/57
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4513
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DIRECT STOW
OFF POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OFP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-337
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/KBD/EPD&C FLIGHT:
4514 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
E_CTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DIRECT STOW
OFF POSITION
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OFP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE uNC0_D
STOWAGEOF THE ANTENNA.
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4515
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) DIRECT STOW
7) OFF POSITION
8)
S)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT HDW/FUNC _
RTLS: /
TAL: /
AOA: /
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DS.OFP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
n
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-339
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/KBD/EPD&C FLIGHT:
4516 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #I
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEPLOY GROUND STOW
DEPLOY POSITION
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
\
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
C [ P ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCO_DED
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORESHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4517
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
DEPLOY POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-341
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 4518 ABORT: /
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGO_RY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) DEPLOY GROUND STOW
7) DEPLOY POSITION
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LiFT0_F: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CN2
c[p]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCO_DED
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-342
mm
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4519
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
7) DEPLOY POSITION
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-343
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE : 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4520
+28V CONTACT #3ITEM:
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
5 ) SWITCHES
6 ) DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
7) DEPLOY POSITION
8)
9)
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-344
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4521
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
7) DEPLOY POSITION
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
3/2R AOA:
/ ATO:
/
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-345
INDEPENDENTQRBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDACID: 4522
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
DEPLOY POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS : /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-346
l
z
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4523
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
DEPLOY POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.DP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-347
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/14/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4524
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DE PLOY/GROUND/S TOW
GROUND POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-348
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4525
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
GROUND POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES"
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-349
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/KBD/EPD&C FLIGHT:
4526 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
7) GROUND POSITION
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /
TAL: /
AOA: /
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4527
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
GROUND POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-351
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4528
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT : /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
E_CTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEPLOY GROUND STOW
GROUND POSITION
SUBSYS LEAD: H. J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CN3
c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4529
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM"
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
GROUND POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-353
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
s/14/sv
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4530
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
7) GROUND POSITION
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: _ / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4531
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
K-U-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
GROUND POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT; 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.GP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-355
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITE_R_S_UBSYSTEMANALYSfS_WQRKSHET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4532
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #I
FAILS SHORTED _ _L u_r
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3 ) EI__CTRI CAL
4) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
5 ) SWITCHES
6 ) DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
7) STOW POSITION
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.SP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4533
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) DEPLOY GROUND STOW
7) STOW POSITION
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.SP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-357
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: ............. 8!14187
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4534
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
STOW POSITION
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL R13A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.SP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-358
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4535
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEPLOY GROUND STOW
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.SP.CN2
rCAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-359
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
s/14/sv
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4536
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS SHORTED
_ _ _ _t_ _
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEP_Y/GRO_D/STOW
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.DGS.SP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-360
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4537
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
STOW POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.SP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-361
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4538
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEPLOY GROUND STOW
STOW POSITION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
\
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: /
/ TAL: /
3/2R AOA: /
/ ATO: /
/
A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.SP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-362
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4539
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/iR
/
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DE PLOY/GROUND/S TOW
STOW POSITION
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS. DC.SW. DGS.SP. CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87
l
C-363
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYST_ ANALYSIS _WO__T
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4540
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_C
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABOR_T: /
ITEM:
FAILU_ MODE:
TA_BACK
FAI_ TO DEPLOY
T._AD _ALYST: A.D. MONTGO_RY
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
i) MEC_ICAL AC_ATION SYSTEM
2) _-B_D DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
3) ET_CTRICAL
4) DISP_YS _D CONTRO_
5) SWITCHES
6) DEP_Y/GRO_D/STOW
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT
PRE_UNCH: / RT_:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
_DING/SAFING: /
SUBSYS L_AD: H.J. _WERY
HDWI_C
/
/
/
/
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
_CATION: DISP_Y _D CONTROL P_EL RI3A2
P_T _BER: KBS.DC.SW._S.TB
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
TA_BACK _Y NOT SHOW CO_ECT STATUS.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-364
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/14/sv
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4541
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TALKBACK
FAILS TO BARBERPOLE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEPLOY GROUND STOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /
TAL: /
AOA: /
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
KBS.DC.SW.DGS.TB
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TALKBACK MAY NOT SHOW CORRECT STATUS.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-365
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER sUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4542
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM: TALKBACK
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO STOW
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
KU-BAND DEPLOY SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAYS AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
DEPLOY/GROUND/STOW
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /:
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: DISPLAY AND CONTROL PANEL RI3A2
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW. DGS.TB
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/I_.TIONALE:
TALKBACK MAY NOT SHOW CORRECT STATUS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4543
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
STOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AGI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-367
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSME_NT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4544
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM: AND GATE #I
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
STOW
CRITICALITIES
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: ,/
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AGI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
i
I
m
mm
mm
g
I
i
J
g
m
m
l
m
I
g
REFERENCES:
I
U
B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-368
D
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±INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4545
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
STOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD CAUSE UNCOMMANDED
STOWAGE OF THE ANTENNA.
t
w
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-369
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDACID: 4546
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM: AND GATE #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-B_D SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
STOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
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REFERENCES:
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m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-370
I
z
m
wDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4547
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
DEPLOY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.EP.AGI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-371
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4548
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2 ) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4) MMC2
5) DEPLOY
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: •
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.EP.AGI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-372
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u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4549
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM: AND GATE #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
DEPLOY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.EP.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-373
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDACID: 4550
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM: AND GATE #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
DEPLOY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.EP.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT ....
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-374
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE"
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/14/sv
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4551
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #I
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
STOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AMI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE ii/25/87 C-375
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
":_ "T
8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/KBD/EPD&C FLIGHT:
4552 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
STOW
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AMI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-376
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4553
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
STOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES"
=
m
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-377
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/KBD/EPD&C FLIGHT:
4554 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM. "
FAILURE MODE :
AMP #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDO_HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
STOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION. "
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-378
m
I
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4555
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2 ) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4) MMC2
5 ) DEPLOY
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS .MC2. STW. AM1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-379
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/KBD/EPD&C FLIGHT:
4556 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
DEPLOY
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AMI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NQI_MMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
l
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-380
U
ww
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4557
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM: AMP #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
DEPLOY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-381
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4558
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY!
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
DEPLOY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.STW.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT ....
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4559
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
KI4
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ICJ-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.KI4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
w
REFERENCES:
w
u
u
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-383
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET...._
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4560
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM: KI4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /
TAL: /
AOA: /
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.KI4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA'
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
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U
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-384
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4561
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
K68
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.K68
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
u
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-385
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4562
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM: K68
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
MMC2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LiFTOFF: • / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.K68
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-386
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4563
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
K72
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.K72
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
u
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-387
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4564
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
!
ITEM: K72
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) MMC2
5) RELAY
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ..... ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / _TLS :
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.K72
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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REFERENCES:
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B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-388
m
im
E
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4565
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
K70
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
5)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
E LE CTRI CAL
MMC2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDWIFUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.K70
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-389
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4566
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM: K70
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
_)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC2
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: i / _ ATO: 7-i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC2.RLY.K70
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-390
I
I
mDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8114/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4567
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STOW MICROSWITCH #I
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.SMS.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE MOTOR DURING STOW OPERATIONS.
COULD PREVENT STOWAGE OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES
REFERENCES:
=
m
m_
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-391
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4568
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STOW MICROSWITCH #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H. J. LOWERY
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
3/3 AOA:
/ ATO:
HDWIFUNC
/
/
/
/
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.SMS.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'.
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4569
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWNHIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: KBS.DMS.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE MOTOR DURING DEPLOY OPERATIONS.
COULD PREVENT DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES
REFERENCES:
=
w
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-393
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/KBD/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/3
4570 ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
° _
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DMS.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c [ ]
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-394
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4571
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
STOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.STW.AGI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
_mm
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-395
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4572
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
STOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
.... ,
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.STW.AGI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-396
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4573
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
STOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.STW.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-397
m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4574
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM: AND GATE #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) K'J-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
STOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / i RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: / ......
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.STW.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-398
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4575
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
DEPLOY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDWIFUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AGI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
w
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-399
E_: i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/sv
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4576
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
DEPLOY
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AGI
B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PiECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-400
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4577
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
e)
9)
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
MMC4
DEPLOY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
w
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-401
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: _CH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAc ID: 4578
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_NC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
AB0_T_ _ /_
ITEM: AND GATE #2
FAILURE MODE: FAI_ OPEN
T._AD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS _AD: H.J. LO_RY
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
I) _C_ICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ET._.CTRICAL
_C4
DEP_Y
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/F_C
PRE_UNCH: / RT_: /
LIFTOFF : _ / TAL: - / _
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
_DING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUCTU_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
NO I_DIATE EFFECT_ ....SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-402
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mm
mDATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4579
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
STOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LA/_DING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.STW.AMI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-403
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
__UBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4580
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #1
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
STOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS : /
TAL: /
AOA: /
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS. MC4. STW. AM1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALEs
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-404
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4581
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
STOW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.STW.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-405
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/8"I
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4582
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) MMc4
5) STOW
6)
v)
s)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.STW.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVE_ STOWAGE
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-406
m
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4583
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
DEPLOY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AM1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
L
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-407
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4584
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
K-J-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
DEPLOY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AMI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-408
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4585
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM: AMP #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
DEPLOY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-409
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4586
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/2R
ABORT: /
+
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
DEPLOY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.DEP.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-410
m
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4587
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
K25
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K25
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
L_
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-411
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDACID: 4588
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM: K25
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
HDW/FUNC .
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K25
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
811418v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4589
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
312R
I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
K2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) K-J-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) MMC4
5) RELAY
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
_NORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
m_
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-413
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4591
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM: K2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
RELAY
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / ....... RTLS: ........./ _ii
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO iMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COUL_D_T STOWAGE
OF THE ANTENNA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4592
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
K27
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
l) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2 ) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4) MMC4
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: _ / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K27
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
u
u
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-415
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4593
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM: K27
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
E_CTRICAL
MMC4
RELAY
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: /
/ TAL: _ /
3/2R AOA: /
/ ATO: /
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K27
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/sv
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4594
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
K37
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K37
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT STOWAGE
REFERENCES:
L
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-417
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/14/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4595
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM: K37
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
MMC4
RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.MC4.RLY.K37
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/14/sv
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4596
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STOW MICROSWITCH #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT
RTLS :
TAL:
AOA:
ATO :
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.SMS.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE MOTOR DURING STOW OPERATIONS.
COULD PREVENT STOWAGE OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-419
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4597
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STOW MICROSWITCH #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HiE_CHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
B)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
_NDiNG/SAFiNG: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.SMS.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID :
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4598
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
12_NDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS. DMS. 2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF ONE MOTOR DURING DEPLOY OPERATIONS. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES
COULD PREVENT DEPLOYMENT OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-421
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER_ SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/14/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4599
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DEPLOY MICROSWITCH #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRiTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DMS.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4600
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
ARM/SAFE
ARM POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.AP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON ANTENNA.
w REFERENCES:
t
m
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-423
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4601
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
ARM/SAFE
ARM POSITION
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.AP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4602
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
ARM/SAFE
ARM POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.AP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON ANTENNA.
=
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-425
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4603
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
ARM/SAFE
ARM POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.AP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO _DIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4604
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
ARM/SAFE
ARM POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.AP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-427
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4605
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
K'J-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
ARM/SAFE
ARM POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.AP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4606
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) ARM/SAFE
7) ARM POSITION
8)
s)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.AP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
L_ REPORT DATE 11/25/87
C-429
ui
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4607
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT'.
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6 ) ARM/SAFE
7) ARM POSITION
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.AP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4608
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
ARM/SAFE
SAFE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.SP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
m
u
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-431
DATE"
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/KBD/EPD&C FLIGHT:
4609 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
ARM/SAFE
SAFE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.SP.CNI
B[ ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
m
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mm
i
m
I
mm
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i
m
mm
m
N
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-432
[]
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4610
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
ARM/SAFE
SAFE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.SP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-433
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKS_ET =
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/8_
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4611
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3 ==
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
ARM/SAFE
SAFE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.SP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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REFERENCES'. mI
i
mm
U
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-434
mm
=m
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/21/sv
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4612
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) ARM/SAFE
7) SAFE POSITION
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.SP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
.m.,
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-435
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4613
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
ARM/SAFE
SAFE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.SP.CN3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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REFERENCES:
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N
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-436
u
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4614
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #4
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
ARM/SAFE
SAFE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.SP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-437
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4615
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM: +28V CONTACT #4
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
ARM/SAFE
SAFE POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDWIFUNC
/
/
/
/
c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.AS.SP.CN4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
M
m
I
mm
B
D
g
U
m
ms
REFERENCES:
I
B
I
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-438
g
mm
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w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4616
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
JETTISON/SAFE
JETTISON POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.JP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
i .
m
w
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-439
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8121187
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4617
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
JETTISON/SAFE
JETTISON POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.JP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PR_ JETTISON
OF THE ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-440
U
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4618
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
JETTISON/SAFE
JETTISON POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.JP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT. SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON ANTENNA.
REFERENCES:
m
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-441
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4619
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
JETTISON/SAFE
JETTISON POSITION
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.JP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATiONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
REFERENCES:
I
I
=
m
i
I
im
ms
II
i
I
i
I
m
I
I
i
I
I
I
I
I
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-442
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
B/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4620
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) JETTISON/SAFE
7) SAFE POSITION
B)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.SP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
m
=
r_
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-443
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4621
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #i
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) JETTISON/SAFE
7) SAFE POSITION
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
3/3 AOA:
/ ATO:
/
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.SP.CNI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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REFERENCES:
m
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m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-444
I
B
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i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8121187
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4622
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
5) SWITCHES
6) JETTISON/SAFE
7) SAFE POSITION
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.SP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-445
=
-w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/sv
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4623
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
+28V CONTACT #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
DISPLAY AND CONTROLS
SWITCHES
JETTISON/SAFE
SAFE POSITION
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
3/3 AOA:
/ ATO:
/
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.DC.SW.JS.SP.CN2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-446
I
mm
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4624
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AGI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-447
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4625
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AGI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
m
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REFERENCES:
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I
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-448
u
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4626
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) LCAI
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-449
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/2x/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4627
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #2
FAILS OPEN
T,_AD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
I
I
I
I
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4628
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
40 MS TIME DELAY
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
./
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS. LCI. MTD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
=
w
u
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-451
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21187 .
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4629
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
40 MS TIME DELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2 ) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4 ) LCAI
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
3/IR AOA:
/ ATO:
/
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.MTD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-452
I
I
ww
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4630
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM: ' AMP #I
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
I
I
I
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AMI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-453
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDACID: 4631
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM: _P #i
FAILURE MODE: FAI_ OPEN
T._AD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MEC_ICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) LCAI
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT P_SE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RT_:
/ TAL:
3/IR AOA:
/ ATO:
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/_C
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AMI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFE_.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
_FERENCES:
I
i
mm
z
mm
I
Ill
i
I
1
lip
I
1
I
1
1
1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-454
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4632
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #3
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AG3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
w
w
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-455
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4633
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
_D GATE #3
FAI_ OPEN
7._AD _ALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2 ) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4 ) LCAI
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE_UNCH: / RT_:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/iR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
_DING/SAFING: /
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. _WERY
B [ F ]
HDW/_C
/
/
/
/
c[P]
_CATION:
P_T _BER: KBS.LCI.AG3
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUC_L FAILLE
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
NO I_EDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE _TENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-456
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4634
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
4 SECOND TIME DELAY
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDLrNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c[P]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.STD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-457
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/21/87
MECHIKBD/EPD&C
4635
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
4 SECOND TIME DELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.STD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-458
m
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4636
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #3
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS. LC 1. AM3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
u
L
= :
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-459
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4637
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AM3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-460
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/8v
MECH}KBD/EPD&C
4638
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: ' /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
GUILLOTINE PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.GP.EI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATEEFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
=
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-461
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4639
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
GUILLOTINE PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.GP.EI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-462
i
i
mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM'.
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4640
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
NUT PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.NP.EI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
w
n
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u
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-463
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8721787 :
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4641
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRI CAL
LCAI
NUT PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.NP.EI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
B
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-464
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4642
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #I
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
I
I
I
I
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AGI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
u
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-465
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4643
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #I
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AGI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-466
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4644
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
w
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-467
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4645
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.AG2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4646
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
40 MS TIME DELAY
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS. LC3. MTD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-469
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4647
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
40 MS TIME DELAY
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.MTD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
m
l
,,m
m
i
m
g
,,m
mm
mm
z
m
mm
m
m
D
m
REFERENCES:
a
g
z
m
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-470
B
m
i
wu
u
w
w
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4648
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #i
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KTJ-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) LCA3
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AMI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
r-
u
REFERENCES:
W
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-471
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/2i/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4649
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM: AMP #i
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) LCA3
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDWIFUNC
I
/
I
I
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AMI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
m
I
ms
mm
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mm
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mm
mm
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I
REFERENCES:
D
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-472
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wm
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i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4650
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #3
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AoA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AG3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
w
w
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-473
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4651
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[F] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AG3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO I_DIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
mm
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REFERENCES:
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U
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-474
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4652
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
4 SECOND TIME DELAY
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
3/IR AOA:
/ ATO:
/
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.STD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
W
c
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-475
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/21/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4653
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT-.
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
4 SECOND TIME DELAY
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HiE_CHY: ....._ _:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL ....
4) LCA3
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / - RTLS: / -
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
_DiNG/SAFING: / ........
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.STD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO I_DIATE-E-FFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT ?AILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
I
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REFERENCES:
I
B
l
U
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-476
U
mm
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4654
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #3
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
K'J-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AM3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
w
m
= =
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-477
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4655
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #3
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) LCA3
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
RTLS : /
TAL: /
AOA: /
ATO: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS. LC3. AM3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
m
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mm
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REFERENCES:
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g
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-478
l
M
um
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4656
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
GUILLOTINE PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.GP.EI
B [ F ] c[P]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
L
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-479
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4657
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
_vB_D SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
GUILLOTINE PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.GP.EI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
REFERENCES:
u
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-480
D
l
nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4658
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
NUT PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.NP.EI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
w
R
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-481
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4659
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT".
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3 "
NUT PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.NP.EI
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
REFERENCES:
I
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-482
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4660
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM: AMP #2
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-483
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4661
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
3/IR AOA:
/ ATO:
/
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO I_EDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
E
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REFERENCES:
B
L _
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B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-484
I
wr
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4662
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #2
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-485
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4663
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP #2
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
"#)
8)
9)
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
LCA3
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.AM2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
REFERENCES:
m
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mm
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m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-486
i
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4664
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONVERTER
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA1
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.CON
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-487
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4665
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONVERTER
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.CON
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO I_EDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PRE_NT JETTISON
REFERENCES:
m
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-488
m
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w
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W
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM"
MDAC ID:
8/21/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4666
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTED AND GATE
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3) ELECTRICAL
4) LCAI
5) pic
6)
v)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.IAG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
w
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-489
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4667
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTED AND GATE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
PIC
\
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.IAG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
REFERENCES:
I
mm
w
D
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l
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l
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-490
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w
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w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4668
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAPACITOR BANK
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.CB
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES :
w
L
w
W
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-491
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4669
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAPACITOR BANK
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[p]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.CB
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
l
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REFERENCES:
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m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-492
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m
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
s/21/s7
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4670
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/ZR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH : / RTLS :
LI FTOFF : / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.AG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
t
= =
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-493
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4671
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE
FAI_ OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.AG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
REFERENCES-.
i
i
m
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z
m
B
m
B
m
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m
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l
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I
D
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-494
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w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4672
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM: AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.AMP
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-495
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4673
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM: AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCAI
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LCI.PIC.AMP
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
J
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m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-496
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER AssESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4674
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEST LOGIC
FAILS SHORTED
_AD _ALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. _WERY
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
I) MEC_ICAL AC_ATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_-B_D SUBSYSTEM
E_CTRICAL
LCAI
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_NC ABORT
P_UNCH: / RT_:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
_NDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/_C
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER: KBS.LCI.PIC.TL
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUCTU_L FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
NO I_EDIATE EFFECT.
_TENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
w
REFERENCES:
w
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-497
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4675
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEST LOGIC
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
E LE CTRI CAL
LCAI
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION."
PART NUMBER: KBS. LCI. PIC. TL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE _-_
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
m
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REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-498
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4676
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONVERTER
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
I
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.CON
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
t .
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-499
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4677
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONVERTER
FAILS OPEN
T._AD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. _RY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
_-B_D SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRE_UNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
_DING/SAFING: /
HDW/_NC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.CON
CAUSES: PIECE-P_T STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES CouLD PREVENT JETTISON
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4678
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTED AND GATE
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDWIFUNC
/
/
/
/
c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.IAG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-501
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4679
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INVERTED AND GATE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.IAG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE-.
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-502
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4680
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAPACITOR BANK
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.CB
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-503
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/8v
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4681
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CAPACITOR BANK
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.CB
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-504
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4682
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM: AND GATE
FAILURE MODE: FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
PIC
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS :
/ TAL:
3/IR AOA:
/ ATO:
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.AG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
m
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-505
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/21/s7
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4683
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AND GATE
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.AG
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
REFERENCES:
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-506
mm
[]
mw
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4684
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
AMP
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.AMP
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
m
REFERENCES:
L
W
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-507
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/KBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 4685
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/
ITEM: AMP
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.AMP
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-508
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4686
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEST LOGIC
FAILS SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2 ) K'J-BAND SUBSYSTEM
3 ) ELECTRICAL
4 ) LCA3
5) pic
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/
/.
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.TL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD JETTISON THE
REFERENCES:
l
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-509
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
8/21/87
MECH/KBD/EPD&C
4687
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TEST LOGIC
FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
KU-BAND SUBSYSTEM
ELECTRICAL
LCA3
PIC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: KBS.LC3.PIC.TL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO IMMEDIATE EFFECT.
OF THE ANTENNA.
SUBSEQUENT FAILURES COULD PREVENT JETTISON
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-510
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PAYOAD BAY DOORS _ALYSIS WORKSHEETS
i
L
m
C-511
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC-ID H/F H/F A B C
5101 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
5102 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5103 3/3 3/3
5104 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5105 3/3 3/3
5106 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5107 * 1/1 1/1
5108 * 2/1R 2/1R P F P
5109 * 1/1 1/i
511o • i/1 1/1
5111 * 1/l i/1
5112 * I/i i/i
5113 * i/i i/I
5114 * i/i 1/1
5115 * 1/1 1/1
5116 3/3 3/3
5117 3/2R 3/2R P P P
5118 3/3 /NA
5119 * 2/1R /NA P P P
5120 * 1/1 1/1
5121 * 1/1 1/1
5122 * 1/1 1/1
5123 • 2/1R 2/IR P N P
5124 3/3 /NA
5125 _* 2/IR 2/IR P N P
5126 3/3 3/3
5127 * 2/1R /NA P N F
5128 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5129 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5130 * 2/1R 2/1R P N F
5131 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5132 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5133 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5134 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5135 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5136 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5137 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5138 * 2/IR 2/1R P N P
5139 * 2/1R /NA P N P
5140 * 2/IR 2/IR P N P
5141 3/3 3/3
5142 3/3 /NA
5143 * 2/IR /NA P P P
5144 3/3 /NA
5145 * 2/IR /NA P P P
ITEM NAME
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MTR
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MTR
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MTR
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MTR
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MTR
CENTERLINE/BUL_EAD LATCH MTR
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG
CL/BLKMD TORQUE LIMITER
CL/BLKHD TORQUE LIMITER
CL/BLKHD TORQUE LIMITER
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD GEARBOX
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD GEARBOX
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD GEARBOX
CL/BLKHD SWITCH OPEN LIMIT
CL/BLKHD SWITCH OPEN LIMIT
CL/BLKHD CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH
CL/BLKHD CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH
CLLG TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLINGS
CLLG TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLINGS
CENTERLINE LATCH ASSEMBLY
CENTERLINE LATCH ASSEMBLY
CENTERLINE LATCH ASSEMBLY
CL LATCH ROLLER ASSEMBLY
CL LATCH ROLLER ASSEMBLY
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
BULKHEAD LATCH GANG BELLCRANK
BULKHEAD LATCH GANG BELLCRANK
BULKHEAD PUSH-PULL ROD
BULKHEAD PUSH-PULL ROD
BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAGE
BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAGE
BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAGE
BULKHEAD ROLLER ASSEMBLY
BULKHEAD ROLLER ASSEMBLY
BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH
BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH
BULKHEAD READY-TO-LATCH SWITCH
BULKHEAD READY-TO-LATCH SWITCH
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(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-512
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PAYLOAD BAY DOORS ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC- I D H/F H/F A B C
_Emi_
5146 * 2/IR 2/1R P P P
5147 * 2/1R 2/IR P F P
5148 313 313
5149 * 211R 211R P F P
5150 313 313
5151 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5152 * 1/1 1/1
5153 * 2/2 2/2
5154 * i/1 I/i
5155 * i/i i/i
5156 * i/i 1/l
5157 * 2/2 2/2
5158 * 1/i 1/1
5159 * 2/IR 2/1R P N F
5160 * 1/1 1/1
5161 * 1/1 1/1
5162 3/IR 3/IR P N P
5163 * i/i 1/1
5164 * 1/i 1/1
5165 * 1/1 1/1
5166 * 1/1 i/1
5167 * 2/IR 2/IR P N P
5168 * I/i 1/1
5169 3/IR 3/IR P N P
5170 3/3 3/3
5171 3/2R 3/2R P P P
5172 3/3 /NA
5173 3/3 /NA
5174 * 1/1 1/1
5175 * i/i 1/1
5176 * 2/1R 2/1R P N P
5177 3/IR 3/IR P N P
5178 313 313
5179 3/IR 3/IR P N P
5501 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5502 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5503 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5504 * 2/1R 2/1R P P P
5505 * 2/IR 2/IR P P P
5506 * 2/1R 2/1R P P P
5507 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5508 3/3 3/3
5509 3/3 3/3
5510 3/3 3/3
5511 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
ITEM NAME
m
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MOTOR
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE BRAKE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE BRAKE
PBD CLUTCH/BRAKE DISC
PBD DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
PBD DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
PBD DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE TORQUE
PBD DRIVE SUPPORT ASSEMBLY
PBD DRIVE SUPPORT ASSEMBLY
PBD DRIVE SUPPORT ASSEMBLY
PBD DRIVE ROTARY ACT/TL
PBD DRIVE ROTARY ACT/TL
PBD DRIVE ROTARY ACT/TL
PBD DRIVE ROTARY ACT/TL
PBD DRIVE ROTARY ACT/TL
PBD DRIVE ROTARY ACT/TL
PAYLOA£ BAY DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE
PBD OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
PBD OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
PBD 88 DEG LIMIT SWITCH
PBD 88 DEG LIMIT SWITCH
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR
PBD ALIGNMENT ROLLER
PBD ALIGNMENT ROLLER GUIDE
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR PASSIVE STOP
PBD SHEAR/FLOATING HINGE
CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR
CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR
CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR
PBD CONTROL SWITCH
FUSE, IA
PBD MECHANICAL POWER SWITCH
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
DIODE
DIODE
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-513
mPAYLOAD BAY DOORS ANALYSIS WORK_HEETS SUMMARY
MDAC-ID
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
5512 313 3/3
5513 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
55i4 * _ " 2/IR 2/iR _ P F P
5515 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
5516 * 2/iR 2/IR P N P
5517 * 2/1R 2/IR P P P
5518 3/3 3/3
5519 * 2/IR 2/IR P F P
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
PAY_AD_BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY
MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
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(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-514
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5101
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT"
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /
TAL: /
AOA: /
ATO: 2/IR
LOCATION:
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER:
B [ P ] C [ P ]
STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS
OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF A MOTOR WOULD RESULT IN LATCHING/UNLATCHNING TAKING A
LONGER TIME. THE LOSS OF THE REDUNDANT MOTOR ON A CENTERLINE
LATCH GANG IS MORE SERIOUS THAN FOR THE BULKHEAD LATCH GANG. THE
FAILURE TO LATCH A BULKHEAD GANG (4 LATCHES) STILL ALLOWS
FOR A SAFE ENTRY• ONLY 2 CENTERLINE LATCHES, EXCEPT FOR THE 15-
16 PAIR, CAN BE UNLATCHED FOR A SAFE ENTRY. FAILURE TO UNLATCH A
GANG WOULD PREVENT PBD OPENING AND CAUSES A LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-515
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
FAILS TO ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF CLUTCH TO ENGAGE WHEN POWER APPLIED WOULD PREVENT THE
MOTOR SHAFT FROM ROTATING. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD COMPLETE
LATCH UNLATCHING BUT AT A SLOWER RATE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE
OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-516
m
m
m
ms
=w
u
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
FAILS TO DISENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR CLUTCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE CLUTCH TO DISENGAGE WOULD ALLOW THE MOTOR SHAFT TO
ROTATE INSTEAD OF BEING STOPPED. SINCE THIS OCCURS AFTER
LATCH/UNLATCHING THIS HAS MINIMAL IMPACT. THE FAILURE WOULD BE
IMPORTANT IF THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR ALSO WERE TO FAIL. THIS WOULD
CAUSE A LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM THE DIFFERENTIAL AND THE LOSS OF A
LATCH GANG.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-517
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT'.
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR BRAKE
FAILS TO DISENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/iR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BRAKE TO DISENGAGE WHEN POWER IS APPLIED WOULD PREVENT
THE MOTOR SHAFT FROM ROTATING. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD COMPLETE
LATCH/UNLATCHING BUT AT A SLOWER RATE. NO EFFECT ON CREW VEHICLE
OR MISSION.
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REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-518
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR BRAKE
FAILS TO ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
B [ ] C [ ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
LOCATION:
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECT OF BRAKE FAILING TO ENGAGE WOULD BE THAT THE MOTOR SHAFT
WOULD STILL BE ABLE TO ROTATE INSTEAD OF BEING LOCKED, SINCE THIS
OCCURS AFTER LATCHING/UNLATCHING THIS HAS MINIMAL IMPACT. THIS
FAILURE WOULD BE IMPORTANT IF THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR ALSO WERE
TO FAIL WHICH WOULD THEN RESULT IN THE REDUNDANT MOTOR
BACKDRIVING THE FAILED ONE WHICH WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF OUTPUT
FROM THE DIFFERENTIAL AND LOSS OF A LATCH GANG.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
L
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-519
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/PBD FLIGHT: 2/IR
5106 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR CLUTCH/BRAKE DISC
SLIPS
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH MOTOR
CLUTCH/BRAKE DISC
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SLIPPING OF THE CLUTCH/BRAKE DISC WOULD REDUCE THE INPUT TO THE
DIFFERENTIAL AND THE RATE OF LATCH GANG OPEN/CLOSING. REDUNDANT
MOTOR WOULD SUPPLY LATCH OPERATION POWER. LOSS OF MOTOR ALONG
WITH CLUTCH/BRAKEIFAILURE WOULD PERMIT BACKDRIVING BY
REMAINING MOTOR, NO OUTPUT FROM THE DIFFERENTIAL AND POSSIBLE
LOSS OF MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS
OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE EFFECT OF THIS FAILURE WOULD BE THE INABILITY TO
LATCH/UNLATCH A CENTER/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG. IF UNABLE TO UNLATCH
A GANG WHEN OPENING THE PBD THEN A LOSS OF MISSION RESULTS. IF
UNABLE TO LATCH A CENTERLINE LATCH GANG THEN AN UNSAFE CONDITION
WOULD
EXIST ON ENTRY. AN EVA CAPABILITY EXISTS TO SECURE TWO FAILED
LATCHES. BULKHEAD LATCH GANG CAN FAIL OPEN AND LEAVE SUFFICIENT
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY FOR A SAFE ENTRY.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-521
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES:
INPUT
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, PARTIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF OUTPUT OF TORQUE FROM THE DIFFERENTIAL WAS LOW ENOUGH THE
SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME LIMIT WOULD BE HIT. THE COMBINATION OF
EXCESSIVE TIME AND NO VISUAL CUE OF WHETHER THE CENTERLINE LATCH
HOOKS ARE CLEAR OF THE ROLLERS WOULD END PBD OPENING CAUSING A
LOSS OF MISSION. IF UNABLE TO CLOSE CENTERLINE LATCH GANG THE
POSSIBILITY EXISTS OF LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. AN EVA COULD BE
PERFORMED TO SECURE 2 OF THE 4 LATCHES IN A GANG WHICH WOULD
ALLOW A SAFE ENTRY. A SAFE ENTRY CAN BE MADE WITH A BULKHEAD GANG
FAILED OPEN. VISUAL CUES AS TO THE STATE OF THE BULKHEAD LATCHES
ARE AVAILABLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039, FLIGHT RULES SECTION 10-
MMACS
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-522
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG DIFFERENTIAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: I/I
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE EFFECT OF THIS FAILURE WOULD BE THE INABILITY TO
LATCH/UNLATCH A CENTER/BULKHEAD LATCH GANG. IF UNABLE TO UNLATCH
A GANG WHEN OPENING THE PBD THEN A LOSS OF MISSION RESULTS. IF
UNABLE TO LATCH A CENTERLINE LATCH GANG THEN AN UNSAFE CONDITION
WOULD
EXIST ON ENTRY. AN EVA CAPABILITY EXISTS TO SECURE TWO FAILED
LATCHES. BULKHEAD LATCH GANG CAN FAIL OPEN AND LEAVE SUFFICIENT
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY FOR A SAFE ENTRY.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
w REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-523
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PBD FLIGHT:
5110 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD TORQUE LIMITER
FAILS TO OPERATE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD TORQUE LIMITER ........:
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TORQUE LIMITER TO SLIP DUE TO EXCESSIVE TORQUE COULD
CAUSE COMPONENTS TO BREAK OR BE DAMAGED. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION IFUNAB_ TO OPEN BPD AND LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF UNABLE
TO CLOSE PBD BECAUSE OF JAMMED OR BROKEN COMPONENTS. EVA
CAPABILITY EXISTS TO CLOSE PBDS. CENTERLINE LATCH GANG MUST BE
LATCHED FOR A SAFE ENTRY, BULKHEAD GANG CAN FAIL OPEN FOR A SAFE
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-524
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 5111 ABORT: i/I
ITEM: CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD TORQUE LIMITER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, SLIPS AT LESS THAN MINIMUM
ALLOWABLE LIMIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TORQUE LIMITER SLIPPING AT LESS THAN THE MINIMUM SPECIFIED LIMIT
COULD CAUSE A LATCH GANG TO NOT LATCH/UNLATCH. THE FAILURE TO
LATCH A BULKHEAD LATCH GANG STILL ALLOWS MARGIN FOR A SAFE ENTRY.
THE FAILURE OF A CENTERLINE LATCH GANG LOWERS THE
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE ORBITER LEADING TO A POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE. EVA CAN BE PERFORMED TO SECURE A FAILED LATCH.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-525
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 5112 ABORT: i/i_
ITEM: CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD TORQUE LIMITER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, DOES NOT SLIP AT MAXIMUM
A£L_WABLE LIMIT ..........
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO LATCH LINKAGES, TORQUE SHAFT OR POWER DRIVE
UNIT COULD OCCUR IF TORQUE LIMITER DOES NOT SLIP WHEN A JAM
OCCURS. FAILURE OF A CENTERLINE LATCH TORQUE SHAFT COULD FAIL
THE ENTIRE GANG IN THE UNLATCHED POSITION WHICH IS UNACCEPTABLE
FOR
ENTRY. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF ANY DAMAGE SEVERE
ENOUGH.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-526
m
i
nINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5113
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/I
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD GEARBOX
FAILS TO TRANSFER MOTOR OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: !/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: I/I
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF GEARBOX WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF A LATCH GANG. LOSS OF
MISSION WOULD OCCUR IF THIS HAPPENED WHEN OPENING PBD AND LATCHES
WERE NOT CLEAR OF ROLLERS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF
CENTERLINE LATCH GANG COULD NOT BE LATCHED AND CREW DOES NOT
DETECT THIS. THERE IS AN EVA PROCEDURE TO SECURE FAILED LATCHES.
REFERENCES: V070"594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-527
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
7/22/87
MECHIPBD
5114
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
i/i
I/I
ITEM:
FAILU_ MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD GEARBOX
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
T._AD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LO_RY
B_AKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAY_AD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CE_ERLINE/BULKHEAD GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RT_: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
BAY BULKHEADS
PART _BER:
STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, TEMPE_TURE
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
FAILURE WOULD CAUSE THE _SS OF A LATCH GANG. LOSS OF MISSION
WOULD OCCUR IF THIS _PPENED WHEN OPENING PBD AND LATCHES _RE
NOT CLEAR OF ROLLERS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF
CENTERLINE _TCH GANG COULD NOT BE LATCHED. EVA PROCEDURE EXISTS
TO SECURE FAILED LATCHES.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-528
m
B
i
wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5115
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD GEARBOX
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
MC287-0040, MC287-0039
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INSUFFICIENT OUTPUT WOULD NOT FULLY LATCH/UNLATCH A GANG. SINGLE
MOTOR DRIVE TIME WOULD BE REACHED BEFORE FULL LATCH TRAVEL
COMPLETED. VISUAL CUES ARE AVAILABLE FOR THE BULKHEAD LATCHES
BUT NOT THE CENTERLINE ONES. FAILURE TO LATCH A CENTERLINE GANG
COULD RESULT IN THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. FAILURE TO UNLATCH A
GANG WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF MISSION.
m
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-529
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5116
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD OPEN LIMIT SWICH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER: MC452-0123
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECT WOULD BE THAT THE MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE TO RUN. WITH TWO
MOTORS OPERATING THE LATCHES WOULD REACHED THE OPEN POSITION,
TORQUE LIMITERS WOULD SLIP WHEN LINKAGES JAM. SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE
TIME WOULD BE REACHED. NO EFFECT ON MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-530
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5117
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD OPEN LIMIT SWICH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
M452-0123
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION, SHORTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIMIT SWITCH PREMATURELY GOING TO THE OPEN POSITION WOULD SHUT
OFF A MOTOR. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE OPENING THE LATCH
GANG AT A REDUCED RATE. FAILURE OF BOTH SWITCHES WOULD PREVENT
PBD OPENING CAUSING LOSS OF MISSION. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-531
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/PBD FLIGHT: 3/3
5118 ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH _ _
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD CLOSED LIMIT SWICH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
M452-0123
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EFFECT WOULD BE THAT THE MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE TO RUN. WITH TWO
MOTORS OPERATING THE LATCHES WOULD REACH THE CLOSED POSITION,
TORQUE LIMITERS WOULD SLIP WHEN LINKAGES JAM. SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE
TIME WOULD BE REACHED. NO EFFECT ON MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-532
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5119
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD CLOSED LIMIT SWITCH
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE/BULKHEAD CLOSED LIMIT SWICH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
BAY BULKHEADS
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD PBD, STARBOARD/PORT AND FORE/AFT PAYLOAD
M452-0123
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION, SHORTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LIMIT SWITCH PREMATURELY GOING TO THE CLOSED POSITION WOULD SHUT
OFF A MOTOR. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE CLOSING THE LATCH
GANG AT A REDUCED RATE. FAILURE OF BOTH SWITCHES WOULD PREVENT
PBD CLOSURE CAUSING A POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. AN EVA
CAPABILITY IS ON HAND TO MANUALLY SECURE A FAILED LATCH.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, V070-594160, V070-594250,
V070-594260, MC287-0040, MC287-0039
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-533
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT-.
HDW/FUNC
1/1
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH GANG TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLINGS
BROKEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH GANG TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF" / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD
PART NUMBER: V070-594345-001 TO -009, V070-594325-001, V070-
594326-001, V070-594347-001, V070-594350-001, V070-59354-001 & -
002, +MISC.
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION,
STRIPPED CROWN SPINLINE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLING WOULD PREVENT A LATCH OR TWO LATCHES
FROM LATCH/UNLATCHING. WHEN OPENING PBD THIS WOULD PREVENT
OPENING AND CAUSE A LOSS OF MISSION. FAILURE AFTER LATCH HOOK
CLEARS ROLLER OR WHEN LATCHING PBD CLOSED COULD CAUSE A POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. LATCH PAIR 15-16 MUST BE CLOSED TO HAVE A
FACTOR OF SAFETY GREATER THAN i. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF VEHICLE
IS LOWERED WITH A LATCH PAIR FAILED.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH GANG TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLINGS
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
e)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH GANG TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLINGS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: 1/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD
PART NUMBER: V070-594345-001 TO -009, V070-594325-001, V070-
594326-001, V070-594347-001, V070-594350-001, V070-59354-001 & -
002, +MISC.
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, SEIZED BUSHING, PBD WARPED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING TORQUE SHAFT COUPLING WOULD PREVENT A LATCH OR
TWO LATCHES FROM LATCH/UNLATCHING. WHEN OPENING PBD THIS WOULD
PREVENT OPENING ANDCAUSE A LOSS OF MISSION. FAILURE AFTER LATCH
HOOK CLEARS ROLLER OR WHEN LATCHING PBD CLOSED COULD CAUSE A
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE. LATCH PAIR 15-16 MUST BE CLOSED
TO HAVE A FACTOROF SAFETYGREATER THAN i. STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY
OF VEHICLE IS LOWERED WITH A LATCH PAIR FAILED,
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-535
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH GANG LATCH ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATOi I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD
PART NUMBER: V070-594306-001, V070-594307-001 & -002, V070-
594341-001, V070-594357-002
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, PBD WARPED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING OF LATCH ASSEMBLY BEFORE LATCH OPENED WOULD
PREVENT PBD OPENING CAUSING A LOSS OF MISSION. IF OCCURS AFTER
LATCH HOOK CLEARED ROLLER OR WHEN CLOSING PBD THE TORQUE LIMITER
WOULD SLIP DUE TO THE JAM. THIS WOULD ALSO PREVENT THE OTHER 3
LATCHES FROM MOVING. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PBD FLIGHT:
5123 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH ASSEMBLY
BROKEN COMPONENT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH GANG LATCH ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD
PART NUMBER: V070-594306-001, V070-594307-001 & -002, V070-
594341-001, V070-594357-002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, MATERIAL FATIGUE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN LINK OR BELLCRANK WOULD PREVENT TORQUE SHAFT ROTATION FROM
MOVING THE LATCH HOOK TO THE OPEN POSITION POSSIBLY PREVENTING
PBD OPENING CAUSING A LOSS OF MISSION. BROKEN LINK, BELLCRANK OR
LATCH WOULD PREVENT CLOSING OF A LATCH. SAFE ENTRY CAN BE
MADE WITH A SINGLE LATCH NOT ENGAGED, SOME LOSS OF STRUCTURAL
INTEGRITY. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-537
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5124
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/_C
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
CENTERLINE _TCH ASSEMBLY
_TCH HOOK FAILS TO ENGAGE ROLLER
T._.AD _ALYST: J. BACHER
B_AKDO_ HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
?)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. _RY
MEC_ICAL AC_ATION SYSTEM
PAY_AD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE _TCH MEC_ISM ...............
CENTERLI_ _TCH GANG _TCH ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRE_UNCH: / RT_: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
_DING/SAFING: /
REDUND_CY SC_ENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: ST_BO_D PBD
P_T _BER: V070-594306-001, V070-594307-001 & -002, V070-
594341-001, V070-594357-002
CAUSES: TEMPE_T_E, MISRIGGED
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
_TCH HOOK FAILING TO ENGAGE ROLLER WHEN C_SING PBD WOULD CAUSE
_SS OF T_T _TCH. SAFE ENTRY CAN BE _DE WITH A SINGLE _TCH
NOT ENGAGED, SOME _SS OF STRUCTU_L INTEGRITY. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHIC_.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-538
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mINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5125
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CENTERLINE LATCH ROLLER ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH ROLLER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PORT PBD
V070-594330-004, -005, -006
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING OF THE ROLLER ASSEMBLY WHEN OPENING A LATCH
CAUSES TORQUE LIMITER TO ENGAGE AND A LOSS OF MISSION WHEN PBD
CANNOT BE OPENED. SAME SITUATION OCCURRING WHEN CLOSING COULD
PREVENT A LATCH GANG FROM ENGAGING AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE. EVA CAPABILITY EXISTS TO SECURE FAILED LATCHES.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-539
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT:
MDACID: 5126 ABORT:
ITEM: CENTERLINE LATCH ROLLERASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: BROKEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYSLEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWNHIE_CHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
CENTERLINE LATCH MECHANISM
CENTERLINE LATCH ROLLER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PORT PBD
V070-594330-004, -005, -006
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN ROLLER ASSEMBLY PREVENTS HOOK ENGAGING ROLLER. RESULT IS
DECREASED VEHICLE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY DUE TO A LATCH MISSING BUT
SAFE ENTRY IS POSSIBLE. NO EFFECT ON MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5127
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT-.
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
FAILS TO ENGAGE CLAW
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: V070-594302-001, -002, -003
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, MISADJUSTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SHEAR FITTING ROLLER TO ENGAGE CLAW COULD PREVENT BPD
CLOSURE. IF PBD CAN BE CLOSED IT WOULD DEGRADE STRUCTURAL
INTEGRITY OF VEHICLE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF MORE THAN
ONE FAILS TO ENGAGE.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-541
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/8v
MECH/PBD
5128
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
BROKEN
7_AD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LORRY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
3) PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRELAUNCH: / RT_: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PORT PBD
V070-594302-001, -002, -003
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN ROLLER WOULD DEGRADE VEHICLE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. SHEAR
LOAD CARRIED BY THIS FITTING WOULD BE CARRIED BY _MAINING
FITTINGS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IN THE EVENT OF MULTIPLE
FAILURES.
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REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040 I
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5129
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PBD SHEAR FITTING ROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PORT PBD
V070-594302-001, -002, -003
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING ROLLER PREVENTS MOVEMENT OF ROLLER OUT OR INTO
CLAW. LOSS OF MISSION IF PBD CANNOT BE OPENED. LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE IF ROLLER WILL NOT ENGAGE CLAW AND STOPS DOOR
CLOSURE.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-543
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
v/22/sv
MECH/PBD
5130
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
FAILS TO ENGAGE ROLLER
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ F ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD
PART NUMBER: V070-59375-001, V070-594376-001, V070-594378-001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, MISA_DJUSTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF SHEAR FITTING CLAW TO ENGAGE ROLLER COULD PREVENT PBD
CLOSURE. IFPBDCANB_CLOSE_ IT_WOULD DEGRADE STRUCTURAL
INTEGRITY OF YEHICLE. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF MORE THAN
ONE FAILS.
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REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-544
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5131 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
BROKEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD PBD
V070-59375-001, V070-594376-001, V070-594378-001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN CLAW WOULD DEGRADE VEHICLE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. SHEAR
LOAD CARRIED BY THIS FITTING WOULD CARRIED BY REMAINING FITTINGS.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IN THE EVENT OF MULTIPLE FAILURES.
REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-0040
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-545
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
"ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
BENT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PBD SHEAR FITTING CLAW
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD PBD
PART NUMBER: V070-59375-001, V070-594376-001, V070-594378-001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BENT CLAW WOULD PREVENT PBD OPENING/CLOSING. IF ROLLER CANNOT
FOLLOW NOMINAL TRAJECTORY AS PBD OPENS A JAM WOULD OCCUR
RESULTING IN A LOSS OF MISSION. IF ROLLER CANNOT SEAT IN CLAW,
PBD MAY BE PREVENTED FROM CLOSING. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: V070-594300, V070-594360, MC287-O040 g
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5133
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BULKHEAD LATCH GANG BELLCRANK LINKAGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD LATCH BELLCRANK LINKAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
PART NUMBER: V070-594163-001 & -002, V070-594165-001 & -002,
V070594167-001, V070-594223-001, V070-594263-005 & -006, V070-
594265-005 & -006, V070-594267-001 & -002, AND MISC.
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING OF BELLCRANK OR LINK WOULD PREVENT PBD OPENING
CAUSING A LOSS OF MISSION. IF FAILURE OCCURS AFTER LATCHES CLEAR
ROLLERS OR WHEN CLOSING PBD A SAFE ENTRY IS POSSIBLE. FAILURE
COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF i, 2 OR 3 LATCHES DEPENDING ON THE
LOCATION OF THE FAILURE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE UNLESS TWO
GANGS FAIL. VEHICLE LOSES SOME STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY WITH ONE
GANG FAILED.
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-547
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5134
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/F_C
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BU_EAD _TCH GANG BELLC_K LINAGE
BROWN
_AD _ALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDO_ HIE_CHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS _AD: H.J. _WERY
_C_ICAL AC_ATION SYSTEM
PAY_AD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BUL_EAD _TCH MEC_ISM
BU_EAD _TCH BELLC_K LINAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_NC
PRE_UNCH: / RT_: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
_DING/SAFING: /
REDUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
_CATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BUL_EAD
P_T _BER: V070-594163-001 & -002, V070-594165-001 & -002,
V070594!67TQ01, V070-594223,001 , V070-594263-005 & -006, V070-
594265-005 & -006, V070-594267-001 & -002, AND MISC.
CAUSES: MEC_ICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-P_T FAIL_
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
BROKEN BELLC_NK, LINK OR ASSOCIATED HARDW_E WOULD P_NT PBD
OPENING CAUSING A _SS OF MISSION. IF FAILURE OCCURS AFTER
_TCHES CLEAR ROLLERS OR _EN CLOSING PB_D-kSAFE ENTRY IS
POSSIB_. FAILURE COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF I, 2 OR 3 _TCHES
DEPENDING
ON THE _CATION OF THE FAILLE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/_HICLE _SS
_O G_GS FAIL. VEHICLE LOSES SO_ STRUCT_L INTEGRITY WITH ONE
G_G FAI_D.
_FERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PBD FLIGHT:
5135 " ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BULKHEAD PUSH-PULL ROD
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD PUSH-PULL ROD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
V070-594220, AND MISC.
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING OF PUSHROD WOULD PREVENT PBD OPENING CAUSING A
LOSS OF MISSION. IF FAILURE OCCURS AFTER LATCHES CLEAR ROLLERS
OR WHEN CLOSING PBD A SAFE ENTRY IS POSSIBLE. FAILURE COULD
CAUSE THE LOSS OF i, 2 OR 3 LATCHES DEPENDING ON THE LOCATION OF
THE FAILURE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE UNLESS TWO GANGS FAIL.
VEHICLE LOSES SOME STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY WITH ONE GANG FAILED.
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
E
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-549
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDACID: _ 5136
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: BULKHEAD PUSH-PULL ROD
FAILURE MODE: BROKEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD PUSH-PULL ROD
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
V070-594220, AND MISC.
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN PUSHROD OR ASSOCIATED HARDWARE WOULD PREVENT PBD OPENING
CAUSING A LOSS OF MISSION. IF FAILURE OCCURS AFTER LATCHES CLEAR
ROLLERS OR WHEN CLOSING PBD A SAFE ENTRY IS POSSIBLE. FAILURE
COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF I, 2 OR 3 LATCHES DEPENDING ON THE
LOCATION OF THE FAILURE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE UNLESS TWO
GANGS FAIL. VEHICLE LOSES SOME STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY WITH ONE
GANG FAILED.
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-550
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5137
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BULKHEADLATCH LINKAGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAYDOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
PART NUMBER: V070-594280, V070-594276 THRU V070-594279, V070-
594281 THRU V070-594284, V070-594314, V070-594315, V070-594319,
V070-594316, V070-594317, V070-594320
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING OF LATCHING BELLCRANK, LINK OR HOOK WOULD PREVENT
PBD OPENING CAUSING A LOSS OF MISSION. IF FAILURE OCCURS AFTER
LATCHES CLEAR ROLLERS OR WHEN CLOSING PBD A SAFE ENTRY IS
POSSIBLE. FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF i, 2, 3 OR 4 LATCHES
DEPENDING ON THE LOCATION OF THE FAILURE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE UNLESS TWO GANGS FAIL. VEHICLE LOSES SOME
STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY WITH ONE GANG FAILED.
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-551
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/22/8?
MECH/PBD
5138
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BUL_EAD LATCH LINKAGE
BROKEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. _WERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BU_EAD LATCH MECHANISM
BU_EAD LATCH LINKAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE_UNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
_DING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
PART _BER: V070-594280, V070-594276 THRU V070-594279, V070-
594281 THRU V070-594284, V070-594314, V070-594315, V070-594319,
V070-594316, V070-594317, V070-594320
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-P_T FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TiONALE:
BROKEN BELLC_NK, LINK OR HOOK WOULD PREVENT PBD OPENING CAUSING
A LOSS OF MISSION. IF FAILURE OCCURS AFTER LATCHES CLEAR ROLLERS
OR HEN CLOSING PBD A SAFE ENTRY IS POSSIBLE. FAILURE COULD
CAUSE LOSS OF I, 2, 3 OR 4 LATCHES DEPENDING ON THE LOCATION
OF THE FAILURE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE UNT_SS TWO BANGS FAIL.
VEHICLE LOSESSOME STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY WITH ONE GANG FAILED.
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5139
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAGE
FAILS TO LATCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD LATCH LINKAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
PART NUMBER: V070-594280, V070-594276 THRU V070-594279, V070-
594281 THRU V070-594284, V070-594314, V070-594315, V070-594319,
V070-594316, V070-594317, V070-594320
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
MISRIGGED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE TO LATCH REDUCES STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE. AN
ENTIRE BULKHEAD LATCH GANG CAN FAIL BUT STILL ALLOW A SAFE ENTRY.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-553
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PBD FLIGHT:
5140 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BULKHEAD ROLLER ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PA_AD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD ROLLER ASSEMBLY
CRiTICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
PART NUMBER: V070-594180, V070-594280
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
MISADJUSTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: ..........
BINDING/JAMMING OF A BULKHEAD COULD POSSIBLY PREVENT PBD
OPEN/CLOSING. FAILURE COULD PREVENT A SECURE LATCH OF HOOK WITH
ROLLER WHEN FORCE CAUSES TORQUE LIMITER TO SLIP. SAFE ENTRY CAN
BE MADE WITH A GANG FAILED. NO EFFECT ON CREW VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039 B
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-554
I
B
B
=w
r
m
w
Lf
i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22187
MECH/PBD
5141
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BULKHEAD ROLLER ASSEMBLY
BROKEN FROM BULKHEAD
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD ROLLER ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
PART NUMBER: V070-594180, V070-594280
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS OF A ROLLER ASSEMBLY WOULD INCREASE THE LOAD ON THE
REMAINING ROLLERS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-555
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5142
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /_
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
V070-594222
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE TO RUN TILL SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME LIMIT
REACHED. TORQUE LIMITER WOULD BEGIN SLIPPING WHEN DOOR REACHED
CLOSED POSITION. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5143
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD DOOR CLOSED SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDw/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
V070-594222
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DOOR CLOSED SWITCH PRE_TURELY GOING TO THE CLOSED POSITION WOULD
SHUT OFF A MOTOR. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE CLOSING THE PBD
AT A REDUCED RATE. FAILURE OF BOTH SWITCHES WOULD PREVENT
COMPLETE PBD CLOSURE AND LATCHING WITH POSSIBLE LOSS OF
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-557
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/PBD FLIGHT: 3/3
5144 ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BULKHEAD READY-TO-LATCH SWITCH MODULE
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD READY-TO-LATCH SWITCH MODULE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: / AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
LOCATION: FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
PART NUMBER: V070-594222
c [ ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, MISADJUSTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF READY-TO-LATCH SWITCH MODULE WOULD PREVENT A BULKHEAD
LATCH GANG FROM ENGAGING THE BULKHEAD ROLLERS AND CLOSING THE
PBD. THIS FAILURE WOULD CAUSE A CRT MESSAGE TO ALERT THE CREW.
MANUAL PROCEDURE CAN THEN CLOSE PBD. A SAFE ENTRY IS
WITH A BU_EAD GANG UNLATCHED. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE.
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REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5145
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
BULKHEAD READY-TO-LATCH SWITCH MODULE
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
BULKHEAD LATCH MECHANISM
BULKHEAD READY-TO-LATCH SWITCH MODULE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORE/AFT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
V070-594222
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
VIBRATION, INADVERTENT OPERATION, MISADJUSTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PREMATURE SWITCHING BY THE READY-TO-LATCH MODULE WOULD CAUSE A
PREMATURE ATTEMPT TO LATCH. COULD POSSIBLY INTERFERE WITH
CLOSING PBD. IF THERE IS NO INTERFERENCE THE LOSS OF A LATCH
GANG REDUCES VEHICLE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY BUT A SAFE ENTRY CAN
BE ACCOMPLISHED.
m
REFERENCES: V070-594160, V070-594250, V070-594260, MC287-0039
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-559
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7122/87
MECH/PBD
5146
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MOTOR
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
s)
9)
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0004
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS
OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE LOSS A PBD DRIVE MOTOR CAUSES THE OPEN/CLOSING OF THE PBD AT
A REDUCED RATE BY THE REDUNDANT MOTOR. LOSS OF MISSION WOULD
ONLY HAPPEN IF BOTH MOTORS FAIL WHEN OPENING THE PBD. POSSIBLE
LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE UPON FAILURE OF BOTH MOTORS AND UNABLE TO
PERFORM EVA CLOSING OF PBD.
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REFERENCES: V070-594125 ms
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-560
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5147
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH
FAILS TO ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF CLUTCH TO ENGAGE WHEN POWER IS APPLIED WOULD PREVENT
THE MOTOR SHAFT FROM ROTATING. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD COMPLETE
OPEN/CLOSING OF PBD BUT AT A SLOWER RATE.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-561
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
MECH/PBD
5148
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH
FAILS TO DISENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF THE CLUTCH TO DISENGAGE WOULD ALLOW THE MOTOR SHAFT TO
ROTATE INSTEAD OF BEING STOPPED. SINCE THIS OCCURS AFTER
OPEN/CLOSING OF PBD THIS HAS MINIMAL IMPACT. THE FAILURE WOULD
BE IMPORTANT IF THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR ALSO WERE TO FAIL. THIS
WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM THE DIFFERENTIAL AND PBD
OPEN/CLOSE.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5149
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE BRAKE
FAILS TO DISENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BRAKE TO DISENGAGE WHEN POWER IS APPLIED WOULD PREVENT
THE MOTOR SHAFT FROM ROTATING. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD COMPLETE
OPEN/CLOSING OF THE PBD BUT AT A SLOWER RATE.
REFERENCES: V070-594i25
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-563
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
v/22/sv
MECH/PBD
5150
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE BRAKE
FAILS TO ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE BRAKE
\
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF BRAKE TO ENGAGE WOULD ALLOW THE MOTOR SHAFT TO ROTATE
INSTEAD OF BEING LOCKED. SINCE THIS OCCURS AFTER OPEN/CLOSING OF
PBD THIS HAS MINIMAL IMPACT. THE FAILURE WOULD BE IMPORTANT IF
THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR ALSO WERE TO FAIL. THIS WOULD CAUSE A
LOSS OF OUTPUT FROM THE DIFFERENTIAL AND PBD OPEN/CLOSE.
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REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-564
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 5151 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH/BRAKE DISC
SLIPS
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE CLUTCH/BRAKE DISC
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SLIPPING OF THE CLUTCH/BRAKE DISC WOULD REDUCE THE INPUT TO THE
DIFFERENTIAL AND THE RATE OF PBD OPEN/CLOSING. REDUNDANT MOTOR
WOULD SUPPLY OPEN/CLOSING POWER. LOSS OF MOTOR ALONG WITH
CLUTCH/BRAKE DISC SLIPPAGE WOULD PERMIT BACKDRIVING BY REMAINING
MOTOR, NO OUTPUT FROM THE DIFFERENTIAL AND POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-565
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7122187
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDACID: 5152
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/I
i/I
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/I ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0004
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS
OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OPEN/CLOSE PBD. IF UNABLE TO OPEN THE PBD THEN A LOSS
OF MISSION RESULTS. IF UNABLE TO CLOSE THE PBD THEN A SAFE ENTRY
CANNOT BE MADE. AN EVA, THE UNLIKE REDUNDANCY, WOULD BE
NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE PBD.
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REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-566
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5153
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION"
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0004
CAUSES:
INPUT
CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, PARTIAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IF OUTPUT OF TORQUE FROM THE DIFFERENTIAL WERE LOW ENOUGH THE
SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME LIMIT WOULD BE HIT. THE CREW HAS VISUAL
CUES OF PBD MOVEMENT AND POSITION. POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION IF
FAILURE OCCURS WHEN OPENING PBD. ON CLOSING OF THE PBD FLIGHT
RULES ALLOW DRIVING BEYOND SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME BECAUSE VISUAL
CUE EXISTS.
REFERENCES: V070-594125, FLIGHT RULES SECTION IO-MMACS
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-567
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
7/22187
MECH/PBD
5154
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/1
I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING i_-_i
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE DIFFERENTIAL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: I/I
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING WOULD PREVENT PBD OPEN/CLOSING. FAILURE WHEN
OPENING THE PBD CAUSES A LOSS OF MISSION. IF UNABLE TO CLOSE THE
PBD THEN AN UNSAFE CONDITION WOULD EXIST FOR ENTRY. AN EVA
PROCEDURE EXISTS TO CLOSE THE PBD. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE
IF PBD NOT SECURED CLOSE.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
mm
_m
mm
i
m
mm
mm
==
I
I
mm
mm
m
mm
B
l
l
m
m
l
I
_m
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-568
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5155
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
FAILS TO OPERATE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: i/I
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0004
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
GEARBOX FAILURE CAUSES NO TORQUE TRANSFER TO THE PBD TORQUE SHAFT
AND ROTARY ACTUATORS. PBD STOPS MOVEMENT, FAILS CLOSED, OPEN OR
IN TRANSIT. LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IF PBD COULD NOT BE
OPENED FAR ENOUGH. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD OCCUR IF PBD
COULD NOT BE CLOSED. AN EVA PROCEDURE EXISTS FOR MANUAL CLOSURE
OF PBD.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-569
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDACID: 5156
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
I/i
i/i
ITEM: PAYLOADBAY DOORDRIVE GEARBOX
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING ....
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM _ __
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MEC_ISM .......
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING CAUSES THE TORQUE LIMITERS IN EACH PBD ROTARY
ACTUATOR TO SLIP. PBD STOPS MOVEMENT, FAILS CLOSED, OPEN OR IN
TRANSIT. LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IF PBD COULD NOT BE OPENED
FAR ENOUGH. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD OCCUR IF PBD
COULD NOT BE CLOSED. AN EVA PROCEDURE EXISTS FOR MANUAL CLOSURE
OF PBD.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5157
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
2/2
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
PARTIAL OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/2 ATO: 2/2
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0004
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INSUFFICIENT OUTPUT WOULD NOT FULLY ROTATE THE PBD. SINGLE MOTOR
DRIVE TIME WOULD BE REACHED BEFORE FULL PBD TRAVEL COMPLETED.
VISUAL CUES _ AVAILABLE TO THE CREW TO MONITOR PBDMOVEMENT.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF MISSION. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-571
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PBD FLIGHT:
5158 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
1/I
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLING
BROKEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0009 TO -0031
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION
T
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN TORQUE SHAFT/COUPLING COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF UP TO 4 PBD
ROTARY ACTUATORS. LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IF PBD COULD NOT
BE OPENED. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD HAPPEN IF PBD COULD NOT BE
CLOSED. AN EVA PROCEDURE EXISTS FOR THE MANUAL CLOSURE OF
PBD.
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REFERENCES: V070-594125
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
?/22/8?
MECH/PBD
5159
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT BEARING ASSEMBLY
SEIZED BEARING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT BEARING ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ F ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0008
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VACUUM
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SEIZED BEARING WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. EACH DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT
BEARING ASSEMBLY HAS TWO DOUBLE SEALED/DUAL ROTATION BEARINGS.
SINGLE BEARING WOULD CONTINUE TO TRANSMIT TORQUE BETWEEN TORQUE
SHAFT SECTIONS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHCLE FOR A SINGLE FAILURE.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-573
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 5160 ABORT: I/I
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT BEARING ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, BROKEN SUPPORT HOUSING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM __
3) PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVEMECHANISM
4) PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT BEARING ASSEMBLY
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0008
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE SUPPORT HOUSING BREAKING FROM THE ORBITER FUSELAGE ATTACHMENT
WOULD BIND OR BREAK TORQUE SHAFT. PBD MOVEMENT WOULD BE
PREVENTED. LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IF PBD COULD NOT BE
OPENED FAR ENOUGH. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD OCCUR IF PBD COULD
NOT
BE CLOSED. AN EVA PROCEDURE EXISTS FOR MANUAL CLOSING OF PBD.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-574
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/PBD FLIGHT: i/i
5161 ABORT: I/i
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT BEARING ASSEMBLY
BROKEN SUPPORT SHAFT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE SUPPORT BEARING ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0008
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN SUPPORT SHAFT COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF 1 TO 4 ROTARY
ACTUATORS. LOSS OF MISSION WOULD OCCUR IF PBD COULD NOT BE
OPENED. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE COULD HAPPEN IF PBD COULD NOT BE
CLOSED. AN EVA PROCEDURE EXISTS FOR THE MANUAL CLOSURE
OF PBD.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
E :
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-575
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT: 3/iR
MDAC ID: 5162 ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE
LIMITER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, TORQUE LIMITER SLIPS AT
LESS THAN MINIMUM LIMIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0005, MC162-0008-0033
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
TORQUE LIMITER SLIPPING AT LESS THAN THE MINIMUM SPECIFIED LIMIT
WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT. IF THERE IS NO OBSTACLE TO PBD MOVEMENT
THE REMAINING 5 ROTARY ACTUATORS CAN OPEN/CLOSE THE PBD. IF THE
DOOR LINKAGE ASSEMBLY WERE TO JAM THE OTHER TORQUE LIMITERS
WOULD SLIP ALSO_D PBD MOVEMENT WOULD STOP. AN EVA CAPABILITY
EXISTS TO MANUALLY CLOSE THE PBD.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT: i/i
MDAC ID: 5163 ABORT: i/i
ITEM: PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE
LIMITER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE, TORQUE LIMITER FAILS TO
SLIP AT MAXIMUM ALLOWABLE LIMIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION sYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0005, MC162-0008-0033
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POSSIBLE DAMAGE TO PBD AND/OR PBD DRIVE SYSTEM IF TORQUE LIMITER
DOES NOT SLIP AT MAXIMUM TORQUE LIMIT. DAMAGE TO PBD COULD
POSSIBLY CAUSE THE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-577
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5164
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/i
ITEM:
LIMITER
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE
TORQUE LIMITER FAILS TO OPERATE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRI_v'E MEC__ ........
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0005, MC162-0008-0033
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF TORQUE LIMITER TO RELEASE TORQUE CAUSED BY A JAM COULD
CAUSE DAMAGE TO THE PBD AND/OR DRIVE SYSTEM. POSSIBLE LOSS OF
MISSION IF PBD CANNOT BE OPENED OR LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF CANNOT
CLOSE PBD OR IF DOOR DAMAGE TOO SEVERE.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
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iINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7122/87
MECH/PBD
5165
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/I
1/1
ITEM:
LIMITER
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE
JAMMED ROTARY ACTUATOR GEARBOX
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: I/i ATO: I/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0005, MC162-0008-0033
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JAMMED ROTARY ACTUATOR GEARBOX WOULD PREVENT DOOR LINKAGE FROM
MOVING. TORQUE LIMITERS WOULD SLIP DUE TO JAMMED LINKAGE. PBD
OPEN/CLOSING STOPS. POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE AND MISSION.
EVA CAPABILITY EXISTS TO MANUALLY CLOSE THE PBDS.
REFERENCES". V070-594125
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-579
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD
MDAC ID: 5166
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
i/i
i/I
ITEM:
LIMITER
FAIL_ MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY AC_ATOR/TORQUE
ROTARY AC_ATOR OUTPUT ARM BROKEN
T._AD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS BAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL AC_ATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MEC_ISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY AC_ATOR/TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_NC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELA_CH: / RT_: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
8NORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 1/1 ATO: 1/1
_DING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SC_ENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0005, MC162-0008-0033
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONAT._:
BROKEN ROTARY AC_ATOR OUTPUT ARM WOULD T.WT LINKAGE PUSHROD FLOAT
_EE. THE PUSHROD THEN COULD LODGE IN A POSITION WHICH WOULD JAM
LINKAGE AND PREVENT PBD MOVEMENT. POSSIBL_. LOSS OF CREW/VEHIC_
AND MI_E_ON. EVA COULD BE D_ TO C_AR THE J_.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7122/87
MECH/PBD
5167
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
LIMITER
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE
BROKEN MOUNTING BRACKET
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE ROTARY ACTUATOR/TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0005, MC162-0008-0033
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN MOUNTING BRACKET WOULD LESSEN STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF
ASSEMBLY. THE 3 REMAINING MOUNTING AREAS WILL TAKE UP THE LOAD.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. POSSIBLE JAMMING COULD
OCCUR IF TWO OR MORE MOUNTING POINTS FAIL.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-581
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECHIPBD
5168
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
I/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: i/I AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/I ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARBOARD/PORT ORBITER MIDFUSELAGE
V070"594126-0001, V070-594i30-0001, V070-59431-0001
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BiNDING/J_ING IN DOOR DRIVE LIEGE CAUSES ALLTORQUE LIMITER
TO SLIP. DOOR MOVEMENT WOULD STOP. LOSS OF MISSION IF UNABLE TO
OPEN PBD. LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF UNABLE TO CLOSE PBD. EVA
CAPABILITY EXISTS TO MANUALLY CLOSE PBDS.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5169
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: 3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
BROKEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: STARBOARD/PORT 0RBITER MIDFUSE_GE
PART NUMBER: V070-594126-0001, V070-594130-0001, V070-5943i'0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN PUSHROD OR BELLCRANK WOULD HAVE NO EFFECT ON MISSION OR
CREW/VEHICLE. REMAINING 5 DOOR DRIVE LINKAGE ASSEMBLIES WILL
OPEN/CLOSE PBD.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-583
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5170
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: " /
DEORBIT: / ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD/AFT ROTARY ACTUATOR ON STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE_ -_- _..... _._i_ ._- _ ...... _ _
PBD MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE TO RUN. WITH TWO MOTORS OPERATING THE
DOOR WOULD REACH FULL OPEN POSITION, TORQUE LIMITERS WOULD SLIP
WHEN LINKAGES WILL NO LONGER MOVE. IN THE EVENT OF A FAILED
MOTOR T_ SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME LIMIT WOULD BE HIT AND MOTOR
SHUTDOWN. NO EFFECT ON MISSION OR CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5171
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/2R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR OPEN LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: 3/2R
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FORWARD/AFT ROTARY ACTUATOR ON STARBOARD/PORT PBD
MC162-0008-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION, SHORTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OPEN LIMIT SWITCH PREMATURELY GOING TO THE OPEN POSITION WOULD
SHUT OFF A MOTOR. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD CONTINUE OPENING OF PBD
AT A REDUCED RATE. FAILURE IN BOTH SWITCHES WOULD CAUSE THE LOSS
OF MISSION SINCE PBD COULD NOT BE OPENED. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-585
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PBD FLIGHT:
5172 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD/AFT ROTARY ACTUATOR ON STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MCI62-0008X0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. THIS SWITCH IS A GSE
INDICATOR WHICH IS USED ONLY WHEN THE ORBITER IS ON THE PAD. PBD
COULD POSSIBLY BE DAMAGED IF IT WERE TO STRIKE SERVICE STRUCTURE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5173
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH
PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE MECHANISM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR 88 DEGREES LIMIT SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: FORWARD/AFT ROTARY ACTUATOR ON STARBOARD/PORT PBD
PART NUMBER: MC162-0008-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION, SHORTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION. THIS SWITCH IS A GSE
INDICATOR WHICH IS USED ONLY WHEN THE ORBITER IS ON THE PAD.
COULD STILL BE OPENED MANUALLY USING VISUAL CUES.
PBD
REFERENCES: V070-594125
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-587
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
?/22/87
MECH/PBD
5174
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
i/i
i/I
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR z
WARPED .....
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
3) PAYLOAD BAY DOOR
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH : / RT_ : /
LIFTOFF : / TAL: /
ONORBIT : 1/1 AOA : /
DEORBIT : i/1 ATO : 1/1
LANDING/SAFING : /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER MIDFUSELAGE, PORT AND STARBOARD SIDES
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
MISRIGGED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WARPED PBD COULD NOT BE LATCHED CLOSED DUE TO MISALIGNMENT
BETWEEN LATCHES AND ROLLERS. WARPAGE DUE TO THERMAL GRADIENT CAN
BE CORRECTED BY VARYING ORBITER ATTITUDE. IF WARPAGE CANNOT BE
REDUCED OR ELIMINATED THEN LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IS POSSIBLE.
VEHICLE WOULD HAVE REDUCED STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY IF PBDS CANNOT BE
CLOSED.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5175
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT : I/1
ABORT : i/1
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR
DAMAGED PANEL
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: I/i AOA: /
DEORBIT: i/i ATO: i/i
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER MIDFUSELAGE, PORT AND STARBOARD SIDES
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DAMAGED PANEL WOULD REDUCE STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY OF THE VEHICLE.
POSSIBLE LOSS OF CREW/VEHICLE IF DAMAGE AREA IS LARGE OR AREA
WERE TO INCREASE TO AN EXTENT THAT ENTIRE DOOR WOULD FAIL.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-589
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WQRKSHEET
m
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 5176 ABORT: 2/IR
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR ALIGNMENT ROLLER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERYLEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR ALIGNMENT ROLLER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
ABORT
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
2/1R
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
B [NA ] c[P]REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
AFT STARBOARD/PORT PBDLOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
MISADJUSTED
mm
mm
m
mm
m
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
JAMMED ROLLER COULD PREVENT AFT BULKHEAD LATCH GANG FROM BEING
ENGAGED. RESULTS IN SOME LOSS OF STRUCTURAL INTEGRITY. SAFE
ENTRY POSSIBLE WITH ONE BULKHEAD LATCH GANG NOT ENGAGED. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE.
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5177
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT r
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR ALIGNMENT ROLLER GUIDE
BROKEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR ALIGNMENT ROLLER GUIDE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT STARBOARD/PORT PAYLOAD BAY BULKHEAD
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BROKEN ROLLER GUIDE WOULD INCREASE STRUCTURAL LOAD ON THE
REMAINING 3 ROLLER GUIDES. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: V070-594125
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-591
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORICSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD FLIGHT:
MDACID: 5178 - ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOADBAY DOORPASSIVE STOP
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE,BROKEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR PASSIVE STOP
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PORTSIDE MIDFUSELAGE
V070-594117-001, V070-594117-002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, MISADJUSTED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION DUE TO BROKEN OR MISADJUSTED
PASSIVE STOP. IF ALL 4 WERE _FAIL, EXCESSIVE TRAVEL BY LEFT
PBD COULD OCCUR PREVENTING CENTERLINE LATCH CLOSURE.
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REFERENCES: V070-594125
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-592
B
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DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/22/87
MECH/PBD
5179
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR SHEAR/FLOATING HINGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS SUBSYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR SHEAR/FLOATING HINGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [NA ] C [ P ]
STARBOARD/PORT ORBITER MIDFUSELAGE
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
w
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BINDING/JAMMING HINGE WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY (13 TOTAL,
5 SHEAR HINGES, 8 FLOATING HINGES). NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC-18341
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-593
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/25/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR
SHORTS, RESISTANCE LOWER THAN RATED VALUE
HDW/FUNC
211R
2!IR
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DC CONTROL BUS
1.2K RESISTOR
\ CRITICALiTiEs
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3L
AIR1, AIR2, AIR3
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTOR THAT SHORTS OR WITH RESISTANCE LOWER THAN RATED VALUE
WOULD ALLOW EXCESSIVE CURRENT TO REACH OTHER COMPONENTS. HIGHER
CURRENT CAUSES LOSS OF COMPONENT AND LOSS OF FUNCTION. REDUNDANT
ELEMENTS WILL CONTINUE OPERATION BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
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REFERENCES: VS72-956099 l
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-594
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/25/87
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
550_
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR
OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DC CONTROL BUS
1.2K RESISTOR
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
2/IR AOA:
2/IR ATO:
/
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3L
PART NUMBER: AIR1, AIR2, AIR3
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTOR FAILURE AS AN OPEN CIRCUIT WOULD CAUSE A LOSS OF CURRENT
TO OTHER COMPONENTS. THIS RESULTS IN A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY WHEN
AFFECTED COMPONENTS CANNOT OPERATE. REDUNDANT ELEMENTS WILL
CONTINUE OPERATION BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT ON
CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-595
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/25/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC IDa. 5503
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: CONTROL BUS 1.2K RESISTOR
FAILURE MODE: RESISTANCE HIGHER THAN RATED VALUE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DC CONTROL BUS
1.2K RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
I
I
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3L
PART NUMBER: AIR1, AIR2, AIR3
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTANCE HIGHER THAN RATED VALUE WOULD REDUCE CURRENT TO THE
RELAY WHICH CLOSES TO PASS AC BUS POWER TO THE ACTUATOR MOTORS.
LOGIC CIRCUIT INPUT WOULD BE LOW SIGNIFYING RELAY NEED NOT BE
CLOSED. REDUNDANT MCA WOULD ALLOW AC POWER TO REACH ACTUATOR
MOTORS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099, RELAY CONTROL AC POWER IN MCA
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-596
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/25/8v
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CONTROL SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DC CONTROL BUS
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS OPEN-CLOSE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3L
S3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF PAYLOAD BAY DOORS CONTROL SWITCH TO SWITCH TO THE
DESIRED COMMAND (OPEN-STOP-CLOSE) CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
PBDS CAN BE COMMANDED IN THE DESIRED DIRECTION BY USING THE DEU
ON PANEL RI2. THE "PBD SW BYPASS" ENTRY WILL ALLOW SOFTWARE
CONTROL OF THE SWITCH FUNCTIONS. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-597
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/25/8v
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5505
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, IA
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DC CONTROL BUS
FUSE, IA
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT
/ RTLS:
/ TAL:
2/IR AOA:
2/IR ATO:
/
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3A2
F37-F42
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE: .........
FAILED FUSE CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. FAILURE CAUSES LOSS OF
DC POWER TO RELAYS WHICH ARE CLOSED TO SUPPLY AC POWER TO
ACTUATOR MOTORS. REDUNDANT E_MENTS WILL COMP_TE AC_ATOR
OPERATION BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-598
mm
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mDATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/25/87
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MECHANICAL POWER SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DC CONTROL BUS
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR MECHANICAL POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3A2
S13 (SYS 1), S14 (SYS 2)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF PBD MECHANICAL POWER SWITCH TO GO TO THE COMMANDED
POSITION CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY. POWER COULD STILL BE
APPLIED TO THE ACTUATOR MOTOR RELAYS AND MCA LOGIC RELAYS BY
USING THE DEU ON PANEL RI2. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-599
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSISWORKSHEET
DATE: 8/25/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: MAIN DC BUS RELAY
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE _ _
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
=
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: ORBITER MID FUSELAGE, MID MCA-I, -2, -3, -4
PART NUMBER: K78, K66, K37, K39, K54, K42, K22, K20, K29, K41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICALSHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELAY IS USED TO SUPPLY AC BUS POWER To PAYLOAD BAY DOOR DRIVE
MOTORS, CENTERLINE AND BULKHEAD LATCH ACTUATOR MOTORS. FAILURE
OF RELAY CAUSES AN OPEN CIRCUIT AND THE LOSS OF A MOTOR. THE
REDUNDANT MOTOR CONTINUES THE PARTICULAR FUNCTION BUT AT A
REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
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REFERENCES: VS72-956099 i
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-600
m
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/25/87
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5508
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
FAILS TO OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ORBITER MID FUSELAGE, MID MCA-I, -2, -3, -4
K78, K66, K37, K39, K54, K42, K22, K20, K29, K41
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF RELAY TO OPEN HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION. AC MOTOR POWER WILL BE REMOVED WHEN SECOND RELAY IN THE
PAIR OPENS OR VIA DEU COMMANDS.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-601
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM".
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/25/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PBD/EPD&C FLIGHT:
5509 ABORT:
DIODE
OPEN CIRCUIT
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3A2
PART NUMBER: A3CRI, A3CR2, A3CR3, A3CR4
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONALE:
OPEN CIRCUIT FAILURE MODE CAUSES A LOSS OF INPUT TO_PAY_AD BAY
TALKBACK. PAYLOAD BAY DOORS STATUS IS DISPLAYED ON CRT SO
FAILURE HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
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REFERENCES". VS72-956099
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/25/87
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5510
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIODE
SHORTED OUT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION. "
PART NUMBER:
AFT ORBITER FLIGHT DECK, PANEL RI3A2
A3CRI, A3CR2, A3CR3, A3CR4
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DIODE PREVENTS SIGNAL FROM ONE MDM FEEDING BACK INTO THE OTHER.
SHORTED DIODE WOULD ALLOW FEEDBACK INTO MDM. FEEDBACK WOULD HAVE
NO EFFECT. TALKBACKANDVISUAL CUES WOULD SHOW PBD POSITION. NO
EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-603
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/25/87
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5511
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
SHORTS, RESISTANCE LOWER THAN RATED VALUE
T._AD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANI_L A_ATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MID _SELAGE MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLIES -I, -2, -3, -
4
PART NUMBER: SEE PAGES 56AB, AC, AD, AH, _ IN REFERENCE
CAUSES: _ERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MEC_ICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTOR THAT SHORTS OR WITH RESISTANCE LOWER THAN RATED VALUE
WOULD ALLOW EXCESSIVE CURRENT TO REACH RELAY AC MOTOR POWER LOGIC
GATE. HIGHTER CURRENT CAUSES LOSS OF COMPONENET. POSSIBLE
PREMATURE AC MOTOR POWER SHUT OFF. REDUNDANT MOTOR WOULD
COMPLETE FUNCTION BUT AT A REDUCED RATE.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/25/87
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5512
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
H DW/FUN C
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
OPEN CIRCUIT
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
4
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLIES -i, -2, -3, -
SEE PAGES 56AB, AC, AD, AH, AJ IN REFERENCE
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESITOR FAILURE AS AN OPEN CIRCUIT CAUSES MOTOR TO CONTINUE TO
RUN. RELAY WOULD NOT GET INPUT SIGNIFYING DOOR OR LATCHES WERE
IN DESIRED POSITION. MOTOR WOULD STALL WHEN LIMIT REACHED. CREW
CAN REMOVE AC MOTOR POWER. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-605
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/25/8v
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5513
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT".
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
RESISTANCE HIGHER T_ RATED VALUE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
SWITCH RESISTOR, 1.2K 2W
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBiT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
4
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLIES -i, -2, -3, -
SEE PAGES 56AB, AC, AD, AH, AJ IN REFERENCE
CAUSES: THERMAL STRESS, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL
SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RESISTANCE HIGHER THAN RATED VALUE WOULD REDUCE CURRENT TO THE
RELAY CONTROLLING AC POWER TO THE ACTUATOR MOTOR. LOGIC CIRCUIT
INPUT WOULD BE LOW SIGNIFYING DOOR OR LATCHES _RE IN THE DESIRED
POSITION. RELAY WOULD OPEN AND AC POWER WOULD BE REMOVED
FROM ACTUATOR MOTOR. REDUNDANT ELEMENTS WOULD CONTINUE FUNCTION
BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/25/87
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5514
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY
FAILS TO CLOSE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /
TAL: /
AOA: /
ATO: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
4
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLIES -I, -2, -3, -
SEE PAGES 56AB, AC, AD, AH, AJ IN REFERENCE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RELAY IS USED TO CONNECT THE 3 PHASE AC POWER TO THE ACTUATOR
MOTORS FOR OPENING/CLOSING PAYLOAD BAY DOORS OR OPERATING THE
LATCHES. FAILURE OF RELAY CAUSES AN OPEN CIRCUIT AND THE LOSS OF
A MOTOR. THE REDUNDANT MOTOR CONTINUES THE PARTICULAR FUNCTION
BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-607
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
8/25/87
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5515
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY
FAILS TO OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
MID MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS AC BUS RELAY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
4
PART NUMBER:
MID FUSELAGE MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLIES -i, -2, -3, -
SEE PAGES 56AB, AC, AD, AH, AJ IN REFERENCE
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAII//RE OF RELAY TO OPEN CAUSES THE LOSS OF AN ACTUATOR MOTOR.
RELAY IS USED TO CHANNEL THE THREE PHASE AC BUS POWER TO THE
ACTUATOR MOTOR (A-B-C OR A-C-B). IF RELAY USED IN RELEASING
LATCHES AND OPENING PBD FAILS TO OPEN THEN WHEN PBD CLOSURE IS
BEGUN THE B ANDC PHASE REVERSAL WILL NOT OCCUR. REDUNDANT MOTOR
WILL COMPLETE FUNCTION. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-956099
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-608
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/25/87
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5516
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
AC 3 PHASE BUS
MCA AC POWER CIRCUIT BREAKER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL MA73C
CBI2, CB7, CB9, CBI3, CB2, CB3
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, INADVERTENT OPERATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF CIRCUIT BREAKER CAUSES LOSS OF THE THREE PHASE AC
POWER FROM THE MAIN AC BUS. REDUNDANT MOTOR WILL COMPLETE
FUNCTION BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC-II174
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-609
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/25/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDACID: 5517
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
CONTROL BUS
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL MA73C
PART NUMBER: S12, $7, $9, S13, $2, $3
C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILING OFF CAUSES AN OPEN CIRCUIT AND THE LOSS OF CONTROL
SIGNAL TO THE ASSOCIATED RPC. REDUNDANT RPC FOR FUNCTION WOULD
ALLOW OPERATION TO BE COMPLETED BUT AT A REDUCED RATE. NO EFFECT
ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
8/25/87
MECH/PBD/EPD&C
5518
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
FAILS ON
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
CONTROL BUS
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL MA73C
S12, $7, $9, S13, $2, $3
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH FAILING IN THE ON POSITION HAS NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE
OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: JSC-II174
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-611
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 8/25/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBD/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 5519
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OFF
LEAD ANALYST: J. BACHER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS EPD&C
DISPLAY AND CONTROL
CONTROL BUS
MCA RELAY LOGIC POWER SWITCH
REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 2/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF A REMOTE POWER CONTROLLER CAUSES A LOSS OF REDUNDANCY.
SECOND RPC PERMITS CONTINUED PBD OPERATION WITH REDUNDANT MOTORS.
NO EFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
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REFERENCES: JSC-II174
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-612
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PAYLOAD BAY RADIATORS ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
u
C-613
IPAYLOAD BAY RADIATORS ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC-ID H/F H/F A B C
6101 3/1R /NA P P P
6102 3/3 /NA
6103 3/3 /NA
6104 3/3 /NA
6105 3/3 /NA
6106 3/IR /NA P P P
6107 3/IR /NA P P P
6108 3/IR /NA P P P
6109 3/3 /NA
6110 3/3 /NA
6111 3/IR /NA P P P
6112 3/3 /NA
6113 3/3 /NA
6201 3/IR /NA P P P
6202 3/3 /NA
6203 3/3 /NA
6204 3/3 /NA
6205 3/3 /NA
6206 3/1R /NA P P P
6207 3/IR /NA P P P
6208 3/IR /NA P P P
6209 3/3 /NA
6210 3/3 /NA
6211 3/IR /NA P P P
6212 3/3 /NA
6213 3/3 /NA
6301 3/IR /NA P P P
6302 3/IR /NA P P P
6501 3/3 /NA
6502 3/3 /NA
6503 3/IR /NA P P P
6504 3/3 /NA
6507 3/3 /NA
6508 3/3 /NA
6509 3/IR /NA P P P
6510 3/3 /NA
ITEM NAME
MOTOR
MOTOR BRAKE
MOTOR BRAKE
TORQUE LIMITER
TORQUE LIMITER
DIFFERENTIAL ASSEMBLY
GEARBOX
GEARBOX
LIMIT SW, RELEASE (SI), ($3), ($4)
LIMIT SW, LATCH ($2), ($3), ($4)
LATCH _ORQUE SHAFT ASSEMBLY
LATCH ROTARY ACTUATOR
LATCH HOOK MECHANISM
MOTOR
MOTOR BRAKE
MOTOR BRAKE
TORQUE LIMITER
TORQUE LIMITER
DIFFERENTIAL ASSEMBLY
GEARBOX
GEARBOX
LIMIT SW, DEPLOY (SI,$2,$4)
LIMIT SW, STOW (SI,$2,$3)
DEPLOYMENT TORQUE SHAFT
DEPLOYMENT ROTARY ACTUATOR
DEPLOYMENT CRANK AND LINK
HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS
HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/S6)
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/S6)
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH (S5/S7)
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH (S5/$7)
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
VlOllSV
MECH/PBR
6101
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MOTOR
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO START
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
Mc287-oo37-OOOl (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS
OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ONE MOTOR/POWER SOURCE IN A PDU RESULTS IN TWICE THE
NORMAL DRIVE TIME TO RELEASE/LATCH ONE SIX-LATCH GANG FOR THE
AFFECTED RADIATOR PANEL. FAILURE OF SECOND MOTOR IS LOSS OF
CAPABILITY TO RELEASE/LATCH THAT PANEL. IF UNABLE TO RELEASE,
TOTAL COOLING CAPACITY IS REDUCED WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME
MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATION DEPENDENT UPON WATER CONSUMMABLES
REQUIREMENTS. IF UNABLE TO LATCH, POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR
INTERFERENCE WITH PLBD CLOSURE AND/OR LOOSE RADIATOR PANEL DURING
DEORBIT/ENTRY.
REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG NO 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-615
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PBR FLIGHT:
6102 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TO DISENGAGE
MOTOR BRAKE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, FAILS TO SWITCH, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: W.T, SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
MOTOR BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0037-0001 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT,_PIECE'PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/_TI_LE: ........
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT FOR AFFECTED MOTOR CAUSING
TWICE THE NORMAL DRIVE TIME TO RELEASE/LATCH.
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REFERENCES: V070_5§44S0, SSSH DWG NO 14 1
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 3/3
6103 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TO ENGAGE
MOTOR BRAKE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, FAILS TO SWITCH, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
MOTOR BRAKE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0037-0001 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BRAKES ARE DESIGNED TO PREVENT MOTORS FROM TURNING WHEN THE
MECHANSIM IS UNPOWERED AND TO PREVENT A FAILED MOTOR FROM BEING
DRIVEN VIA THE DIFFERENTIAL WHILE THE OTHER MOTOR IS TURNING.
FAILURE OF A MOTOR BRAKE TO ENGAGE IS NOT DETECTABLE AND HAS NO
APPARENT EFFECT UNLESS THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR FAILS. IN THIS
EVENT, BACKDRIVE FROM MOTOR #2 VIA THE DIFFERENTIAL IS PROBABLE,
BUT THE NEAR TERM EFFECTS ARE RELATIVELY INCONSEQUENTIAL.
w REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG NO 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-617
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/01/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 3/3
6104 ABORT: " /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TORQUE LIMITER
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE - HIGH, FAILS TO SLIP
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
3) RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
4) LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
5) TORQUE LIMITER
6)
V)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /N A
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0037-0001 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A TORQUE LIMITER CLUTCH TO SLIP IN RESPONSE TO THE PDU
OUTPUT REACHING/EXCEEDING A SET LIMIT COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OR MECHANICAL DAMAGE AND/OR STALLING AND OVERHEATING OF THE
DRIVING MOTOR. LOSS OF ONE MOTOR RESULTS IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE
TIME TO LATCH/RELEASE SIX-LATCH GANG FOR THAT RADIATOR PANEL.
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iw
im
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-618
mm
I
mu
w
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM :
MDAC ID:
V/Ol/SV
MECH/PBR
6105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TORQUE LIMITER
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE - LOW, FAILS TO ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
c [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC287-0037-0001 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THIS MODE THE RIGHT CLUTCH PLATE/SPRING WASHER/FRICTION RINGS
FAIL IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO ALLOW THE DRIVE GEAR TO ROTATE FREE
OF THE OUTPUT SHAFT. HENCE, THE ROTARY INPUT OF ONE DRIVE MOTOR
IS LOST AND THE RELEASE/LATCH STATE WILL BE EFFECTED IN
SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME.
u
REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG NO 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-619
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/01/87
MECH/PBR
6106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STRIPPED TEETH
DIFFERENTIAL ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLBRADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
DIFFERENTIAL ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TION_A_:
WORSE CASE FAILURE OF THE DIFFERENTIALASSEMBLY fS COMPLETE LOSS
OF THE OUTPUT OF A PDU AND RESULTANT INABILITY TO RELEASE/LATCH
THE ASSOCIATED RADIATOR PANEL. IF UNABLE TO RELEASE, TOTAL
COOLING CAPACITY IS REDUCED WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME MISSION/PAYLOAD
OPERATIONS DEPENDENT UPON WATER CONSUMMABLES REQUIREMENTS. IF
UNABLE TO LATCH, POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR INTERFERENCE WITH PLBD
CLOSURE AND/OR LOOSE RADIATOR PANEL DURING DEORBIT/ENTRY,
REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG NO 14.1
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-620
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSME%NT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o8/87
MECH/PBR
6107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/?UNC
3/1R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FROZEN GEARS
GEARBOX
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
MC-287-0037-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THIS MODE TORQUE LIMITERS WILL RELEASE AT THE PRESENT LIMIT TO
ALLOW BOTH DRIVING MOTORS TO RUN FREE OF THE OUTPUT SHAFT. THIS
WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF OUTPUT OF A PDU AND INABILITY TO
RELEASE OR LATCH THE ASSOCIATED RADIATOR PANEL. IF UNABLE TO
RELEASE, TOTAL COOLING CAPACITY IS REDUCED WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME
MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS DEPENDENT UPON WATER CONSUMMABLES
REQUIREMENTS. IF UNABLE TO LATCH, POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR
INTERFERENCE WITH PLBD CLOSURE AND/OR LOOSE RADIATOR PANEL DURING
DEORBIT/ENTRY.
REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG NO 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-621
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER'ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PBR FLIGHT:
6108 _ ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GEARBOX
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF OUTPUT, STRIPPED TEETH
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0001
B [ P ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THIS MODE GEARBOX FAILS IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO TRANSMIT
REDUCED OR NO ROTARY MOTION TO PDU OUTPUT SHAFT. WORSE CASE
EFFECT IS COMPLETE LOSS OF PDU OUTPUT RESULTING IN INABILITY TO
RELEASE OR LATCH THE AFFECTED RADIATOR PANEL. IF UNABLE TO
RELEASE, TOTAL COOLING CAPACITY IS REDUCED WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME
MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS DEPENDENT UPON WATER CONSUMMABLES
REQUIREMENTS. IF UNABLE TO LATCH, POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR
INTERFERENCE WITH PLBD CLOSURE AND/OR LOOSE RADIATOR PANEL DURING
DEORBIT/ENTRY.
REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG NO 14.1
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 3/3
6109 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LIMIT SWITCHES, RELEASE (SI), (S3), ($4)
FAILS TO CLOSE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
LIMIT SWITCHES, RELEASE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A REDUNDANT PAIR OF RELEASE LIMIT SWITCHES WITHIN A
PDU WILL ALLOW THE MECHANISM TO CONTINUE TO DRIVE TOW_DS THE
RELEASE STATE UNTIL (I) THE RELEASE COMMAND SIGNAL IS REMOVED,
(2) TORQUE LIMITER SETTINGS ARE REACHED, OR (3) STRUCTURAL
FAILURE IS EXPERIENCED SOME POINT IN THE DRIVE TRAIN DOWNSTREAM
OF THE TORQUE LIMITERS. PORT (STARBOARD) INDICATOR, DS4(DS2) ON
PANEL RI3L WILL SHOW BARBERPOLE ALTHOUGH LATCHES FOR THE AFFECTED
PANEL ARE IN THE RELEASE STATE.
REFERENCES: VS70-590409, VS70-960099, SSSH DWG. N. 15.6
i
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-623
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PBR FLIGHT:
6110 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: LIMIT SWITCHES, LATCH ($2), ($3), ($4)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO CLOSE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
LIMIT SWITCHES, LATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0001
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A REDUNDANT PAIR OF LATCH LIMIT SWITCHES WITHIN A PDU
WILL ALLOW THE MEC_ISM TO CONTINUE TO DRIVE TOWARDS THE LATCH
STATE UNTIL (1) THE LATCH COMMAND SIGNAL IS REMOVED, (2) TORQUE
LIMITER SETTINGS ARE REACHED, OR (3) STRUCTURAL FAILURE IS
EXPERIE-NCED AT soME P_INT=_N THE DRI_TRAiN _WNSTRE_ OF THE _
TORQUE LIMITERS. PORT (STARBORD) INDICATOR, DS4(DS2) ON PANEL
RI3L WILL SHOW BARBERPOLE ALTHOUGH LATCHES FOR THE AFFECTED PANEL
ARE IN THE LATCH STATE.
REFERENCES: VS70-590409, VS70-960099, SSSH DWG. N. 15.6
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
MECH/PBR
6111
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
(RUPTURE)
LATCH TORQUE SHAFT ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDIND/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH TORQUE SHAFT ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
V070-594480-001/002/003/004, V070-594490-001/002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, OVERLOAD, PIECE-
PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH A BROKEN/DISCONNECTED TORQUE SHAFT, AT LEAST ONE PAIR OF
LATCHES WILL DRIVE TO THE RELEASE/LATCH STATE. WITH A
BINDING/JAMMED SHAFT SEGMENT, TORQUE LIMITERS WILL ACTIVATE AT
PRESET LIMIT TO PREVENT MOTOR BURN OUT AND CAPABILITY TO
RELEASE/LATCH THE EFFECTED RADIATOR PANEL IS LOST. IF UNABLE TO
LATCH, POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR INTERFERENCE WITH PLBD CLOSURE AND/OR
LOOSE RADIATOR PANEL DURING DEORBIT/ENTRY.
n
REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG. NO. 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-625
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: LATCH ROTARY ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE), LOSS OF OUTPUT,
STRIPPED TEETH/GEARS, BROKEN OUTPUT ARM
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH ROTARY ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
MC-147-0016-0001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THIS MODE PDU OUTPUT IS INTACT AND IS TRANSMITTED TO THE
ROTARY ACTUATOR (IN TERMS OF EFFECT, A BINDING/JAMMED ACTUATOR IS
TREATED AS A FAILED LATCH TORQUE SHAI_T ASSEMBLY)_ DUE TO
INTERNAL SLIPPAGE OR A BRO_ OUTPUT ARM, MOTION IS NOT OUTPUT TO
THE LATCH HOOK MECHANISM RESULTING IN THE INABILITY TO
RELEASE/LATCH THE ASSOCIATED PAIR OF LATCHES. REMAINING LATCH
PAIR(S) WILL DRIVE TO THE COMMANDED STATE; INDICATORS ON PANEL
RI3L SHOULD SHOW BARBERPOLE ALTHOUGH REMAINING LATCHES WILL BE IN
THE COMMANDED STATE.
REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG. NO. 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-626
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6113 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: LATCH HOOK MECHANISM
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO RELEASE/LATCH, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR LATCH SYSTEM
LATCH HOOK MECHANISM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: V070-594460-001, VS070-594470-001
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MOST PLAUSIBLE EFFECT OF A FAILED LATCH HOOK MECHANISM
COMPONENT (BELLCRANK, BELLCRANK ATTACHMENT, PUSH-PULL ROD,
ADJUSTABLE STOP, LINK, LATCH ROLLER) IS THE LOSS OF THE ABILITY
TO RELEASE/LATCH A SINGLE LATCH. WORST CASE FAILURE IS THE LOSS
OF ABILITY TO RELEASE/LATCH A LATCH PAIR. EITHER CASE IS
CONSIDERED A CRITICALITY THREE (3) AS IT WILL NOT AFFECT MISSION
CONTINUANCE.
z
REFERENCES: V070-594450, SSSH DWG. NO. 14.1
=
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-627
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7121187
MECH/PBR
6201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MOTOR
LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO START
- _-_ _ ,_ -- ;_E_ i_+ r • -_ _ :_
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHYz
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MEC ICAL AC ATION SYSTm 
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE WIT
MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY _ORS _
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0002 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, LOSS
OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ONE MOTOR/POWER SOURCE IN A PDU RESULTS IN TWICE THE
NORMAL DRIVE TIME TO DEPLOY STOW THE TWO RADIATOR PANELS (PORT OR
STARBOARD) DRIVEN BY THAT PDU. FAILURE OF SECOND MOTOR IS LOSS
OF CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY/STOW TH_ AFFECTED PAIR OF PANELS.
IF UNAB_TO DEPLOY, TOTAL COOLING CAPABITY IS REDUCED WHICH MAY
AFFECT SOME MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS DEPENDENT UPON WATER
CONSUMABLES REQUIREMENTS. IF UNABLE TO STOW, PLBD CLOSURE IS
UNLIKELY AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW MAY RESULT.
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REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO 14.1
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM"
MDAC ID:
7/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 3/3
6202 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TO DISENGAGE
MOTOR BRAKE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, FAILS TO SWITCH, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
MOTOR BRAKE
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
CRITICALITIES
ABORT
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
RTLS:
TAL:
AOA:
ATO:
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
MC-287-0037-0002 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE RESULTS IN LOSS OF OUTPUT FOR AFFECTED MOTOR CAUSING
TWICE THE NORMAL DRIVE TIMETO DEPLOY/STOW.
REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-629
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
I
i
DATE: 7/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6203 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TO DISENGAGE
MOTOR BRAKE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, FAILS TO SWITCH, FAILS
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
MOTOR BRAKE
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
B [ ]
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0002 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
BRAKES ARE DESIGNED TO PREVENT MOTORS FROM TURNING WHEN THE
MECHANISM IS UNPOWERED AND TO PREVENT A FAILED MOTOR FROM BEING
DRIVEN VIA THE DIFFERENTIAL WHILE THE OTHER MOTOR IS TURNING.
FAILURE OF A MOTOR BRAKE IS NOT DETECTABLE AND HAS NO
APPARENT EFFECT UNLESS THE ASSOCIATED MOTOR FAILS. IN THIS
EVENT, BACKDRIVE FROM MOTOR #2 IS PROBABLEF BUT THE NEAR-TERM
EFFECTS ARE RELATIVELY INCONSEQUENTIAL.
REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO 14.1
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/21/8v
MECH/PBR
6204
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TORQUE LIMITER
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE-HIGH, FAILS TO SLIP
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION. "
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
MC-287-0037-0002 (TWO MOTORS PER PDU)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A TORQUE LIMITER CLUTCH TO SLIP IN RESPONSE TO THE PDU
OUTPUT REACHING/EXCEEDING A SET LIMIT COULD RESULT IN STRUCTURAL
OR MECHANICAL DAMAGE AND/OR STALLING AND OVERHEATING OF THE
DRIVING MOTOR. LOSS OF ONE MOTOR RESULTS IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE
TIME TO DEPLOY/STOW THE AFFECTED RADIATOR PANELS (PORT OR
STARBOARD).
REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-631
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/21/87
MECHIPBR
6205
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
TORQUE LIMITER
FAILS OUT OF TOLERANCE-LOW, FAILS TO ENGAGE
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
TORQUE LIMITER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0002 (TWO MOTORS PER PDV)
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/_TIONALE: .............
IN THIS MODE THE RIGHT CLUTCH PLATE/SPRING WASHER/PR_iON_NGS
FAIL IN SUCH A MANNER AST0 ALLOW THE=DRIVE GEA_RTOROTATE FREE
OF THE OUTPUT SHA_. HENCE, THE ROTARY OUTPUT OF ONE DRIVE MOTOR
IS LOST AND THE COMMANDED DEPLOY/STATE WILL BE EFFECTED
IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME.
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REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO 14.1
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/21/87
MECH/PBR
6206
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STRIPPED TEETH
DIFFERENTIAL ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
DIFFERENTIAL ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORSE CASE FAILURE OF THE DIFFERENTIAL ASSEMBLY IS COMPLETE LOSS
OF THE OUTPUT OF THE PDU AND THE RESULTANT INABILITY TO
DEPLOY/STOW THE ASSOCIATED PAIR OF RADIATOR PANELS (PORT OR
STARBOARD). IF UNABLE TO DEPLOY, TOTAL COOLING CAPACITY IS
REDUCED WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS
DEPENDENT UPON WATER CONSUMMABLES REQUIREMENTS. IF UNABLE TO
STOW, PLBD CLOSURE IS UNLIKELY AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW MAY
RESULT.
REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-633
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6207
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/NA
ITEM: GEARBOX
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
FROZEN GEARS
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MEC_I_MS _
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
MC-287-0037-0002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THIS MODE TORQUE LIMITERS WILL RELEASE AT THE PRESENT LIMIT TO
ALLOW BOTH DRIVING MOTORS TO RUN FREE OF THE OUTPUT SHAFT. THIS
WILL RESULT IN LOSS OF OUTPUT OF THE PDU AND INABILITY TO
DEPLOY/STOW THE ASSOCIATED PAIR OF RADIATOR PANELS (PORT OR
STARBOARD). IF UNABLE TO DEPLOY, TOTAL COOLING CAPACITY IS
REDUCED WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS
DEPENDENT UPON wATER CONSUMMABLES REQUIREMENTS. IF UNABLE TO
STOW, PLBD CLOSURE IS UNLIKELY AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW MAY
RESULT.
REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO 14.1
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-634
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 3/IR
6208 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GEARBOX
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF OUTPUT, STRIPPED TEETH
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
GEARBOX
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:_ /NA
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
MC-287-0037-0002
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THIS MODE THE GEARBOX FAILS IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO TRANSMIT
REDUCED OR NO ROTARY MOTION TO THE PDU OUTPUT SHAFT. WORSE CASE
EFFECT IS COMPLETE LOSS OF OUTPUT OF THE PDU RESULTING IN
INABILITY TO DEPLOY/STOW THE ASSOCIATED PAIR OF RADIATOR PANELS
(PORT OR STARBOARD). IF UNABLE TO DEPLOY, TOTAL COOLING CAPACITY
IS REDUCED WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS. IF
UNABLE TO STOW, PLBD CLOSURE IS UNLIKELY AND LOSS OF VEHICLE AND
CREW MAY RESULT.
REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-635
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE".
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 3/3
6209 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LIMIT SWITCHES, DEPLOY (Sl, $2, $4)
FAILS TO CLOSE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION sYSTEM
2) PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
3) RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
LIMIT SWITCHES, DEPLOY
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE
pi_E--LA_=UN-dH: /NA
LI_OFF: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
- RTLS: /--NA + + -
TAL: /NA
AOA: /NA
ATO: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER: MC-287-0037-0002
B [ ] C [ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A REDUNDANT PAIR OF DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES WITHIN THE
PDU WILL ALLOW THE _C_ISM TO CONTINUE TO DRIVE TOWARDS THE
DEPLOY STATE UNTIL 1) THE DEPLOY COMMAND SIGNAL IS REMOVED, 2)
TORQUE LIMITER SETTINGS ARE REACHED, OR 3) STRUCTURAL FAILURE IS
EXPERIENCED AT SOME POINT IN THE DRIVE TRAIN DOWNSTREAM OF THE _
TORQUE LIMITERS. PORT (STARBOARD) INDICATOR, DS5 (DS3) ON PANEL
R13L WILL SHOW BARBERPOLE ALTHOUGH THE ASSOCIATED PAIR OF
RADIATOR PANELS IS IN THE DEPLOY STATE.
REFERENCES: VS70-590409; VS70-960099; SSSH DWG. NO 15.6
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 3/3
6210 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LIMIT SWITCHES, STOW (SI, $2, $3)
FAILS TO CLOSE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
LIMIT SWITCHES, DEPLOY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
MC-287-0037-0002
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF A REDUNDANT PAIR OF STOW LIMIT SWITCHES WITHIN THE PDU
WILL ALLOW THE MECHANISM TO CONTINUE TO DRIVE TOWARDS THE STOW
STATE UNTIL I) THE STOW COMMAND SIGNAL IS REMOVED, 2) TORQUE
LIMITER SETTINGS ARE REACHED, OR 3) STRUCTURAL FAILURE IS
EXPERIENCED AT SOME POINT THE DRIVE TRAIN DOWNSTREAM OF THE
TORQUE LIMITERS. PORT (STARBOARD) INDICATOR, DS5 (DS3) ON PANEL
RI3L WILL SHOW BARBERPOLE ALTHOUGH THE ASSOCIATED PAIR OF
RADIATOR PANELS IS IN THE STOW STATE.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-590409; VS70-960099; SSSH DWG. NO 15.6
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-637
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
712118 
MECH/PBR
6211
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
(RUPTURE)
DEPLOYMENT TORQUE SHAFT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
3) RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
4) DEPLOYMENT TORQUE SHAFT
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
005
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
V070-594412-001; V070-594420-001/002; V070-594480-
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH A BROKEN/DISCONNECTED TORQUE SHAFT, OUTPUT OF THE PDU IS
LOST TO ONE OR BOTH OF THE ROTARY ACTUATORS DEPENDENT UPON THE
LOCATION OF THE BREAK. IF BOTH ACTUATORS AFFECTED, CAPABILITY TO
DEPLOY/STOW THAT RADIATOR PANEL IS LOST. WITH A BINDING/
JAMMED SHAFT SEGMENT, TORQUE LIMITERS WILL ACTIVATE AT THE PRESET
LIMIT TO PREVENT MOTOR BURNOUT AND CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY/STOW THE
AFFECTED PAIR OF RADIATOR PANELS (PORT, STARBOARD) IS LOST. IF
UNABLE TO STO, POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR INTERFERENCE WITH PLBD
CLOSURE AND/OR LOOSE RADIATOR PANELS DURING DEORBIT/ENTRY.
REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO. 14.1
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-638
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/21/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR
MDAC ID: 6212
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM: DEPLOYMENT ROTARY ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE), LOSS OF OUTPUT,
STRIPPED TEETH/GEARS, BROKEN OUTPUT ARM
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
DEPLOYMENT ROTARY ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
MC-147-00XX-000X
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN THIS MODE PDU OUTPUT IS INTACT AND IS TRANSMITTED TO THE
ROTARY ACTUATOR (IN TERMS OF EFFECTS, A BINDING/JAMMED ACTUATOR
IS TREATED AS A FAILED DEPLOYMENT TORQUE SHAFT ASSEMBLY). DUE
TO INTERNAL SLIPPAGE OR A BROKEN OUTPUT ARM, MOTION IS NOT OUTPUT
TO THE ASSOCIATED DEPLOYMENT CRANK. THE REMAINING ACTUATOR
SHOULD OPERATE NORMALLY TO DRIVE THE RADIATOR PANEL TO THE DEPLOY
STATE. THE INDICATOR ON PANEL RI3L WILL SHOW DEPLOY FOR THAT
RADIATOR PAIR (PORT OR STARBOARD) ALTHOUGH ONE END OF ONE PANEL
MAY NOT BE FULLY DEPLOYED.
REFERENCES: V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO. 14.1
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-639
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS_WORKS_EET
DATE : 7/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 6213 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: DEPLOYMENT CRANK AND LINK ......... _
FAILURE MODE : FAILS TO DEPLOY/STOW, PHYSICAL r BINDING/JAMMING,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE (RUPTURE)
LEAD ANALYST : W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PLB RADIATOR DEP_Y _CHAN-iSMS
3) RADIATOR DEPLOYMENT SYSTEM
4) DEPLOYMENT CRANK AND LINK
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC _
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS : /NA
LI FTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORB--I T: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO : _ "_/NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PAYLOAD BAY DOORS
PART NUMBER:
CAUSES :
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WORST CASE FAILURE OF A BROKEN/DISCONNECTED DEPLOYMENT CRANK OR
LINK IS LOSS OF DEPLOYMENT MOTION/FORCE FOR ONE END OF ONE
RADIATOR PANEL. THE REMAINING ROTARY ACTUATOR/DEPLOYMENT CRANK
MECHANISM SHOULD DRIVE THE RADIATOR PANEL TO THE DEPLOY STATE.
THE INDICATOR ON PANEL RI3L WILL SHOW DEPLOY FOR THAT RADIATOR
PAIR (PORT OR STARBOARD) ALTHOUGH ONE END OF ONE PANEL MAY NOT BE
FULLY DEPLOYED.
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REFERENCES :
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V070-594400; SSSH DWG. NO. 14.1
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-640
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/21/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR FLIGHT:
MDAC ID: 6301 " ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/NA
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR HINGES
HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS/RADIATOR PANELS
TBD
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK,
DISTORTION/ELONGATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
DISTORTION/WARP OF PLBD, RADIATOR PANELS, LONGERON SIL MAY OCCUR
IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO CAUSE HINGES TO BIND OR JAM. WORSE CASE
EFFECT OF A BINDING/JAMMED RADIATOR HINGE IS LOSS A THE
CAPABILITY TO STOW A DEPLOYED RADIATOR PANEL. IF UNABLE TO STOW
POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR INTERFERENCE WITH PLBD CLOSURE AND/OR LOOSE
RADIATOR PANEL DURING DEORBIT/ENTRY.
REFERENCES: TBD
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-641
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT \
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
 /21/8 
MECH/PBR
6302
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
HINGE FITTINGS/POiNT _ ....... -
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, FRAC_
LEAD ANALYST : W.T. SLAUGHTER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
RADIATOR HINGES
HINGE FITTINGS/POINTS
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/_C
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PAYLOAD BAY DOORS/RADIATOR PANELS
TBD
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
DISTORTION/ELONGATION
EFFECTS/RATIONAl:
EFFECTS OF FRACTURED HINGE PARTS, SHEARED/MISSING HINGE PINS ARE
NIL IF THE FAILURE IS ISOLATED TO A SINGLE HINGE/HINGE POINT.
WORSE CASE EFFECT WOULD BE THE FAILURE OF TWO ADJACENT
HINGES/HINGE POINTS WITH THE RADIATORS IN THE DEPLOY STATE
IN WHICH CASE THE ABILITY TO STOW THE RADIATOR AND CLOSE THE PLBD
MAY BE JEOPARDIZED.
REFERENCES: TBD
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-642
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7122187
MECHIPBRIEPD&C
6501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
FAILS TO RELEASE, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
PLB RADIATOR EPD&C
LATCH CONTROL
CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL RI3L
PART NUMBER: ($4/$6)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH SELECTION OF RELEASE POSITION ON SWITCHES $4 AND $6, EFFECT
OF A SINGLE FAILURE IS TO PRECLUDE CONTROL POWER FROM BEING
PASSED TO THE MMCA'S (TWO ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SWITCH) CAUSING
LOSS OF SINGLE (REDUNDANT) MOTOR IN EACH LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
WITH RELEASE FUNCTION OCCURING IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME (TWICE
NORMAL). SECOND FAILURE IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO RELEASE
RADIATORS WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS
DEPENDENT UPON WATER CONSUMMABLES REQUIREMENTS. PARTIAL SWTICH
FAILURE (CONTACT OPEN) RESULTS IN THE LOSS OF USE OF A RADIATOR
PAIR (PORT OR STARBOARD) AND SHOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION
CONTINUANCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-590409; SSSH DWG. NO. 15.6
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-643
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMh_T
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBR/EPD&C
6502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
FAILS IN RELEASE, FAILS TO SWITCH, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H. J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
PLB RADIATOR EPD&C
LATCH CONTROL
CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI3L
(S4/S6)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH DESELECTION OF RELEASE POSITION ON SWITCHES $4 AND S6,
EFFECT OF A SHORT ACROSS A CONTACT PAIR IS TO ALLOW CONTINUOUS
POWER TO BE APPLIED TO THE CONTROL UNIT OF A SINGLE, GATED RELAY
DRIVER/RELAY. THE INVERTED "AND" SIGNAL AT THAT GATE WILL
OPERATE AS NORMAL TO REMOVE THE POWER FROM THE RELAY DRIVER/RELAY
WHEN THE PDU LIMIT SWITCH REACHES THE RELEASED STATE. RELEASE
COMMAND SIGNAL SHOULD BE REMOVED WHEN PLB MECH PWR SYSI/SYS2
SWITCH (SI/$2) PLACED TO OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-590409; SSSH DWG. NO. 15.6
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-644
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC I_:
7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/PBR/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
6503 ABORT: /NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
FAILS TO LATCH, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
PLB RADIATOR EPD&C
LATCH CONTROL
CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL RI3L
PART NUMBER: ($4/$6)
I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH SELECTION OF LATCH POSITION ON SWITCHES $4 AND $6, EFFECT OF
A SINGLE FAILURE IS TO PRECLUDE CONTROL POWER FROM BEING PASSED
TO THE MMCA'S (TWO ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SWITCH) CAUSING LOSS OF
SINGLE (REDUNDANT) MOTOR IN EACH LATCH POWER DRIVE UNIT
WITH LATCH FUNCTION OCCURING IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME (TWICE
NORMAL). SECOND FAILURE IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO LATCH
RADIATORS. IF UNABLE TO LATCH, POTENTIAL EXISTS FOR INTERFERENCE
WITH PLBD CLOSURE AND/OR LOOSE RADIATOR PANEL(S) DURING
DEORBIT/ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590409; SSSH DWG. NO. 15.6
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-645
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/22/87
MECHIPBRIEPD&C
6504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
LATCH CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
FAILS IN LATCH, FAILS TO SWITCH, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICALACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
PLB RADIATOR EPD&C
LATCH CONTROL
CONTROL SWITCH ($4/$6)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: RI3L
PART NUMBER: ($4/$6)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH DESELECTION OF LATCH POSITION ON SWITCHES $4 AND $6, EFFECT
OF A SHORT ACROSS A CONTACT PAIR IS TO ALLOW CONTINUOUS POWER TO
BE APPLIED TO THE CONTROL INPUT OF A SINGLE, GATED RELAY
DRIVER/RELAY. THE INVERTED "AND" SINGNAL AT THAT GATE
OPERATE AS NORMAL TO REMOVE THE POWER FROM THE RELAY DRIVER RELAY
WHEN THE PDU LIMIT SWITCH REACHES THE LATCH STATE. LATCH COMMAND
SIGNAL SHOULD BE REMOVED WHEN PLB MECH PWR SYSI/SYS2 SWITCH
(SI/$2) PLACED TO OFF.
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REFERENCES: VS70-590409; SSSH DWG. NO. 15.6
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-646
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/PBR/EPD&C
6507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
FAILS TO DEPLOY, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
PLB RADIATOR EPD&C
RADIATOR CONTROL
CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL RI3L
(S5/S7)
CAUSES: PIECE-PARTFAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE'.
WITH SELECTION OF DEPLOY POSITON ON SWITCHES $5 AND $7, EFFECT OF
A SINGLE FAILURE IS TO PRECLUDE CONTROL POWER FROM BEING PASSED
TO THE MMCA'S (TWO ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SWITCH) CAUSING LOSS OF
SINGLE (REDUNDANT) MOTOR IN EACH DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE UNIT
WITH DEPLOY FUNCTION OCCURING IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME (TWICE
NORMAL). SECOND FAILURE IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO DEPLOY
RADIATORS WHICH MAY AFFECT SOME MISSION/PAYLOAD OPERATIONS
DEPENDENT UPON WATER CONSUMMABLES REQUIREMENTS.
PARTIAL SWITCH FAILURE (CONTACT OPEN) RESULTS IN LOSS OF USE OF A
RADIATOR PAIR (PORT OR STARBARD) AND SHOULD NOT AFFECT MISSION
CONTINUANCE.
REFERENCES: VS70-590409; SSSH DWG' NO. 15.6
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-647
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECHIPBR/EPD&C
6508
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
FAILS IN DEPLOY, FAILS TO SWITCH, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY :
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
PLB RADIATOR EPD&C
RADIATOR CONTROL
CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
P_LALTNCH: /NA RTLS:
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: /NA ATO:
LANDI-NG/SAFiNG: /NA
HDW/FUNC
/NA
/NA
/NA
/NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL RI3L
PART NUMBER: ($5/$7)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, DEBRIS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH DESELECTION OF DEPLOY POSITION ON SWITCHES $5 AND $7, EFFECT
OF A SHORT ACROSS A CONTACT PAIR IS TO ALLOW CONTINUOUS POWER TO
BE APPLIED TO THE CONTROL INPUT OF A SINGLE, GATED RELAY
DRIVER/RELAY. THE INVERTED "AND" SIGNAL AT THAT GATE WILL
OPERATE AS NORMAL TO REMOVE THE POWER FROM THE RELAY DRIVER/RELAY
WHEN THE PDU LIMIT SWITCH REACHES THE DEPLOYED STATE. DEPLOY
COMMAND SIGNAL SHOULD BE REMOVED WHEN PLB MECH PWR SYSI/SYS2
SWITCH (S1/S2) PLACED TO OFF.
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REFERENCES: VS70-590409; SSSH DWG. NO. 15.6
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-648
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PBR/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 6509 ABORT: /NA
ITEM: RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO STOW, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), FAILS TO SWITCH
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANISMS
3) PLB RADIATOR EPD&C
RADIATOR CONTROL
CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /NA
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: PANEL RI3L
PART NUMBER: ($5/$7)
CAUSES: PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH SELECTION OF STOW POSITION ON SWITCHES $5 AND $7, EFFECT OF
A SINGLE FAILURE IS TO PRECLUDE CONTROL POWER FROM BEING PASSED
TO THE MMCArS (TWO ASSOCIATED WITH EACH SWITCH) CAUSING LOSS OF
SINGLE (REDUNDANT) MOTOR IN EACH DEPLOYMENT POWER DRIVE
UNIT WITH STOW FUNCTION OCCUR!NG IN SINGLE MOTOR DRIVE TIME
(TWICE NORMAL). SECOND FAILURE IS LOSS OF CAPABILITY TO STOW
RADIATORS REQUIRING CREW EVA TO MECHANICALLY DISCONNECT AND STOW
RADIATOR PANELS. DEPLOYED RADIATORS INTERFERE WITH PLBD
CLOSURE WHICH MAY RESULT IN LOSS OF VEHICLE AND CREW.
REFERENCES: VS70-590409; SSSH DWG. NO. 15.6
L
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-649
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PBR/EPD&C FLIGHT:
6510 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/NA
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RADIATOR CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
FAILS IN STOW, FAILS TO SWITCH, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: W.T. SLAUGHTER SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PLB RADIATOR DEPLOY MECHANIS_
PLB RADIATOR EPD&C ......
RADIATOR CONTROL
CONTROL SWITCH ($5/$7)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /NA RTLS: /_
LIFTOFF: /NA TAL: /NA _
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /NA
DEORBIT: /NA ATO: /NA
LANDING/SAFING: /NA
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [
LOCATION: PANEL RI3L
PART NUMBER: ($5/$7)
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, VIBRATION, DEBIRS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WITH DESELECTION OF STOW POSITION ON SWITCHES S5 AND S7, EFFECT
OF A SHORT ACROSS A CONTACT PAIR IS TO ALLOW CONTINUOUS POWER TO
BE APPLIED TO THE CONTROL INPUT OF A SINGLE, GATED RELAY
DRIVER/RELAY. THE INVERTED "AND" SIGNAL AT THAT GATE
WILL OPERATE AS NORMAL TO REMOVE THE POWER FROM THE RELAY
DRIVER/RELAY WHEN THE PDU LIMIT SWITCH REACHES THE STOWED STATE.
STOW COMMAND SIGNAL SHOULD BE REMOVED WHEN PLB MECH PWR SYSI/SYS2
SWITCH (SI/$2) PLACED TO OFF.
REFERENCES: VS70-590409; SSSH DWG. NO. 15.6
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-650
mm
m
C.7
PERSO_EL _TCH _ALYSIS WORKSHEETS
u
C-651
IPERSONNEL HATCH ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
MDAC-ID H/F H/F A B C
u_Dmi_m
7100 * 3/IR /NA P F P PRESSURE PORT
7101 * I/i /NA PRESSURE PORT
7102 * 3/IR /NA P F P 0 RING
7103 * 3/IR /NA P F P O RING
7104 * 3/IR /NA P F P VIEWPORT
7105 3/IR /NA P P P VIEWPORT
7106 * 3/IR /NA P F P ACTUATOR
7107 * 3/IR /NA P F P ACTUATOR
7108 * 3/iR /NA P F P ACTUATOR
7109 * 3/2R /NA P F P ACTUATOR
7110 * 3/2R /NA P F P ACTUATOR
7111 * 3/2R /NA P F P ACTUATOR
7112 * 3/IR /NA P F P O RING
7113 * 3/IR /NA P F P 0 RING
7114 * 3/IR /NA P F P VIEWPORT
7115 3/iR /NA P P P VIEWPORT
7116 3/3 /NA VIEWPORT LATCH
7117 3/3 /NA VIEWPORT LATCH
7118 3/3 3/3 BOOT
7119 3/3 3/3 DRAIN TUBING
7120 3/3 3/3 DRAIN TUBING
ITEM NAME
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(*) Potential Critical Items.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE :
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID :
7/08/87
MECH/PH
7100
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE PORT
CLOGGED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PERSONNEL HATCHES
3) AIRLOCK
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
MA.AL.I
CAUSES: DEBRIS IN PORT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AIRLOCK PRESSURE MAY NOT BE ABLE TO EQUALIZE WITH PAYLOAD BAY
AND/OR MIDDECK. THIS COULD CAUSE THE AIRLOCK HATCH B TO NOT OPEN
BECAUSE OF HIGHER PRESSURE INSIDE.
REFERENCES:
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-653
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
MECH/PH
7101
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: I/I
ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE PORT
LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
AIRLOCK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF:. / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 1/1 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
MA.AL.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ATMOSPHERE LEAKAGE THROUGH THE PRESSURE PORT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-654
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM: O RING
FAILURE MODE: LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
AIRLOCK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: MA.AL.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ATMOSPHERE LEAKAGE THROUGH THE 0 RING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-655
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PH FLIGHT:
7103 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM: O RING
FAILURE MODE: CRACKED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
AIRLOCK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
MA.AL.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A CRACKED O RING COULD CAUSE LEAKAGE OF ATMOSPHERE THROUGH THE O
RING. -THIS COULD CAUSE_LOSS_OF LIFE. °_ _ _ ...._ ...... _:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM: VIEWPORT
FAILURE MODE: LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PERSONNEL HATCHES
AIRLOCK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: /
LIFTOFF: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ]
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: /
TAL: /
AOA: /
ATO: /
B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
MA.AL.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ATMOSPHERE LEAKAGE THROUGH THE VIEWPORT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-657
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7105
ITEM: VIEWPORT
FAILURE MODE : CRACKED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET _
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
PERSONNEL HATCHES
AIRLOCK
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: MA.AL.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ATMOSPHERE LEAKAGE THROUGH THE VIEWPOINT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
LIFE.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/o8/s7
MECH/PH
7106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ACTUATOR
BROKEN GEAR
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
AIRLOCK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
MA.AL.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A BROKEN ACTUATOR WOULD PREVENT OPENING OF THE AIRLOCK. THIS
COULD PREVENT AN EVA TO CLOSE THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS, ETC.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-659
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM_ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_NC
3/1R
/
ITEM: ACTUATOR
FAIL_ MODE: BROWN SHAFT
T._AD _ALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PERSONNEL HATCHES
3 ) AIRLOCK
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS _AD: H.J. _RY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
_DUND_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
_CATION: MIDDECK
P_T _BER: _.AL.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
A BROWN ACTUATOR WOULD PRE_NT OPENING OF THE AIR_CK.
COULD P_NT _ EVA TO C_SE _E PAY_AD BAY _ORS, ETC.
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM: ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: JAMMED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
AIRLOCK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
MA.AL.4
CAUSES: DEBRIS IN ACTUATOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A JAMMED ACTUATOR WOULD PREVENT OPENING OF THE AIRLOCK.
COULD PREVENT AN EVA TO CLOSE THE PAYLOAD BAY DOORS, ETC.
THIS
u
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-661
BINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
MECH/PH
7109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ACTUATOR
BROKEN GEAR
LEAD A_ALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
SIDE HATCH
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/2R RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
MA.SH.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A BROKEN ACTUATOR DURING PRELAUNCH COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-662 D
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PH FLIGHT:
7110 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM".
FAILURE MODE:
ACTUATOR
BROKEN SHAFT
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
s)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
SIDE HATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
MA.SH.1
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A BROKEN ACTUATOR DURING PRELAUNCH COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
v
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-663
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDACID: 7111
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
/
ITEM: ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: JAMMED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PERSONNEL HATCHES
3) SIDE HATCH
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
MA.SH.I
CAUSES: DEBIR IN ACTUATOR
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A JAMMED ACTUATOR DURING PRELAUNCH COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-664
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7112
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM: O RING
FAILURE MODE: CRACKED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
SIDE HATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
MA.SH.2
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A CRACKED 0 RING COULD CAUSE LEAKAGE OF ATMOSPHERE THROUGH THE 0
RING. THIS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF LIFE.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-665
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PH FLIGHT:
7113 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
/
ITEM: O RING
FAILURE MODE: LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2 ) PERSONNEL HATCHES
3 ) S I DE HATCH
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS :
LIFTOFF : / TAL:
ONORBIT : 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT : / ATO :
LANDING/SAFING: /
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: MA.SH.2
A [ 2 ] B [ F ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ATMOSPHERE LEAKAGE THROUGH THE O RING COULD CAUSE LOSS OF FIRE.
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REFERENCES: I
I
REPORT DATE II/25/87 C-666
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7114
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/IR
ABORT: " /
ITEM: VIEWPORT
FAILURE MODE: LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
SIDE HATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA:
DEORBIT: / . ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ F ]
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
C [ P ]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: MA.SH.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ATMOSPHERE LEAKAGE THROUGH THE VIEWPORT COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF
LIFE.
REFERENCES:
=
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-667
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PH FLIGHT:
7115 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIEWPORT
CRACKED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PERSONNEL HATCHES
3) SIDE HATCH
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
MA.SH.3
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
ATMOSPHERE LEAKAGE THROUGH THE VIEWPORT COULD CAUSE THE LOSS OF
LIFE.
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REFERENCES:
I
m
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-668
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: 7116
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: /
ITEM: VIEWPORT LATCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
SIDE HATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS:
LIFTOFF: / TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: / ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: /
HDW/FUNC
/
/
/
/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
MA.SH.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO LATCH THE VIEWPORT COVER CLOSED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-669
DATE'.
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PH FLIGHT:
7117 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
/
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
VIEWPORT LATCH
FAILS CLOSED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
PERSONNEL HATCHES
SIDE HATCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: MA.SH.4
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WILL NOT BE ABLE TO UNLATCH THE VIEWPORT COVER.
u
z
l
B
U
mR
[]
mm
mm
m
R
mm
z
B
REFERENCES: []
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-670
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DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/PH FLIGHT:
7118 " ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: BOOT
FAILURE MODE: LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) PERSONNEL HATCHES
3) SIDE HATCH
ATTENUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
MA.SH.AT.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. THIS FAILURE DOES NOT AFFECT HATCH OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
u
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-671
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/PH
MDAC ID: "7119
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: DRAIN TUBING
FAILURE MODE: LEAKAGE
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PERSONNEL HATCHES
SIDE HATCH
ATTENUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
MA.SH.AT.I
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. THIS FAILURE DOES NOT AFFECT HATCH OPERATION.
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-672
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
MECH/PH
7120
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DRAIN TUBING
CLOGGED
LEAD ANALYST: A.D. MONTGOMERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
PERSONNEL HATCHES
SIDE HATCH
ATTENUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDDECK
MA.SH.AT.I
CAUSES: DEBRIS IN DRAIN TUBING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
NO EFFECT. THIS FAILURE DOES NOT AFFECT HATCH OPERATION.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-673
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VENT DOOR MECHANISM _ALYSIS WORKSHEETS
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MDAC-ID
8100 *
8101 *
8102 *
8103 *
8104 *
8105 *
8106 *
8 iO7 *
8108 *
8109
8501 *
8502 *
8503 *
8504 *
8505 *
8506 *
8507 *
8508 *
8509 *
8510 *
8511 *
8512 *
8513 *
8514 *
8515 *
8516 *
8517 *
VENT DOOR MECHANISM ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY REDUNDANCY
FLIGHT ABORT SCREENS
H/F H/F A B C ITEM NAME
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
3/3 3/3
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
2/IR 2/IR P N P
ROD ASSEMBLY
BELLCRANK
BOLT BRACKET DOUBLER
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT
DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRAIN ASSY
DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRAIN ASSY
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR
ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID
ACTUATOR MOTOR
ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA PURGE SIGNAL DRIVER
MCA DC POWER BUS
MCA AC POWER BUS
MCA DIODE
MCA DIODE
ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS/PINS
CABLES/WIRING
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR
GPC SOFTWARE
FUSE
RESISTOR
RESISTOR
GPC SOFTWARE
ill ili_l_l_llllillli
(*) Potential Critical Items.
C-675
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
=
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8100
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: ROD ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE INOPERABLE,
DEBRIS OR FROZEN BEARI_SURFACE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATIQN SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
ROD ASSEMBLY
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR ° TAL" 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
(TBD)
NEAR DOOR
V070-592511-001/2, 5512-007/8, ME162-0024-001/2,
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO CONTROL DOOR POSITION.
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REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO. 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD) m
W
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-676
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8101
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: BELLCRANK
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE INOPERABLE,
BENT, BROKEN, DEBRIS OR FROZEN BEARING SURFACE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
BELLCRANK
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING" 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NEAR DOOR
vo7o-5945o5/6-OOl, 11/2-OOl, (TBD)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO CONTROL DOOR POSITION.
REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO' 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD)
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-677
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: BOLT/BRACKET/DOUBLER
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, LINKAGE INOPERABLE,
BENT, BROKEN, DEBRIS OR FROZEN BEARING SURFACE
LEAD ANALYST : H. J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
BOLT/BRACKET/DOUBLER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/iR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: NEAR DOOR
PART NUMBER: NASI004-16/18/22, V070-384318-002,5328-002,595528,
V070-385311/2-001/2, (TBD)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO CONTROL DOOR POSITION.
REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO. 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD)
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-678
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
MECH/VDM
8103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
S)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE SHAFT - HOUSING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION".
PART NUMBER:
001/2, (TBD)
NEAR DOOR
MC147-0008/9-004-6, V070-594504/7-001/2, 2503/13-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO CONTROL DOOR POSITION.
REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO. 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD)
w
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-679
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM _ALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
?/o8/8 
_CH/VDM
8104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/_C
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAIL_ MODE:
FREELY
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S_FT - HOUSING
FAIL_ TO ST_T/STOP AS CORDED _D ROTATES
T._.AD _ALYST: H.J. _RY SUBSYS _D: H.J. _RY
B_AK_ HIE_CHY:
I) MEC_ICAL AC_ATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
_NT _OR MEC_ISM
INPUT/OUTPUT TORQUE S_FT - HOUSING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT P_SE HDW/_C ABORT HDW/_C
PRE_CH: 3/3 RT_: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/iR
_DING/SAFING: 3/3
_D_D_CY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
_CATION:
P_T _BER:
001/2, (TBD)
NE_ DOOR
MC147-0008/9-004-6, V070-594504/7-001/2, 2503/13-
CAUSES: CONT_INATION, _C_ICAL SHOCK, MIS_DLING/ABUSE,
O_R_AD, PIECE-P_T FAIL_, STRUC_L FAILURE, TEMPE__,
THE_L SHOCK, ACCE_TION, VIB_TION
EFFECTS/_TIONA_:
_SS OF PRESS_E CONTROL DURING T_SIENT P_SSURE CONDITIONS
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO CONTROL DOOR POSITION.
REFE_NCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO. 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD)
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-680
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
MECH/VDM
8105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
001/2, (TBD)
NEAR DOOR
MC147-0008/9-004-6, V070-594504/7-001/2, 2503/13-
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
JAMMED, FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO CONTROL DOOR POSITION.
m
REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO. 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD)
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-681
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/VDM FLIGHT:
8106 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
FAILS TO REMAIN IN POSITION, FREELY ROTATES
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
001/2, (TBD)
NEAR DOOR
MC147-0008/9-004-6, V070-594504/7-001/2, 2503/13-
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO CONTROL DOOR POSITION.
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REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO. 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD)
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-682
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/08/87
MECHIVDM
8107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 2/IR
ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATION
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, PREMATURE
LEAD ANALYST : H. J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NEAR DOOR
MC147-0008/9-004-6, (TBD)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION,INADVERTENT OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROLDURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO CONTROL DOOR POSITION.
REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO. 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD)
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-683
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 8108 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, PREMATURE
OPERATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
MICROSWITCH POSITION INDICATOR, ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NEAR DOOR
MC147-0008/9-004-6, (TBD)
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL
SHOCK, VIBRATION,INADVERTENT OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO CONTROL DOOR POSITION.
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REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO. 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD)
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-684
n
mm
wu
L=
m
L_i
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM
MDAC ID: 8109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 8100 - 8108
FAILURE MODE: ALL FAILURE MODES
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
ALL REMAINING PARTS
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
NEAR DOOR
ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 8100 - 8108
CAUSES: ALL CAUSES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 8100 -8108 WILL HAVE NO
EFFECT ON MISSION, VEHICLE OR CREW.
REFERENCES: V070-592501,4501,381031,4031,5031,5300, SSSH DWG.
NO. 15.1 SHEET 1-3, (TBD)
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-685
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: ACTUATOR MOTOR
FAILURE MODE: PREMATURE OPERATION, DELAYED OPERATION, OPEN
(ELECTRICAL), SHORTED, FAILS TO START/STOP
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
ELECTROMECHANICAL ACTUATOR
ACTUATOR MOTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
INSIDE ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY, NEAR VENT DOOR
I0V59A (XX)
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, PARTIAL INPUT, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY OF ACTUATOR MOTOR TO MOVE VENT DOOR TO REQUIRED
POSITION. EXCESS DELTA P COULD CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND
PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS
GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL.
COULD CREATE A TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO
CLOSE VENT DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR
ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-686
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8502
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM: ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO
SWITCH, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
ELECTROMECHANI CAL ACTUATOR
ACTUATOR SWITCH MODULE
CRITICALIT!ES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
I2%NDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION" •
PART NUMBER:
INSIDE ACTUATOR ASSEMBLY, NEAR VENT DOOR
TBD
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART
FAILURE, PARTIAL INPUT, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P
COULD CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH
DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A
TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS
DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE
TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-687
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
MDAC ID: 8503 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM: MCA AC POWER RELAY
FAILURE MODE: PARTIAL OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT,
FAILSTOSW_TCH, SHORT_ ........
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISMS
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
AC POWER RELAY
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION :
PART NUMBER:
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
TBD
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, PARTIAL
INPUT, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P MAY
CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH
DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A
TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS
DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE
TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-688
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8504
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: MCA PURGE SIGNAL DRIVER
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF
OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISMS
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PURGE SIGNAL DRIVER
\
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: REFERENCE DESIGNATOR - AR(XX)-TYPE 1
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, PARTIAL INPUT, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, LOSS OF
INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL FOR EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GASES (H2) DURING
PRELAUNCH DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A
TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-689
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/08/87
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
85O5
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MCA DC POWER BUS
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISMS
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DC POWER BUS
CRITICALITIES _
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: REFERENCE DESIGNATOR - DC-A, B, C
C [ P ]
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, LOSS OF
INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSU_ CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRES_ C_ITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P
COULD CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH
DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A
TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS
DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE
TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
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REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. IOB
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-690
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/08/87
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8506
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MCA AC POWER BUS
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISMS
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
AC POWER BUS (3-PHASE)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/IR
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 2/IR
ATO: 2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
REFERENCE DESIGNATOR - AC-I, AC-2, AC-3
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, PARTIAL
INPUT, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P
COULD CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH
DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A
TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS
DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE
TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-691
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/o8/87
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8507
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MCA DIODE
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
VENT DOOR MECHANISMS
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3 _
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: REFERENCE DESIGNATOR - AICR(XX)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOOR DUE TO LOSS OF "CLOSE" COMMAND
SIGNAL TO ACTUATOR MOTOR RELAY LOGIC GATE. LOSS OF
PRESSURE/ACOUSTICS CONTROL DUE TO INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS.
EXCE_ DELTA P COULD CAUSE ORBITER STRUC_RAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE.
POTENTIAL FOR ACOUSTIC DAMAGE TO PAYLOADS. POTENTIAL FOR
ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-
ENTRY .................
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-692
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/08/87
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8508
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MCA DIODE
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISMS
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
DIODE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS:
L_FTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
2/IR
2/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ]
LOCATION: MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: REFERENCE DESIGNATOR - AICR(XX)
c[p]
CAUSES:
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SHORTED DIODE COULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO MDM "CLOSE" COMMAND OUTPUT
CIRCUITRY AND SHORT "PURGE" COMMAND SIGNAL, CAUSING LOSS OF MCA
RELAY CONTROL DURING CLOSE OR PURGE CYCLES. POTENTIAL FOR EXCESS
BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GASES (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH DUE TO
LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS
ENVIRONMENT. POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-693
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8509
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM: ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS/PINS
FAILURE MODE: OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHYz
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
ELECTRICAL CONNECTORS/PINS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FROM MDMs TO VENT DOOR ACTUATOR MOTORS
PART NUMBER: TBD
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P MAY
CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH DUE TO
LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS
ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY
CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
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REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-694
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/o8/8v
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8510
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CABLES/WIRING
OPEN (ELECTRICAL), SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
CABLES/WIRING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FROM MDMs TO VENT DOOR ACTUATOR MOTORS
TBD
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P MAY
CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH DUE TO
LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS
ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY
CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
w
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-695
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM-
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/VDM/EPD&C FLIGHT:
8511 ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR (2)
DELAYED OPERATION, PARTIAL OUTPUT, LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) VENT DOOR MECHANISM
3 ) MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/1R ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM
MC615"0004-5100, MC615-0004-5200
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE
TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P MAY
CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURALAND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING PRELAUNCH DUE TO
LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE A TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS
ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY
CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT DURINGRE-ENTRY.
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REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-696
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8512
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM: MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION, PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
MODULATOR/DEMODULATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM
MC615-0004-5100, MC615-0004-5200
CAUSES:
FIELDS,
ERRONEOUS INPUT, PIECE-PART FAILURE, ELECTROMAGNETIC
INADVERTENT OPERATION/ACTIVATION, PARTIAL INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL FOR EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DUE TO
PREMATURE VENT OPENING DURING PRELAUNCH. COULD CAUSE
TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INADVERTENT OPENING OF VENT
DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD
DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-697
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 9/08/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/VDM/EPD&C
MDAC ID: 8513
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM: GPC SOFTWARE
FAILURE MODE: INADVERTENT OPERATION, PREMATURE OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER
VENT DOOR CONTROL SOFTWARE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
2/1R
2/IR
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
GPCS - DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM
N/A
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, PARTIAL INPUT, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION, ELECTROMAGNETIC FIELDS
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL FOR EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING
PRELAUNCH DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE AN
EXPLOSIVE/TOXIC GAS ENVIRONMENT. INADVERTENT OPENING OF VENT
DORRS DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD
DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-698
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/08/87
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8514
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/1R
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
FUSE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
REFERENCE DESIGNATORS - FI, F5
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OPEN FUSE WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF MCA RELAY CONTROL, CAUSING LOSS
OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE TO
INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P COULD
CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
HAZARODUS GAS (H2) BUILDUP DURING PRELAUNCH DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE
SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CAUSE TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT.
INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL
FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING
RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-699
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
9/08/87
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8515
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR
SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PREL_UNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
L_DING/SAFING: 3/3
P ]REDUNDANCY SCREENS:_ A_[_ 2_] B [NA ] C [
LOCATION: MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
PART NUMBER: REFERENCE DESIGNATORS - AIR(X)
CAUSES: .....OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, - TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A SHORTED RESISTOR COULD CAUSE DAMAGE TO MDM DOOR POSITION
MONITOR CIRCUITRY AND/OR MCA RELAY LOGIC CIRCUITRY, CAUSING LOSS
OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS DUE TO
INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P COULD
CAUSE QRBITER STRU_L_DPAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR
EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM
CONTROL. COULD CAUSE TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY
TO CLOSE VENT DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR
ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-
ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
9/o8/8v
MECH/VDM/EPD&C
8516
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/IR
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
RESISTOR
OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
z)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
RESISTOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/1R
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/1R
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MOTOR CONTROL ASSEMBLY
REFERENCE DESIGNATORS - AIR(X)
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
AN OPEN RESISTOR WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF ANY ACTUATOR MOTOR
MICROSWITCH POSITION FEEDBACK SIGNAL TO MDMs AND MCA RELAY LOGIC
CIRCUIT, CAUSING LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING TRANSIENT
PRESSURE CONDITIONS, DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT DOOR
OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P COULD CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL AND
PAYLOAD DAMAGE. POTENTIAL FOR EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS
(H2) DURING PRELAUNCH DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD
CAUSE TOXIC/EXPLOSIVE GAS ENVIRONMENT. INABILITY TO CLOSE
VENT DOORS DURING RE-ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD
DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: VS70-590509, JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC
12770 VOL. 10B
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-701
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDACID:
9/08/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/VDM/EPD&C FLIGHT: 2/IR
8517 ABORT: 2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OUTPUT
GPC SOFTWARE
DELAYED OPERATION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT, LOSS OF
LEAD ANALYST: M. BRADWAY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
VENT DOOR MECHANISM
GENERAL PURPOSE COMPUTER
VENT DOOR CONTROL SOFTWARE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 2/IR RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/IR TAL: 3/3
ONdRBIT: 3/3 AOA: 2/IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
GPCS - DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM
N/A
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, ERRONEOUS INPUT, PARTIAL INPUT, PIECE-
PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
POTENTIAL FOR EXCESS BUILDUP OF HAZARDOUS GAS (H2) DURING
PRELAUNCH DUE TO LOSS OF PURGE SYSTEM CONTROL. COULD CREATE AN
EXPLOSIVE/TOXIC GAS ENVIRONMENT. LOSS OF PRESSURE CONTROL DURING
TRANSIENT PRESSURE CONDITIONS, DUE TO INABILITY TO CONTROL VENT
DOOR OPERATION. EXCESS DELTA P COULD CAUSE ORBITER STRUCTURAL
AND PAYLOAD DAMAGE. INABILITY TO CLOSE VENT DOORS DURING RE-
ENTRY CREATES POTENTIAL FOR ORBITER/PAYLOAD DAMAGE DUE TO THERMAL
ENVIRONMENT DURING RE-ENTRY.
REFERENCES: JSC 18341 VOL. II REV. A SB 2.2, JSC 12770 VOL. 10B
m
[]
M
i
l
i
z
[]
ms
i
mm
mm
mm
mm
m
m
ms
[]
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-702
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STARTRACKER DOOR ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
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C-703
BMDAC-ID
9100
9101
9102
9103
9104
9105
9106
9107
9108
9500
9501
STARTRACKER DOOR ANALYSIS WORKSHEETS SUMMARY
CRITICALITY
FLIGHT ABORT
H/F H/F
mmmm_ m _ mm m
3/1R 3/3
3/1R 3/3
3/IR 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/IR 3/3
3/IR 3/3
3/3 3/3
3/1R 3/3
3/3 3/3
REDUNDANCY
SCREENS
AB C
PP P
P P P
PP P
P P P
P P P
P P P
ITEM NAME
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
OPEN LIMIT SWITCHES ($1 & $3)
STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & $3)
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($2 & $4)
DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($2 & $4)
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID
CIRCUIT BREAK]_R/SWITCH
ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID
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(*) Potential Critical Items. mm
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/SDM
9100
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
(RUPTURE)
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
STARTRACKER DOOR MECHANISM
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT-HOUSING
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
0NORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARTRACKER COMPARTMENT
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OPEN/CLOSE THE Y/Z STARTRACKER DOOR. OPEN - POSSIBLE
LOCALIZED COMPARTMENT DAMAGE. CLOSED - LOSS OF Y/Z STARTRACKER.
REFERENCES: V070-310730/i, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-
590202/9, -760709, MC452-0123, MC621-0066
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-705
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87
MECH/SDM
9101
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FREELY
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT - HOUSING
FAILS TO START/STOP AS COMMANDED AND ROTATES
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
2) STARTRACKER DOOR MECHANISM
3) INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT-HOUSING
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
RTLS : 3/ 3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO : -3/ 3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARTRACKER COMPARTMENT
TBD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
OVERLOAD, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE,
THERMAL SHOCK, ACCELERATION, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OPEN/CLOSE THE Y/Z STARTRACKER DOOR. OPEN - POSSIBLE
LOCALIZED COMPARTMENT DAMAGE. CLOSED - LOSS OF Y/Z STARTRACKER.
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REFERENCES: V070-310730/I, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-
590202/9, -760709, MC452-0123, MC621-0066
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-706
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDAC ID: 9102 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: OPEN LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 3) ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, PREMATURE
OPERATION, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
STARTRACKER DOOR MECHANISM
OPEN LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 3) ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARTRACKER COMPARTMENT
S1 & 3; VS70-590202
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, ACCELERATION, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES DOOR IS OPEN WHEN IT MAY BE CLOSED.
IS CLOSED, OPEN CAPABILITY WOULD BE INHIBITED.
IF THE DOOR
m
REFERENCES: V070-310730/I, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-
590202/9, -760709, MC452-0123, MC621-0066
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-707
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM
MDAC ID: 9103
HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
FLIGHT: 3/3
ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: STOW LIMIT SWITCHES (SI & 3) ACTUATOR
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, PREMATURE
OPE_TI6N-, _-OPEN _ (ELECTRICAL) < _-_: _ ......
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM ............
ST_TRACKER DOOR MECHANISM ...._C_C_:_I_
OPEN LIMIT SWITCHES Z(Sl & 3)KCTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARTRACKER COMPARTMENT
S1 & 3; VS70-590202
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES DOOR NOT OPEN WHEN IT MAY BE PROPERLY
POSITIONED. MOTORS WOULD CONTINUE TO TURN UNTIL OFF COMMAND IS
TRANSMITTED.
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REFERENCES: V070-310730/I, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-
590202/9, -760709, MC452-0123, MC621-0066
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REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-708
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wINDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 9104 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($2 & 4)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN, FAILS TO OPEN, PREMATURE
OPERATION, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
STARTRACKER DOOR MECHANISM
CLOSE LIMIT SWITCHES (S2 & 4) ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARTRACKER COMPARTMENT
$2 & 4; VS70-590202
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES DOOR IS CLOSED WHEN IT MAY BE OPEN.
IS OPEN, CLOSE CAPABILITY WOULD BE INHIBITED.
IF THE DOOR
I
REFERENCES: V070-310730/I, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-
590202/9, -760709, MC452-0123, MC621-0066
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-709
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 9105 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: DEPLOY LIMIT SWITCHES ($2 & 4)
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, PREMATURE
OPERATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL) ................
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
STARTRACKER DOOR MECHANISM
CLOSE LIMIT SWITCHES ($2 & 4) ACTUATOR
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELALrNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [
LOCATION: STARTRACKER COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: $2 & 4; VS70-590202
] c [ ]
CAUSES: ACOUSTICS, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK, VIBRATION, INADVERTENT
OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SWITCH INDICATES DOOR NOT CLOSED WHEN IT MAY BE CLOSED.
WOULD CONTINUE TO TURN UNTIL OFF COMMAND IS TRANSMITTED.
MOTORS
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REFERENCES: V070-310730/i, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-
590202/9, -760709, MC452-0123, MC621-0066
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7122187
MECH/SDM
9106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FRACTURE
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
STARTRACKER DOOR MECHANISM
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
STARTRACKER COMPARTMENT
TBD
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
JAMMED, FRACTURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OPEN/CLOSE STARTRACKER DOOR.
REFERENCES: V070-310730/I, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-
590202/9, -760709, MC452-0123, MC621-0066
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-711
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
MECH/SDM FLIGHT: 3/IR
9!07 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
GEAR TRAI. ASSEMBLY
FAII_ TO RE_IN IN POSiTiON, FREELY ROTATES
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
. 12 s : 7
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
STARTRACKER DOOR MECHANISM
GEAR TRAIN ASSEMBLY
BREAKDOWN_HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: STARTRACKER COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: TBD
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, OVERLOAD
EFFECTS/RATIONALE".
UNABLE TO OPEN/CLOSE STARTRACKER DOOR.
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REFERENCES: V070-310730/I, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-
590202/9, -760709, MC452-0123, MC621-0066
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/22/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY
MECH/SDM FLIGHT:
9108 ABORT: "
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9100-9107
ALL FAILURE MODES
LEAD ANALYST : H. J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
STARTRACKER DOOR MECHANISM
ALL REMAINING PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: STARTRACKER COMPARTMENT
PART NUMBER: ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9100-9107
CAUSES: ALL CAUSES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9100-9107 WILL HAVE NO
EFFECT ON MISSION, VEHICLE OR CREW.
w
REFERENCES: V070-310730/I, -591402/3, SSSH DWG. NO. 9.6, VS70-
590202/9, -760709, MC452-0123, MC621-0066
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-713
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 7/23/87 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: MECH/SDM/EPD&C FLIGHT: 3/IR
MDACID: 9500 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: CIRCUIT BREAKER/SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED, FAILS TO CLOSE, STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, PREMATURE OPERATION, OPEN (ELECTRICAL)
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
STARTRACKER DOOR MECHANISM
CIRCUIT BREAKER/SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 2 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL 06, 014/5
S4-Y, S5-Z, CB 26/7
CAUSES: OVERLOAD, STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION,
INADVERTENT OPERATION/ACTIVATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
UNABLE TO OPEN THE Y/Z STARTRACKER DOOR.
REFERENCES: SSSH DWG. NO. 2.4 SHEET 1-3, 9.6 SHEET i, VS70-
590202/9, "760709
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
7/23/87
MECH/SDM/EPD&C
9501
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT"
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ALL ITEMS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9500
ALL FAILURE MODES
LEAD ANALYST: H.J. LOWERY SUBSYS LEAD: H.J. LOWERY
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
MECHANICAL ACTUATION SYSTEM
STARTRACKER DOOR MECHANISM
ALL REMAINING PARTS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
ALL
ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9500
CAUSES: ALL CAUSES
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FAILURE OF ALL PARTS NOT SHOWN ON MDAC ID 9500 WILL HAVE NO
EFFECT ON MISSION, VEHICLE OR CREW.
REFERENCES: SSSH DWG. NO. 2.4 SHEET 1-3, 9.6 SHEET i, VS70-
590202/9, -760709
REPORT DATE 11/25/87 C-715
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wMDAC-ID
ll01
1102
1103
ll04
ll05
ll06
1107
ll08
1500
1501
1502
1503
1504
1505
1506
1507
1509
1511
1513
1515
1516
1518
1520
1522
1524
1526
1532
1533
1534
1535
1536
1537
1538
1539
1541
1543
1545
1547
1548
1550
1552
1554
1556
1558
1564
FLIGHT
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM
MOTOR
GEARBOX
GEARBOX
PRESSURE LINE
PROBE
PROBE
SHAFT
SHAFT --
+28v CONTACT #1
+28v CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28v CONTACT #3
+28v CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+2SV CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #2
INVERTED AND GATE
FAILURE MODE
FAILS TO OPERATE
JAMMED
BROKEN GEAR
LEAKAGE
JAMMED
CLOGGED PORT
BROKEN
BENT
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
D-I
\ APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
MDAC-ID FLIGHT ITEM
3/IR INVERTED AND GATE
3/IR INVERTED AND GATE
3/_R INVERTED AND GATE
3/IR INVERTED AND GATE
3/1R INVERTED AND GATE
3/1R RELAY DRIVER
3/1R RELAY DRIVER
3/IR RELAY DRIVER
3/IR RELAY DRIVER
3/IR RELAY DRIVER
3/IR RELAY DRIVER
3/IR RELAY
3/IR RELAY
3p_R- RELAY
3/IR RELAY
3/IR RELAY
3/IR RELAY
3/IR AND GATE
3/1R TIME DELAY
3/IR SOLID STATE DRIVER
3/IR REMOTE PWR CNTRLR
3/IR REMOTE PWR CNTRLR
3/IR REMOTE PWR CNTRLR
3/IR SWITCH RELAY
3/IR LATCH RELAY
3/1R EMI FILTER
3/IR OP AMP
3/IR REGULATOR
3/IR GENERATOR
3/IR GENERATOR
3/1R CLOCK
3/1R CLOCK
3/IR +Q TRANSISTOR
3/IR -Q TRANSISTOR
3/IR TRANSFORMER
3/1R +I0V AMP
3/1R -10V AMP
3/iR +10V TRANSISTOR
3/IR -10V TRANSISTOR
3/IR PWR sUpPLY TEST AMP
3/IR FLD EFFECT TRNSSTR
3/IR CONTROL CIRCUIT
3/IR READ ONLY MEMORY
3/IR READ ONLY MEMORY
3/iR AMP
1565
1566
1567
1568
1570
1572
1573
1574
1575
1576
1578
1580
1581
1582
1583
1584
1586
1589
1591
1593
1595
1597
1599
1601
1603
1605
1607
1609
1610
1611
1612
1613
1615
1617
1619
1621
1623
1625
1627
1629
1637
1639
1640
1641
1645
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN
FAI L$_ SHORTED
FAILS OPEN --
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FA LS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
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MDAC-ID
1647
1648
1649
1650
1651
1652
1653
1654
1655
1656
1657
1658
1659
1660
1661
1662
1663
1664
1665
1666
1667
1668
1669
1670
1671
1672
1673
1674
1675
1676
1677
1678
1679
1680
1681
1682
1683
1684
1685
1686
1687
1688
1689
1690
1691
FLIGHT
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
371R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
311R
3/1R
3/ZR
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/ZR
3/ZR
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/ZR
311R
3/ZR
3/1R
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM
TRANS I S TOR
AND GATE
AND GATE
SRL SHFT REGISTER
SRL SHFT REGISTER
BINARY COUNTER
BINARY COUNTER
ADDRESSABLE SWITCH
ADDRESSABLE SWITCH
AMP
AMP
SWITCHING LADDER
SWITCHING LADDER
POLARITY DETECTOR
POLARITY DETECTOR
CONTROL LOGIC
CONTROL LOGIC
REGISTER
REGISTER
DISCREET INPUT BFFR
DISCREET INPUT BFFR
SRL/PRLLEL CNVRTR
SRL/PRLLEL CNVRTR
OSCILLATOR
OSCILLATOR
2 MH2 CLOCK
2 MH2 CLOCK
1 MH2 CLOCK
1 MH2 CLOCK
500 MH2 CLOCK
500 MH2 CLOCK
COUNTER
COUNTER
OR GATE
OR GATE
SENSOR WINDOW GNRTR
SENSOR WINDOW GNRTR
BUFFER
BUFFER
OUTPUT CONTROL
OUTPUT CONTROL
ENCODER
ENCODER
AMP
AMP
FAILURE MODE
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
m
D-3
MDAC-ID
1692
1693
1694
1695
1696
1697
1698
1699
2100
2101
2102
2103
2104
2105
3101
3102
3105
3106
3107
3108
3109
3111
3112
3115
3116
3117
3118
3119
3120
3121
3122
3123
3124
3126
3127
3128
3129
3130
3131
3134
3135
3136
3137
3138
3139
FLIGHT
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
311R
3/1R
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
i/i
1/1
i/I
1/l
1/l
I/I
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
1/1
1/1
1/1
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
2/1R
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
1/1
1/1
1/1
1/i.......
1/1
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM
CPU
CPU
SELECTOR LOGIC
SELECTOR LOGIC
READ ONLY MEMORY
ROM
READ/WR_I__MdRY _
READ/WRITE MEMORY
ROD ASSEMBLY
ROD ASSEMBLY
BELLCRANK
BELLCRANK
BOLT
BOLT
CENTERLINE LTCH MTR
CNTRLN MTR CLUTCH
CENTERLINE MTR BRK
CNTRLN LTCH DFFRNTL
CNTRLN LTCH DFFRNTL
CENTERLINE LATCH
CENTERLINE LATCH
DooR CLOSURE MTR
DOOR CLOSURE MTR
DOOR CLOSURE MTR
TORQUE LMT CLTCH
TORQUE LMT CLTCH
DOOR LINKAGE ASSY
DOOR LINKAGE ASSY
HNGE LINKAGE ASSY
HNGE LINKAGE ASSY
DOOR CLOSURE TORQ
DOOR CLOSURE TORQ
DOOR CLOSURE LMT
DOOR HINGE
DOOR HINGE
DOOR UPLATCH RLLR
UMBILICAL DOOR
UPL_CKLATCH MTR
UPLATCH MTR CLTCH
UPLATCH MOTOR BRK
TRQ LIMIT CLTCH
TRQ LIMIT CLTCH
UPLATCH TRQ TUBE
UPLATCH TRQ
INBOARD UPLCK LTCH
FAILURE MODE
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAII_ SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN .....
F_I_LS_SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO ENGAGE
FAILS TO DISENGAGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
PREMATURE OPERATION
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO ENGAGE
FAILS TO DISENGAGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PHYSI_L BINDING/JAMMING
LINKAGE BROKEN/UNATTACHED
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LINKAGE BROKEN/UNATTACHED
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
TORQUE TUBE BROKEN
PREMATURE OPERATION
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
BRKN OFF DOOR
DAMAGED ON ASCENT
FAILS TO START
FAILS TO ENGAGE
FAILS TO DISENGAGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
_ _UBE B_
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
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APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
w
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MDAC-ID
3140
3141
3142
3143
3501
3503
3507
3509
3511
3512
3514
3515
3516
3517
3519
3522
3524
3525
3526
3527
3528
3529
4101
4102
4103
4104
4105
4106
4109
4110
4111
4112
4508
4509
4510
4511
4512
4513
4514
4515
4516
4517
4518
4519
4520
FLIGHT
1/1
I/i
i/i
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/IR
1/i
2/2
I/i
i/i
2/IR
211R
211R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
3/2R
3/1R
312R
3/IR
3/2R
3/IR
3/2R
3/IR
3/IR
3/2R
3/IR
3/2R
3/IR
ITEM
INBOARD UPLCK LTCH
UPLOCK LATCH MECH
UPLOCK LATCH MECH
READY TO LATCH LMT
RELAY
RELAY
CNTLRN LTCH-STOW
ET UMBILICAL DR
ET UMBILICAL DR
ET UMBILICAL DR
ET UMBILICAL DR
CONTROL BUS FUSE
MCA AC PWR CRCT
MCA RELAY LGC PWR
REMOTE PWR CNTRLLR
DIODE
RESISTOR, 5. IK I/4W
RESISTOR, 5.1K I/4W
RESISTOR, 5. IK I/4W
FUSE, IA
RESISTOR, 1.2K
RESISTOR, 1.2K
GLLTN/PRSSR CRTRDG
GLLTN/PRSSR CRTRDG
NUT/BREECH
NUT/BREECH
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT
INPUT/OUTPUT SHAFT
DEPLOY LIMIT SWTCH
DEPLOY LIMIT SWTCH
GEAR TRAIN ASSY
GEAR TRAIN ASSY
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
FAILURE MODE
BROKEN/UNATTACHED
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
BROKEN/UNATTACHED
PREMATURE OPERATION
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS OFF
FAILS OFF
OPEN CIRCUIT
SHORTS
OPEN CIRCUIT
RESISTANCE HIGHER
BLOWN
SHORTS
OPEN CIRCUIT
FAILS MID-TRAVEL
PREMATURE OPERATION
INTL/EXTL LEAKAGE
PREMATURE OPERATION
PHYSICAL BNDNG/JAM
FAILS TO START/STOP
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO REMAIN CLSD
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
FAILS TO RMN IN PSTN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
D-5
MDAC-ID FLIGHT
4521 3/2R
4522 3/1R
4523 3/2R
4525 3/2R
4527 3/2R
4529 3/2R
4531 3/2R
4532 3/2R
4533 3/IR
4534 3/2R
4535 3/1R
4536 3/2R
4537 3/IR
4538 3/2R
4539 3/IR
4543 3/2R
4544 3/IR
4545 3/2R
4546 3/!R
4547 3/IR
4548 3/2R
4549 3/1R
4550 3/2R
4551 3/2R
4552 3/IR
4553 3/2R
4554 3/IR
4555 3/IR
4556 3/2R
4557 3/IR
4558 3/2R
4559 3/2R
4560 3/IR
4561 3/2R
4562 3/IR
4563 3/IR
4564 3/2R
4565 3/IR
4566 3/2R
4567 3/IR
4569 3/2R
4571 3/2R
4572 3/IR
4573 3/2R
4574 3/IR
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM FAILURE MODE
m
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
AND GATE #1
AND GATE #1
AND GATE #2
AND GATE #2
AND GATE #1
AND GATE #1
AND GATE #2
AND GATE #2
AMP #1
AMP #I
AMP #2
AMP #2
AMP #1
AMP #i
AMP #2
AMP #2
KI4
KI4
K68
K68
K72
K72
K70
K70
STW HCRSWITCH #I
DPLY MCRSWTCH #i
AND GATE #I
AND GATE #i
AND GATE #2
AND GATE #2
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FAILS OPEN
FA_.LS OPEN _
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAI_ SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FA_ OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS-OPEN
D-6
u
U
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g
a
g
i
g
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mm
mm
m
I
B
I
m
mm
I
ww
w
m
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MDAC-ID FLIGHT
4575
4576
4577
4578
4579
4580
4581
4582
4583
4584
4585
4586
4587
4588
4589
4591
4592
4593
4594
4595
4596
4598
4600
4601
4602
4603
4604
4605
4606
4607
4616
4617
3/1R
3/2R
3/IR
3/2R
3/2R
3/IR
3/2R
3/1R
3/IR
3/2R
3/1R
3/2R
3/2R
3/1R
3/2R
3/IR
3/ZR
3/2R
3/1R
3/2R
3/1R
3/2R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
311R
3/1R
311R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/IR
4618 _ 3/1R
4619 3/IR
4624 3/IR
4625 3/IR
4626 3/IR
4627 3/IR
4628 3/IR
4629 ....3/IR
4630 3/IR
4631 3/IR
4632 3/IR
4633 3/IR
4634 3/IR
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM FAILURE MODE
AND GATE #i
AND GATE #i
AND GATE #2
AND GATE #2
AMP #1
AMP #1
AMP #2
AMP #2
AMP #1
AMP #i
AMP #2
AMP #2
K25
K25
K2
K2
K27
K27
K37
K37
STW MCRSWITCH #2
DPLY MCRSWITCH #2
+28V CONTACT #1
+28V CONTACT #I
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #3
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #4
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #i
+28V CONTACT #2
+28V CONTACT #2
AND GATE #I
AND GATE #i
AND GATE #2
AND GATE #2 .........
40 MS TIME DELAY
40 MS TIME DELAY
AMP #1
AMP #1
AND GATE #3
AND GATE #3
4 SECOND TIME DELAY
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS _ OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
C
D-7
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
MDAC-ID
4635
4636
4637
4638
4639
FLIGHT
3/IR
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM
4640 3/IR.
4641 3/_R EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
4642 3/IR AND GATE #i
4643 3/IR AND GATE #i
4644 3/!R AND GATE #2
4645 3/IR AND GATE #2
4646 3/IR 40 MS TIME DELAY
FAILURE MODE
4 SECOND TIME DELAY FAILS OPEN
AMP #3 FAILS SHORTED
AMP #3 FAILS OPEN -
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR FAILS SHORTED
EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR FAILS OPEN
EXPLOSI_ INIT-IATO-R °_ FAI_S_0RTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
4647 3/1R 40 MS TIME DELAY
4645 3/ R . AMP #1
4649 3/IR AMP #I
4650 3/IR AND GATE #3
4651 3/IR AND GATE #3
4652 3/IR 4 SECOND TIME DELAY
4653 3/IR 4 SECOND TIME DELAY
4654 3/IR AMP #3
4655 3/IR AMP #3
4656 3/IR EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
4657 3/IR EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
4658 3/IR EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
4659 3/IR EXPLOSIVE INITIATOR
4660 3/IR AMP #2
4661 3/IR AMP #2
4662 3/IR AMP #2
4663 3/1R AMP #2
4664 3/IR CONVERTER
4665 3/IR CONVERTER
4666 3/IR INVERTED AND GATE
4667 3/IR INVERTED AND GATE
4668 3/IR CAPACITOR BANK
4669 3/IR CAPACITOR BANK
4670 3/IR AND GATE
4671 3/IR AND GATE
4674 3/IR TEST LOGIC
4675 3/IR TEST LOGIC
4676 3/IR CONVERTER
4677 3/IR CONVERTER
4678 3/IR INVERTED AND GATE
4679 3/IR INVERTED AND GATE
4680 3/IR CAPACITOR BANK
4681 3/IR CAPACITOR BANK
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS ON
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
D-8
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mm
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ww
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MDAC-ID
4682
4683
4686
4687
5101
5102
5104
5106
5107
5108
5109
5110
5111
5112
5113
5114
5115
5119
5120
5121
5122
5123
5125
5127
5128
5129
5130
5131
5132
5133
5134
5135
5136
5137
5138
5139
5140
5143
5145
5146
5147
5149
5151
5152
5153
FLIGHT
3/IR
3/IR
3/1R
3/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
1/1
2/IR
1/1
1/1
1/1
i/1
1/1
1/1
1/1
2/IR
1/1
1/1
1/1
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/IR
211R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
211R
211R
2/1R
2/IR
211R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
1/1
2/2
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POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM
AND GATE
AND GATE
TEST LOGIC
TEST LOGIC
CNTRLN/BLKHD LTH MTR
CNTRLN/BLKHD LTH MTR
CNTRLN/BLKHD LTH MTR
CNTRLN/BLKHD LTH MTR
CNTRLN/BLKHD LTH GNG
CNTRLN/BLKHD LTH GNG
CNTRLN/BLKHD LTH GNG
CNTRLN/BLKHD TRQ LMT
CNTRLN/BLKHD TRQ LMT
CNTRLN/BLKHD TRQ LMT
CNTRLN/BLKHD GRBX
CNTRLN/BLKHD GRBX
CNTRLN/BLKHD GRBX
CNTRLN/BLKHD CLS LMT
CNTRLN LTCH GNG TRQ
CNTRLN LTCH GNG TRQ
CNTRLN LTCH ASSY
CNTRLN LTCH ASSY
CNTRLN LTCH RLLR
PBD SHEAR FTTNG RLLR
PBD SHEAR FTTNG RLLR
PBD SHEAR FTTNG RLI_
PBD SHEAR FTTNG CLAW
PBD SHEAR FTTNG CLAW
PBD SHEAR FTTNG CLAW
BLKHD LATCH GANG
BLKHD LATCH GANG
BLKHD PSH-PLL RD
BLKHD PSH-PLL RD
BLKHD LTCH LNKG
BLKHD LTCH LNKG
BLKHD LTCH LNKG
BLKHD RLLR ASSY
BLKHD DR CLSD SWTCH
BLKHD RDY-TO-LTCH SW
PYLD BY DR DRV MTR
PYLD BY DR DRV CL
PYLD BY DR DRV BK
PYLD BY DR DRV CL
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRV
D-9
FAILURE MODE
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
FAILS SHORTED
FAILS OPEN
LOSS OF OUTPUT
FAILS TO ENGAGE
FAILS TO DISENGAGE
SLIPS
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
FAILS TO OPERATE
FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS OUT OF TOL
FAILS TO TRNSFR MTR
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
PARTIAL OUTPUT
PREMATURE OPERATION
BROKEN
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
BROKEN COMPONENT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
FAILS TO ENGAGE CLAW
BROKEN
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
FAILS TO ENGAGE ROLLER
BROKEN
BENT
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
BROKEN
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
BROKEN
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
BROKEN
FAILS TO LATCH
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
PREMATURE OPERATION
PREMATURE OPERATION
LOSS OF OUTPUT
FAILS TO ENGAGE
FAILS TO DISENGAGE
SLIPS
LOSS OF OUTPUT
PARTIAL OUTPUT
5154
5155
5156
5157
5158
5159
5160
5161
5163
5164
5165
5166
5167
5168
5174
5175
5176
5501
5502
5503
5504
5505
5506
5507
5511
5513
5514
5515
5516
5517
5519
7100
7101
7102
7103
7104
7106
7107
7108
7109
7110
7111
7112
7113
7114
8100
8101
8102
8103
8104
8105
8106
1/1
I/i
I/i
2/2
i/i
2/1R
I/I
i/I
i/I
I/I
I/I
I/i
2/1R
i/1
1/1
1/1
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
211R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
3/1R
1/1
3/1R
3/1R
311R
3/1R
3/XR
311R
3/2R
3/2R
3/2R
3/1R
3/1R
3/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRVS
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRVR
PYLD BY DR DRVR
PYLD BY DR DRVR
PYLD BY DR DRV
PYLD BY DR DRVR
PYLD BY DR DRV
_PA_YLOAD BAY ,DQOR
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR
CONTROL BUS i. 2K
CONTROL BUS 1.2K
CONTR6i BUS 1.2K
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR
FUSE,. IA
PAYLOAD SAY DO6_
MAIN DC BUS RELAY
SWITCH R_SISTOR
SWITCH RESISTOR
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR
PAYLOAD BAY DOOR
MCA AC POWER CRCT
MCA RELAY LOGIC PWR
REMOTE POWER CNTRLLR
PRESSURE PORT
PRESSURE PORT
O RING
O RING
VIEWPORT
ACTUATOR
ACTUATOR
ACTUATOR
ACTUATOR
ACTUATOR
ACTUATOR
O RING
0 RI-N_ _
VIEWPORT
ROD ASSEMBLY
BELLCRANK
BOLT/BRACKET/DBLR
INPUT/OUTPUT TRQ
INPUT/OUTPUT TRQ
DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR
DIFFERENTIAL/GEAR
D-10
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
FAILS TO OPERATE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
PARTIAL OUTPUT
BROKEN
SEIZED BEARING
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
BROKEN SUPPORT SHAFT
FAILS OUT OF TOL
TORQUE LIMITER FAILS
JAMMED ROTARY ACT
ROTARY ACTUATOR OUTPUT
BROKEN MOUNTING BRACKET
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
WARPED
DAMAGED PANEL
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
SHORTS
OPEN CIRCUIT
RESISTANCE HIGHER
FAILS TO SWITCH
OPEN
FAILS TO SWITCH
FAILS TO CLOSE
SHORTS
RESISTANCE HIGHER
FAILS TO CLOSE
FAILS TO OPEN
OPEN
FAILS OFF
FAILS OFF
CLOGGED
LEAKAGE
LEAKAGE
CRACKED
LEAKAGE
BROKEN GEAR
BROKEN SHAFT
JAMMED
BROKEN GEAR
BROKEN SHAFT
JAMMED
CRACKED
LEAi_AGE
LEAKAGE
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
FAILS TO START/STOP
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAM
FAILS TO REMAIN IN POS
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MDAC- ID
8107
8108
8501
85o2
8503
8504
8505
8506
8507
8508
8509
8510
8511
8512
8513
8514
8515
8516
8517
FLIGHT
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/iR
2/1R
2/1R
211R
2/IR
2/IR
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
2/1R
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POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
ITEM
MCRSWTCH PSTN IND
MCRSWTCH PSTN IND
ACTUATOR MOTOR
ACTUATOR SWTCH MDL
MCA AC POWER RELAY
MCA PURGE SGNL DRVR
MCA DC POWER BUS
MCA AC POWER BUS
MCA DIODE
MCA DIODE
ELECTRICAL CON
CABLES/WIRING
MOD/DEMOD
MOD/DEMOD
GPC SOFTWARE
FUSE
RESISTOR
RESISTOR
GPC SOFTWARE
FAILURE MODE
FAILS TO REMAIN OPEN
FAILS TO REMAIN CLOSED
PREMATURE OPERATION
OPEN
PARTIAL OUTPUT
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
OPEN
OPEN
OPEN
SHORTED
OPEN
OPEN
DELAYED OPERATION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
INADVERTENT OPERATION
OPEN
SHORTED
OPEN
DELAYED OPERATION
w
D-II
, =
i
i
i
i
i
if
i
a
a
m
=
i
i
|
i
ii,
